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There is a high degree of unanimity in both academic and political circles that a sound political climate 
as well as renewable energy technology intervention is needed to hinder market failures and to lead 
development in a more sustainable direction. However, the unanimity ends when discussion about the 
more precise targets and instruments begins. The primary objective of this thesis was to find and 
compare valuable current research about policy instruments for climate policy and renewable energy 
generation, as well as to screen the important question-marks in the scope, and open them up for 
debate. The literature review was made predominantly with the help of article collections and research 
tools. The focus was research from the years 2003 -2008. The paper provides an understanding of the 
policy backgrounds, exposes reasons behind policy choices, presents the challenging issues around the 
economics of climate change, proposes a selection of policy instruments, and shares with the reader a 
wide criteria-base for judging existing and future policies. 
Some key findings could be made on the basis of the literature survey. When selecting policy 
instruments, the principle of “one policy, one main target” should be emphasised. Regarding 
international climate policy instruments, there is evidence that at least serious thought, debate and 
research should be given to other than current Kyoto policy instruments. In the case of renewable 
energy generation policy instruments, after the wise criteria weights are decided, whichever instrument 
or mix of instruments gives the smallest cost for consumers under these criteria should be selected. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that if electricity markets are further integrated in Europe, harmonised 
policy instruments should again be given greater emphasis. The literature also highlights that an 
integrated technology-focused approach should be further studied. However, whichever instrument is 
chosen, the success of the instrument is highly attributable to how well it is implemented. 
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1 Introduction 
There is an increasing scientific consensus that rising concentrations of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), which originate from the burning of fossil 
fuels, are gradually warming the Earth’s climate. The degree of damage associated with 
this warming remains uncertain, but there is a risk that it could be large, irreversible, 
and possibly catastrophic. The major greenhouse gas CO2 is a global pollutant; a ton of 
emissions from any point on the globe would have the same effect on the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 and would thereby result in the same amount of possible damage 
(Congressional Budget Office 2008, Nordhaus 2008, Stern 2007, Sterner 2003).  Hence 
we need international climate policy.  
Policy instruments for climate policy and renewable energy generation are closely 
interconnected. Together, they are both seen as important from the environmental 
viewpoint and might have a strong effect on economic and social wellbeing. Equally, 
depending on their design, they may either boost or lower each other’s functionality. 
Nevertheless, the usage of these policy instruments should not be seen as substituting 
one for the other, as they work towards different goals. Hence they should rather be seen 
as complementary.   
In this respect, renewable energy generation incentives are accentuated, because the 
utilisation of renewable energy generation is seen to have advantages relative to 
conventional methods. Energy security is currently emphasised heavily and GHG 
emissions reduction has gained more and more focus. Furthermore, the exploitation of 
local and decentralized energy sources and stimulation of innovative industries are in 
the spotlight.  
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Above all, the new renewable energy generation methods have not achieved a level 
where they are profitable in the open electricity market. Hence credible positive 
transition to their use would need to be supported with different policy instruments. This 
support can be justified because technological development has the phenomenal 
characteristics of a positive externality and it might bear remarkable fruit in the long-
run. 
Strategies to enhance climate policy and renewable energy generation are at this 
moment key issues in the field of energy policy and have attracted much attention in the 
media. Finnish goals in energy policy and those of other European Union (EU) member 
countries are strongly guided by adjustment to EU-level decisions, which have proved 
to be challenging, and the realisation of which may require actions entailing significant 
costs. When the costs of required actions as well as non-action might become high, it is 
crucial that they are estimated, implemented, evaluated, improved, and monitored 
prudently. Bad implementation, myopia, and stubbornness might diminish the good 
behind any actions taken and cause among other things carbon leakage, local 
unemployment, inferior technology lock-in, and diminished enthusiasm for more 
efficient approaches. 
There is a broad range of international research concerning policy instruments for 
climate policy and renewable energy generation. Many of the research studies that have 
been found to be important also contain significant inconsistencies one with another. It 
is thus evident that essential questions still remain unresolved. The goal of this thesis is 
to find and compare the valuable research on the scope of policy instruments for climate 
policy and renewable energy generation, and to highlight the essential questions and 
inconsistencies that emerge from the literature review.  
1.1  Problem Formulation 
The purpose of this thesis is to increase the understanding of theoretical as well as 
empirical effects, functionality, and interaction of policy instruments for climate policy 
and renewable energy generation respectively. The main research problems addressed 
by this thesis are thus formulated as follows: what kind of research has been made 
concerning the effects, functionality, and interaction of policy instruments for climate 
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policy and renewable energy generation, and what are the present essential questions 
and proposed answers arising from the broad field of reference at our disposal?         
The main research problem is approached through the following sub-problems: 
• Why do we need policy instruments for climate policy and renewable energy 
generation?   
• What kind of academic debate is going on regarding the economics of climate 
change?  
• According to existing research, what are the most suitable suggestions for 
international climate policy instruments? 
• According to existing research, what are the most suitable suggestions for renewable 
energy (power) generation incentives? 
• What are the suitable criteria for judging policy instruments for climate policies and 
renewable energy generation, and how widely have they been used in the 
international research? 
1.2  Objectives of the Thesis 
Firstly, this thesis seeks to find and compare the valuable research about policy 
instruments for climate policy and renewable energy generation. The second objective is 
to highlight essential questions that emerge from the scope of the research presented 
below, and to compare the academic research carried out about the questions. Last but 
not least, the paper seeks to find important issues that may need further examination 
inside the terms of reference of the study.   In order to reach these objectives, the history 
and the reasons for the policies are presented as a background. Relevant instruments are 
described and the broad output of academic research is presented. This should give the 
reader a good understanding of the current basis of climate policy, why renewable 
energy and climate policies are implemented, and what are the pros and cons of present 
policy instruments that the academic research has highlighted. In addition, the reader 
should gain an understanding of how climate policies and renewable energy incentives 
are connected and interact, how climate policies and renewable energy incentives have 
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been investigated before, and what kind of questions are being discussed in the field at 
the present. 
1.3  Scope of the Thesis 
The scope of this thesis is limited to climate policy issues within the international and 
EU-wide climate policies, leaving out national solutions. Furthermore, only 
international or EU-wide emission trade, carbon tax, and hybrid policy instruments are 
emphasised.  
Renewable energy generation policy instruments are first and foremost studied in the 
EU context, although examples and references are also taken from other continents. 
Renewable power generation issues and questions are strongly emphasised. Even 
though quite a few viewpoints can be generalized to concern energy generation as a 
whole, it should be remembered that power generation and energy generation (heat 
included) are not synonyms. Furthermore, the policy debate is highly narrowed to 
concern debate between feed-in tariff and green certificate issues.   
In this research, incentives are in the first place examined from the climate policy and 
renewable energy generation viewpoints. Results might also hold relevance with the 
energy generation’s reliability and quality, which are taken into consideration but are not 
stressed. 
1.4  Definitions and Abbreviations 
This thesis employs several important terms and definitions. In the international 
literature on the subject, terms and definitions vary substantially. The policy instruments 
have different names in different countries, even though the basic functioning might be 
similar. To be able to understand them correctly and not get lost with different 
definitions, it is important to know the starting points. To minimise the possibility of 
getting mixed up, a selection of terms and definitions are used in this thesis. The most 
important terms and definitions are presented below in alphabetical order. Furthermore, 
abbreviations of the commonly used terms are presented on page VIII.  
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Climate Change: This thesis follows the definition of climate change of the United 
Nations (United Nations 1992) and defines it as “a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods”. 
Discounting: Basic formula (1/(1+i)^n). Discounting involves two related and often 
confused concepts. One is the idea of a discount rate on goods, which is a positive 
concept that measures a relative price of goods at different points of time. This is also 
called the real return on capital, the real interest rate, the opportunity cost of capital, and 
the real return. The real return measures the yield on investments corrected by the 
change in the overall price level. The second important discount concept involves the 
relative weight of the economic welfare of different households or generations over 
time. This is sometimes called the pure rate of social time preference. It is calculated in 
percent per unit time, like an interest rate, but refers to the discount in future welfare, 
not in future goods or dollars. A zero time discount rate means that future generations 
into the indefinite future are treated symmetrically with present generations; a positive 
time discount rate means that the welfare of future generations is reduced or 
“discounted” relative to nearer generations (Nordhaus 2007a).     
Emissions: In this thesis, emissions are defined as “the release of greenhouse gases 
and/or their precursors into the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time” 
(United Nations 1992). Emissions therefore only include those of greenhouse gases 
(GHG), and exclude e.g. waste and solid emissions.  
Emission Trading Scheme: Common name for different market mechanisms, which 
are trading emission permits or allowances. The idea of emission trade is to execute the 
emission abatement actions where it is most cost-efficient. (Huutoniemi, Estlander et al. 
2006)  
Externality: “A cost or benefit that arises from production of a good or service and 
falls on someone other than the producers, or a cost or benefit that arises from 
consumption of a good or service and falls on someone other than the consumer” 
(Parkin, Powell et al. 2005).  
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Policy: A plan or course of action, as of a government, political party, or business, 
intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters (Pickett, et al. 
2000). Furthermore, policy is defined to be the common principles by which a 
government is guided in its administration of public affairs (Thomson, Lehman 2005). 
Scarcity rent: The rent that accrues to the owner of a natural resource just because it is 
scarce. Thus, with increasing scarcity of the natural resource or similarly other good, the 
value of that good must accrue at the same rate as for other financial instruments, or else 
the owner would not keep the good but sell, hence lowering the price (Sterner 2003, 
Hotelling 1931). 
1.5  Research Methodology 
The research methods used in this thesis are literature review and my own evaluation. 
Literature review was predominantly made with the help of ScienceDirect articles 
collection, Helsinki University of Technology Library’s Nelli information research 
portal, the ISI web of science reference research tool, and Google Scholar literature 
research tool.   Literature was collected before October 2008, though a few new articles 
were added to the list afterwards. The focus of the literature survey in on research made 
between the years 2003 -2008. The reason was not to underestimate any earlier  
research work, but to narrow the amount of data and to get a good focus on what kind of 
issues are under the closest examination right now.    
First the articles were chosen according to keywords, which included: climate policy, 
renewable energy policy, feed-in tariff, green certificate, carbon tax, emission trade, and 
economic incentives or policy instruments towards both climate policy and renewable 
energy. 
Secondly, the discovered journals, books, and reports were analysed against the frame 
of reference that was initially as broad as present international climate policy instrument 
options and renewable energy generation policy options. From this wide array of data, 
presently relevant questions were sought out and as a result, the compared Chapter 7 
issues where selected. These issues were chosen using the criteria of “volume of 
research” and “future potential”, meaning which issues were in the centre of the debate 
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and which issues might have future importance in the debate. Thereafter the scope was 
narrowed accordingly.  
1.6  Structure 
The content of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 presents the objectives and scope of 
the thesis as well as the methodology followed for data gathering and analysis. In 
Chapter 2 a background to climate policies and energy generation incentives is 
presented. Also a quick review of the status quo and upcoming expectations (primarily 
from the Finnish point of view) are presented. 
Chapter 3 gives an introduction to the need of policy instruments for climate policy and 
renewable energy generation, and Chapter 4 introduces the international academic 
debate on climate change economics. The policy instruments for climate change and 
renewable energy generation were gathered to Chapter 5, after which the important 
criteria for the evaluation of the research are presented in Chapter 6.  The relevant 
research concerning the issues found was grouped in Chapter 7. The issues were then 
analysed against the criteria and different academic studies were compared. Chapter 8 
concludes and summarises the work done and gives recommendations about future 
work in progress.  
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2 Background Information 
This chapter describes how international climate policies and energy generation policies 
have been evolving historically, especially from the European perspective. It would be 
hard to understand the present if we were not to scrutinise what has happened in the 
past. When choosing policy instruments, as well as in other aspects of life, such things 
as history, traditions, culture, habits, and expectations enter into the selection process 
(Sterner 2003). How a country or international community started its policymaking 
might impact powerfully on its decision making today. This is sometimes called path 
dependency (Toke, Lauber 2007). Amending policies and legislation are huge processes. 
Hence even when new knowledge is available speaking on behalf of changing course, it 
might be hard to move fast enough. Change takes time.  
2.1  Short history of international climate policy 
Before any problem can be resolved, we must first know what the problem is and learn 
how to understand and deal with it.  As we can see from Figure 1, scientists understood 
the phenomena behind climate change before the end of the 19th century (Huutoniemi, 
Estlander et al. 2006).  In fact, Arrhenius, as presented in the table below, was not even 
the first to define the phenomenon. A French scientist called Joseph Fourier introduced 
the concept already in 1824 (Pirilä 2000). From that point on it took a long time to 
launch international cooperation to mitigate climate change. Climate change debate 
started at the end of the 1950s and from the year 1970 onwards the issue was 
highlighted in many international scientific and political conventions (Huutoniemi, 
Estlander et al. 2006).  
  
 
Figure 1: Climate Policy Milestones.1
After 1988 things started to happen slightly faster. In 1988 the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which produces 
regular scientific and technical assessments on climate change (Huutoniemi, Estlander 
et al. 2006).  
At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, agreement was reached on the Framework Convention on Climate 
                                                 
1 Figure strongly imitates one presented in (Huutoniemi, Estlander et al. 2006).  
9 
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Change (FCCC) that established as its ultimate objective the “stabilization of 
greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate system”. As a temporary step, the 
FCCC imposed a non-binding goal which advocated reducing of greenhouse gas 
emissions by Annex I2 counties to their 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Aldy, Barrett et 
al. 2003). The Convention has received nearly universal membership, with 192 
countries having ratified it thus far (UNFCCC 2008a).  
The FCCC was further strengthened in the third Conference of Parties (COP3) in Kyoto, 
Japan in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. The Kyoto Protocol entered into 
force on 16 February 2005, after the Russian Federation ratified it in late 2004. 183 
Parties to the Convention have ratified its Protocol to date. (UNFCCC 2008a)  
As we can see from Figure 1, Finnish national climate policy and research has partly 
followed international developments. The Finnish Research Programme on Climate 
Change (SILMU) opened connections to international research cooperation and created 
a foundation for future research programmes (Huutoniemi, Estlander et al. 2006). After 
the Carbon Dioxide Committee’s3 reports I&II, Finnish climate policy has been strongly 
connected with energy policy and vice versa, especially during the first years of the 21st 
century.  One noticeable milestone for Finns was that Finland enacted a carbon tax in 
1990, the first country to do so. A further characteristic feature of the current decade has 
been that Finland has followed the climate policy goals and main lines devised in the 
European Commission (EC).     
In 2000 the European Commission (EC) established an initiative known as the European 
Climate Change Programme, whose key goal was to ensure that the EU meets its Kyoto 
                                                 
2 These include the developed nations plus economies in transition; precise list of the Annex I countries in 
Appendix 1. 
3 The Carbon Dioxide Committee 1 was established by the Ministry of the Environment (from 1990 to 
1991), to examine possibilities and guidelines for mitigating future Finnish greenhouse gas emissions. 
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target (European Commission 2008). In October 2003 the European Union Emission 
Trading Directive was established.  
At present the main focus is directed to debate on what will happen after 2012, post 
Kyoto. During the United Nations Climate Conference (UNCCC) COP 13 in Bali in 
December of 2007 a unanimous decision was reached that launched negotiations on 
strengthened international action on climate change after Kyoto. Negotiations should be 
set to conclude in December 2009 in the fifteenth COP, to be held in Copenhagen 
(UNFCCC 2008a, Valtioneuvosto 2008).   
2.1.1  The Kyoto Protocol 
The main feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 
industrialized countries and the European Union (Annex B countries4) for reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Reductions amount to an average of five per cent 
against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012. The detailed rules for the 
implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, and are 
called the “Marrakesh Accords.” Under the Treaty, countries must meet their targets 
primarily through national measures (UNFCCC 2008a). 
However, the Kyoto Protocol offers them an additional means of meeting their targets 
by way of three market-based flexibility mechanisms. These are emission trading, joint 
implementation (JI), and the clean development mechanism (CDM). The emission 
trading mechanism allows Annex B countries to trade part of their target emissions with 
one another. Joint implementation allows Annex B countries to cooperate on projects 
and transfer emission allowances on the basis of such projects. Furthermore, the CDM 
allows Annex B countries to finance projects in non-Annex B countries in exchange for 
credits towards meeting their own emission reduction targets (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). 
                                                 
4 Annex B countries and their emission targets are listed in Appendix 2.  
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2.2  Energy Generation Policy in Europe 
The orientation of official energy polices, and the balance of other policies affecting 
energy policy, has shifted over the decades. For much of the post-war period, there was 
an emphasis on fostering national energy resources and managing the transition to a 
more diverse energy balance, based on the concern for energy security (McGowan 
1996). The energy crisis of the 1970s and the emergent realisation of the global scarcity 
of environmental resources, especially oil, boosted great concern in many western 
countries about their energy supply structure. President Jimmy Carter gave a speech in 
April 1977 where he said: “With the exception of preventing war, this (the energy crisis) 
is the greatest challenge our country will face during our life time.”  Energy crisis was 
the big spark that spurred research into technologies for saving energy and for 
alternative methods of producing energy. In many countries it also boosted the 
systematic national subsidising of these technologies in the name of energy security. For 
example in 1974 the European Council adopted a programme that prioritised getting 
energy from as many different sources as possible (CIVITAS 2008). In Denmark it 
triggered the well-known wind energy development, and boosted nuclear power 
implementation in many European countries as well. 
More recently, the emphasis in general energy policy discussion, especially in the 
media, has shifted from energy security and the strategic importance of energy to 
environmental concerns and climate policy (McGowan 1996). In reality, the decision- 
making is still heavily focused on the national energy security agenda. Nevertheless, on 
paper, the three cornerstones that appear in almost every EU or national report 
concerning energy are sustainability, security, and competitiveness (Valtioneuvosto 
2008, Commission of the European Communities 2008). How to balance these three is 
an extremely great challenge.   
2.2.1  Case Finland  
For Finns, in the field of energy generation the most important policy instrument has 
been energy taxation. Finland enacted a carbon tax in 1990, and was the first country to 
do so. While originally based only on the carbon content of fuels, it was changed to a 
combination of carbon and energy tax in 1997. This weakened the position of those 
electricity generation methods that had been untaxed before 1997. These generation 
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forms were then subsidised. Beyond 1997 the general structure has remained unchanged 
(Ministry of the Environment 2008).5
In addition to the tax policy instruments, the Finnish Government has also used 
investment and clearance grant instruments. These grants are distributed to companies, 
corporations, and municipalities to help them with project investments and surveys that 
have furthered energy conservation, made energy production and usage more efficient, 
promoted the production and use of renewable energy, and helped to secure and 
diversify the energy supply (Hiltunen 2004). 
As with climate policy, Finnish 21st century energy policy has often followed the lines 
decided in the European Commission (EC). In Finland, the national climate strategy was 
adopted in 2001. For the following few years the climate and energy policy was based 
on that strategy. However, during 2003 the operating environment changed quite 
drastically and the Government decided to renew the strategy so that it takes into 
account the contents of the EU emission trading directive and the Kyoto mechanism 
(Valtioneuvosto 2005). Hence in 2005 the new climate and energy strategy was 
implemented.  
Since the 2005 report, the international and EU climate and energy policy objectives 
and obligations changed once again to such an extent that, in 2007, a policy position 
was set down in the Government Programme of Prime Minister Vanhanen's second 
Cabinet. The long-term Climate and Energy Strategy - Government Report to 
Parliament was delivered on 6 November 2008. The main objectives of the strategy 
were similar to those of the EU: environmental sustainability, security of supply, 
competitiveness of energy supply (Valtioneuvosto 2008). 
                                                 
5 Appendix 3 presents Finnish energy tax rates. 
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2.2.2  EU Directives and Propositions for Directives 
Finnish climate and energy strategy and targets are strongly directed by the European 
Union and its objectives. Tables 1 and 2 describe those directives and proposals for 
directives that are in place in the fields of greenhouse gas and renewable energy 
sources.6  
Table 1: Greenhouse Gas Directives and Proposal for Directives (November 2008) 
Directive/Proposal 
Code: 
Content: 
Directive 2003/87/EC Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community. (Emission Trading Scheme Directive) 
Directive 2004/101/EC Directive for establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project 
mechanisms. (Link Directive) 
Decision 280/2004/EC Decision concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas 
emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. 
Commission Proposal 
COM(2008) 16 
Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and 
extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the 
Community. 
Commission Proposal 
COM(2008) 17  
Proposal for a Decision on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission 
reduction commitments up to 2020 
Commission Proposal 
COM(2008) 18 
Proposal for a Directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and 
amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, 
(CCS-directive) 
Table 2: Renewable Energy Source Directives and Proposals (November 2008) 
Directive/Proposal 
Code: 
Content: 
Directive 2001/77/EC Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the promotion of 
the electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the international 
electricity market (RES-E Directive) 
Directive 2003/30/EC Directive on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels 
for transport 
Commission Proposal 
COM(2008) 19  
Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources, (RES-Directive) 
                                                 
6 The above proposals for directives were approved with changes in the European Parliament’s plenary 
session of 17 December 2008. Modifications are under construction and some decisions are postponed 
until 1 January 2013. Important decisions concerning force majeure will be decided later by the European 
Commission. Force majeure means a possibility to revaluate the achieving of the targets later on, if 
insuperability obstacles occur (Commission of the European Communities 2008, Elinkeinoelämän 
Keskusliitto 2009a ). 
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Directives are allocating the direction for associated member states and at the same time 
tightening up the free space in which EU members can navigate with their own policy 
instruments.  Under the heaviest political debate right now are the new proposals for 
directives that the Commission released in January 2008 on both greenhouse gas 
emission reductions and renewable energy promotion.  
Essential objectives that concern the EU’s energy and climate strategy are: 
• An overall bidding target of a 20% share of renewable energy sources in energy 
consumption by 2020 in the EU (this was 8.5% in 2005). This target burden would 
be divided between member states so that for example the Finnish share of 
renewables would be 38% by 2020 (it was 28.5% in 2005) (Valtioneuvosto 2008).     
• A 10% binding minimum target for biofuels in transport to be achieved by every 
member state (Valtioneuvosto 2008). The share of biofuels in EU member states in 
2005 was about 1% (Commission of the European Communities 2006). 
• At the same time, to enhance energy efficiency by 20% compared with the baseline 
by the year 2020. This target is not binding, but directive (Valtioneuvosto 2008). 
• The EU makes a firm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 relative to 1990. The objective would rise to 30% 
if a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012 is reached. The 
other developed countries should commit themselves to comparable emission 
reductions and the economically more advanced developing countries should 
commit themselves to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and 
capabilities (Valtioneuvosto 2008). 
These objectives are easy to spot in the Finnish Long-term Climate and Energy Strategy 
of 6 November 2008. The strategy clearly proves that the objectives proposed by the 
European Commission for Finland regarding the reduction of emissions, promotion of 
renewable energy, or enhancing the efficiency of energy consumption cannot be attained 
without new, significant climate and energy policy measures (Valtioneuvosto 2008). The 
more precise objectives for these policies were:   
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• Cutting the emissions according to what is necessary in future EU and international 
conventions. That is, at this moment, according to the Commission’s proposal 
Finland should - by means of national measures - cut emissions by an average of 16 
per cent from the 2005 level, by 2020 (Valtioneuvosto 2008). 
Without new energy policy measures (the baseline) this would be 90 million equivalent 
carbon dioxide tonnes in 2020. In 2005 it was 69 million equivalent carbon dioxide 
tonnes (Tilastokeskus 2008).  This huge gap and challenge would need the above- and 
below-mentioned strategies. It is also highlighted that 2005 is a “bad” benchmark year 
for Finns because we had a mild winter, a good year for rainfall, and furthermore a 
lengthy paper industry strike that shut down the paper mills for several months7.  
• Aggregate energy consumption 310 tetra watt hours (TWh) and electricity 
consumption 98 TWh in 2020 (Valtioneuvosto 2008). 
The baseline aggregate consumption of energy would be 350 TWh in 2020 
(Valtioneuvosto 2008). Year 2007, Finnish aggregate energy consumption was about 
411 TWh and electricity consumption was 90.4 TWh (Tilastokeskus 2009).   In order to 
attain the objectives set, the efficiency of energy consumption must be enhanced, 
particularly in housing, construction, and transport (Valtioneuvosto 2008). 
• To offer sufficient, moderately priced electricity sourcing that supports climate 
objectives (Valtioneuvosto 2008).  
In future, electricity sourcing should continue to be based on a diverse system. The 
emphasis will be placed on plants that do not emit greenhouse gases, or ones with low 
emissions, such as combined power and heat plants using renewable fuels, and 
financially profitable and environmentally acceptable water and wind power plants. A 
decision-in-principle as per the Nuclear Energy Act on the additional construction of 
                                                 
7 This was amended to be calculated from the average emissions in years 2005, 2006 and 2007, and thus 
Finland received 20% more CO2 allowances compared with the above case (Elinkeinoelämän 
Keskusliitto 2009b). 
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nuclear energy generation could be necessary in the next few years (Valtioneuvosto 
2008). 
• To increase the share of renewable energy to 38 per cent by 2020. 
The baseline would be 31% in 2020. In order to stimulate a shift to renewable energy 
usage, the current support and steering systems will be intensified and structures 
changed. Indeed, meeting the obligation would require an intense increase in the use of 
wood-based energy, waste fuels, heat pumps, biogas, and wind energy.  As a new 
method for promoting renewable energy, a cost-effective feed-in tariff system, operating 
on market terms as far as possible, will be introduced (Valtioneuvosto 2008). The feed-
in tariff (FIT) system has been quite popular in other EU member states, and the next 
sub-chapter will introduce the frequency of FIT and other systems inside the EU.   
2.3  Present Renewable Energy Generation Policies in Europe and US 
In the field of energy, the practical policy implementation remains mainly a national 
task, while the broader frames or boundary conditions of energy policy are increasingly 
elaborated internationally. For example in the case of Europe by the European Union, 
within the western industrialised countries by the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
globally by the World Trade Organisation or the UN, or through the supply and demand 
conditions in energy trade by producers’ networks, among others the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or the Nord Pool electricity exchange (Lund 
2007).   
The same mantra applies with policy instruments for renewable energy generation. Even 
though there has been discussion of harmonisation of renewable policy instruments 
inside Europe, the practical policy implementation has still remained a national cause. 
Related to this, the instrument assortment is quite wide, as we will observe in Chapter 5. 
In spite of the wide selection, the main discussion at present focuses on the comparison 
of two instrument systems. These are feed-in tariffs (FIT) and the quota regulation in 
combination with a tradable green certificate (TGC) market. As we can see from Figures 
  
2 and 38 these are the dominant policy instruments for renewable electricity generation 
in Europe.  
 
Figure 2: Renewable Electricity Policies in EU Member States as of February 2007 
(Rickerson, Sawin et al. 2007) 
 
Figure 3: Overview of Primary Renewable Electricity Policies in EU Member States9  
                                                 
8 There are a few differences between Figure 2 and 3 because of the timing (for example Latvia).   
9 Based on (Reece 2008) and (Morthorst, Jensen 2007). 
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As Figure 3 indicates, other policy schemes such as bidding processes are still used, 
though no longer as a dominant policy scheme in any EU country. Finland and Malta 
are the only countries that employ tax incentives and investment grants as a primary 
scheme.  
In the United States the primary policy instrument is renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS), as displayed in Figure 4, which shows the utilization and the goals of the 
scheme. This is the United States version of the tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme 
used in Europe. As we can see, the goals and structures between different states are 
variable. This is also the case with the climate policy. Even though the United States 
Government has rejected mandatory targets for curbing emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol, many of the states, cities, and regional partnerships have taken the initiative 
and set their own programmes and targets to cut greenhouse gases (GHG) (Byrne, 
Hughes et al. 2007). 
 
Figure 4: United States State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) Utilisation Map 
(North Carolina State University 2008)  
When we diversify the examination of the use of different policy instruments we find 
that with these primary policy instruments a wide range of policies are used as 
supplementary as well as in the form of a portfolio approach, both in Europe and in the 
19 
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United States. This is nicely demonstrated in Table 15, located in Appendix 4.  Table 15 
summarises all the different rules, regulations, and policies used in different states, 
cities, and utilities in the United States to promote renewable energy. Support options 
vary from public benefit funds (PBFs) to construction and design. There is a noticeable 
difference between different states as to which kind of instruments are used and how 
much. The situation is the same in Europe and around the world10. Several different 
primary and supplementary instruments are used.  
                                                 
10 For a good summary of renewable energy promotion policy implementation around the world, see 
(REN21 2007).    
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3 The Need for Sound Policy Instruments 
This chapter will attempt to answer a number of questions. Why is it that social, 
economic, and ecological factors do not find the balance on their own? Following from 
this, why should we balance economic priorities with environmental dangers? And why 
is it that Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” will not take care of the balance between the 
economy and the environment, nor does it? The focus here is on the need for climate 
policies and renewable energy generation policies especially from the electricity 
generation viewpoint.  
The energy crisis of the 1970s and the emergent realisation of the scarcity of 
environmental resources caused great concern in many western countries about their 
energy supply and as to how economic growth could be kept up. Later on, the 
emergence of the climate change phenomenon has given rise to great alarm, because we 
seem to be gradually warming the Earth’s atmosphere. Even though the degree of 
damage associated with warming remains uncertain, there is a risk that it could be large, 
irreversible, and possibly even catastrophic (Congressional Budget Office 2008) (IPCC 
2007a).  Hence it is understandable that when human actions might cause catastrophic 
and irreversible damage and or change the direction of development, common principles 
and actions might be needed.  
3.1  The Big Picture 
Nonetheless, these two great concerns are just a part of the bigger picture. The 
population and economic growth of humankind has reached such a volume that its 
impacts on ecology are evident all over the world. Besides population and economic 
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growth, another major determinant of the human impact on the ecosystem is our choice 
of technology11 (Sterner 2003). 
At one extreme, some researchers stress that economic development and growth have 
already surpassed the sustainable level of activity on earth (Meadows, Meadows et al. 
1972). At the other extreme, some researchers trust that demand caused by increased 
population and per capita income can be nourished with technical progress (Kahn, 
Brown et al. 1976). Either way, this growth has already led to scarcity of some 
ecological goods that are needed for the mere existence of their property rights and 
market values12(Sterner 2003).  The problem is that these market values do not always 
follow the real value of the environmental good and that the valid rights do not equally 
take into account either human or environmental rights. 
Furthermore, technological development intended to enhance the condition of the 
human race does not always work in the best possible way and it might have unintended 
and unpredicted negative ecological, economic, and social consequences. In the 1960s, 
Rachel Carson’s book “Silent Spring” (1962) sparked discussion on the downside of 
technology that was intended to better human life. This also had a powerful impact in 
waking up the general public to an understanding that the activities of man are also 
affecting our natural environment profoundly - and probably even irreversibly. 
Because humankind has had a strong impact on nature and vice versa, it has become 
more and more evident that to be able to maximise our “total” wellbeing, especially in 
the long run, we have to nourish economic and social wellbeing as well as our 
environment’s ecological wellbeing.  
                                                 
11 This concept is handily summarized by the I=PAT equation, whereby human impact on ecosystem is 
determined by population, affluence, and technology (Ehrlich, Holdren 1971).   
12 Market values are caused by the scarcity. See scarcity rent in definitions and abbreviations, Chapter 1.4.   
For more about economic treatment of  scarcity and allocation of scarce resources over time, see (Sterner 
2003, Hotelling 1931).  
  
 
Figure 5: Different Priorities of Society; Economy, Social, Ecological Interaction with 
Politics13   
This balance is well described by Figure 5.  The reason why politics and policy 
instruments are added to the figure is that sometimes these three other factors will not 
find the optimal balance to maximise the “total” wellbeing on their own. In such a case 
political intervention might be needed to balance the situation. 
This balance between economic, ecological, and social wellbeing and the possible need 
for intervention is especially necessary in sustainable development. This idea is neatly 
summarised by the World Commission on Environment and Development report, also 
known as the Brundtland Report, which states: "Sustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987) .  
3.2  The Optimal Starting Point 
Economists regularly assume that wellbeing of an individual (i) can be described as a 
utility (U) function that depends on income, environment, leisure, consumption, and 
                                                 
13 Figure imitates the one presented in (Pirilä 2000). 
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other factors. Analogously it is often assumed that social welfare (W) consists of all 
these individual utilities, and forms the welfare function: 
 W(U1,…Ui,…Un)       (1)  
The shape of these functions is typically unknown, and to be able to maximise welfare 
several value judgements are needed. Some people might prefer an egalitarian society, 
while others a more egoistic one. Some might emphasise that the welfare of future 
generations should be included and stressed as well as distributional viewpoints and 
concerns about long-term sustainability. Even though there is conflict between different 
values, welfare maximisation is still a general goal for most purposes (Sterner 2003). 
Hence finding the maximum that would qualify for everyone in the short and the long 
run is an optimal goal to reach. 
3.2.1  Perfect Market          
The key lesson of economics is that the market mechanism is efficient at allocating 
resources. There are two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The first states 
that any competitive equilibrium leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Models 
point out that under perfect conditions, a market will automatically achieve a Pareto 
optimal14 outcome (Sterner 2003). This theorem is often taken to be an analytical 
verification of Adam Smith’s "invisible hand" hypothesis. The theorem strongly 
supports a case for non-intervention in ideal circumstances; in other words, let the 
markets do the work and the outcome will be desirable without any control of policy 
instruments and suchlike. 
This view is also adapted in environmental Kutznets curves (EKCs) that are often 
associated with economy and its development over time. The idea behind this curve is 
that with economic growth, emissions typically follow the inverted “U” curve as 
                                                 
14 “Pareto optimality is an efficiency concept that implies that the economic situation of one individual 
can be improved only if the economic situation of another individual is worsened” (Sterner 2003). For a 
more in-depth overview see (Musgrave 1959).    
  
illustrated in Figure 6.  The usual rationale behind this curve is that in the early phases 
of economic growth there will be inevitable growth in emissions, but as income 
increases, emissions peak and then decline. Thus, a strict belief in EKCs would lead us 
to accept as true that emission increases were unavoidable in the short run and the 
damage would automatically be reversed later  (Sterner 2003).       
 
Figure 6: A hypothetical Environmental Kuznets Curve.15
Thus, it is suggested that increase of emissions and destruction of natural resources do 
not matter, because the damage would be automatically reversed. See for example 
research by (Schmalensee, Stoker et al. 1998) for more insight on emissions following 
this path.  
However, this kind of view might be dangerous, because experience shows that 
“replacing” natural resources and “repairing“ ecosystems is much more expensive than 
disaster prevention, and in certain cases the damage from emissions might be 
irreversible. It should also be noticed that in the case of greenhouse gas emissions, when 
some societies become richer they might want to improve their own environment, but 
they can only do a little for international climate change by reducing their own 
emissions. Other societies, especially those near the left-hand end of the income axis, 
still have little they can do in any respect (Sterner 2003, Stern 2007).  
                                                 
15 Based on figures in (Stern 2007) and (Sterner 2003). 
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The second theorem of welfare economics states that any efficient allocation can be 
sustainable by a competitive equilibrium. Hence it implies that in the case that the state 
arranges the appropriate conditions, any outcome can be decentralized. In other words, 
it can be achieved by the market agents by themselves. It stands for the re-allocation of 
money by taking it from some individuals and giving it to others, though otherwise 
leaving the economy intact (Sterner 2003).  These kinds of redistributions are in our 
special interest when investigating policy instruments. Instruments like taxes and 
subsidies distort the market and influence people’s behaviour, and thus do not always 
work in practice, but in some cases they can redistribute and decentralise wealth as well 
as wellbeing (Sterner 2003).  
3.3  Market Failure 
Theory and reality do not always meet. A textbook example, which needs a “perfect 
market” to be functional, meets in reality an imperfect world. Figure 7 summarizes 
some factors that are needed to make our welfare theorems work. Even with a casual 
look we realize that those requirements do not hold in the real world. In the real world 
we therefore encounter several market failures.   
 
  
 
Figure 7: Perfect Market Requirements 
Market failure is a technical term that roughly refers to situations under which the free 
market does not produce optimal welfare. It is thereby a failure compared with the 
abstract model economists create of a perfect market economy. Such failures include 
externalities, public goods, poorly defined or defended rights, common pool resources, 
non-competitive markets, asymmetric information, policy failures, and institutional 
failures (Sterner 2003). 
Externalities are non-market side effects of production or consumption. An external cost 
is a cost borne not by the producer but by other people. For example, when an electricity 
power company burns coal to generate electricity, the action causes air pollution and 
imposes a real cost for the economy through among other things pulmonary diseases 
and acid rain. The company does not consider the cost of pollution when it decides on 
the quantity of electric power it has to supply. If externalities are not internalized, 
supply is based on production cost only, not on the cost that it inflicts on others.  As a 
result an agent produces more power than is the efficient quantity (Parkin, Powell et al. 
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2005). Even though most external effects are quite hard to calculate, Table 3 below 
describes an estimation of negative external costs that are caused by electricity 
production in the EU member states. It is these costs that markets do not efficiently add 
to electricity prices.  These estimated values are very high, as can be seen for example 
in the case of Belgian coal and lignite power production, where the external costs may 
be as great as 15 € cents (EUR 0.15). In comparison, the average industry electricity 
prices in Europe are 9.59 € cent per kWh (Goerten, Clement 2008). 
 
Table 3: External Costs for Electricity Production in the EU (In € cent per kWh16)17
Country 
Coal & 
lignite Peat Oil Gas Nuclear Biomass Hydro PV Wind 
Austria    1−3  2−3 0.1   
Belgium 4−15   1−2 0.5     
Germany 3−6  5−8 1−2 0.2 3  0.6 0.05 
Denmark 4−7   2−3  1   0.1 
Spain 5−8   1−2  3−5      18   0.2 
Finland 2−4 2−5    1    
France 7−10  8−11 2−4 0.3 1 1   
Greece 5−8  3−5 1  0−0.8 1  0.25 
Ireland 6−8 3−4        
Italy   3−6 2−3   0.3   
Netherlands 3−4   1−2 0.7 0.5    
Norway    1−2  0.2 0.2  0−0.25 
Portugal  4−7   1−2  1−2 0.03   
Sweden 2−4     0.3 0−07   
United 
Kingdom 4−7   3−5 1−2 0.25 1     0.15 
 
                                                 
16 Sub-total of quantifiable externalities (such as global warming, public health, occupational health, 
material damage). Results are by their very nature location- and technology-specific, and therefore no 
simple generalisations are possible. Only subtotals are available, as not all impacts have been assessed 
completely. Assumptions and parameters included in the analysis may be specific for the fuel cycle, 
technology, or location.  Assumptions and parameters have changed over time, reflecting the state of the 
art at that time. 
17 Adapted from (European Communities 2003) 
18 Biomass co-fired with lignite 
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Another form of externality is external benefit or positive externality. It occurs when a 
company for example creates a new innovative technology or invests in energy 
generation reliability. Others might also benefit from that in the form of a “spillover”. 
Because knowledge can be easily copied once it has been created, innovators cannot 
receive the full benefits of their investment in the creation of that knowledge. This is 
because buyers do not take into account the benefits that this product has for others.    In 
this way, produced quantity will fall short of the efficient quantity (Jaffe, Newell et al. 
2005, Foxon, Pearson 2008).  
In sum, climate policy is interested in the case of internalizing negative externality, 
whereas the renewable energy generation policy tries to find ways to deal with the 
positive one, in the form of subsidies, for instance.  
Public goods are products or services that are consumed by everyone, even if they do 
not pay for them. For example, clean air or enforcement of the law. The market tends to 
undersupply these goods because of the free-rider problem, mainly because it is hard to 
exclude those who do not pay. Common pool resources, on the other hand, are resources 
that nobody owns and anyone can use, such as the fish in the ocean, firewood, or fodder 
(Parkin, Powell et al. 2005). Free-riding, and other mechanisms that lead to the 
undersupply of public goods, may also lead to overexploitation of common pool 
resources, at least if institutions are not strong enough to intervene with appropriate 
policy instruments (Sterner 2003). 
In the field of electricity generation there has been much talk about non-competitive 
markets. Where monopolies and oligopolies exist, the usual result is a non-optimal 
supply. Too little may be sold at too high a price.  In some cases, like in electricity 
distribution lines, it is common to have natural monopolies, because it would serve 
nobody’s interest to have multiple lines. Nevertheless, to be able to control pervasive 
prices, policy instruments may yet again be needed.  
Of all the market failures, asymmetric information is perhaps the most pervasive. Hence 
understanding information asymmetries goes to the heart of the most essential dilemma: 
how to promote social goals like abatement of climate change and energy security 
without destroying incentives for work and efficiency. For instance, if policymakers do 
not have reliable data on emission damages and abatement cost, they cannot design 
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policies that are both efficient with respect to resource allocation and fair in sharing the 
burdens of all costs involved. Thus, if policymakers need the cooperation of individuals 
who have “inside” information, they must accept that those individuals may require that 
they get something in return (Sterner 2003).        
3.4  Rights from the Point of View of Climate Policy  
Rights, politics, and policy instruments are interlinked in ways that vary between 
economies. One descriptive everyday illustration of rights is cigarette smoking (Sterner 
2003). A few decades ago, individuals had the right to smoke almost everywhere they 
pleased, and they still do in some countries. People who suffered from the effects of 
second-hand smoke had no alternative but to try to avoid smokers. Over time, 
information and awareness have increased and have changed this situation so much that 
today in some countries the rights has been reversed: individuals have the right to enjoy 
a smoke-free environment. The use of instruments such as tobacco taxes, prohibition of 
tobacco advertising, no-smoking zones, and law suits against tobacco companies has 
strongly affected the general perception of rights regarding cigarette smoking as well as 
the functioning of the tobacco industry. Hence we can observe that some policy 
instruments demand changes in individual rights, whereas other policy instruments can 
also help to change the structure of rights by changing ethical and moral perceptions 
(Sterner 2003).       
One way to scrutinise especially negative externalities is that they can be seen as the 
consequences of incomplete rights: if air would have owners with a right to clean air, 
then those owners could sue those who caused the air pollution and thus internalize the 
effects. The same hypothetical game could be used with positive externalities. The 
trouble with this approach is that many costs and profits are hard to estimate and in 
rights models many of them overlap one another. For example, one person’s right to 
build a wind turbine on his property limits a neighbour’s right to enjoy an aesthetic 
environment.  Furthermore, when we add the rights relationship not only between 
human beings but also between humans and nature, things become even more 
complicated.     
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3.5  Market inadequacy  
Past experience has shown that pure market forces, even though effective in resource 
use, have mainly too short-sighted a perspective to work out sufficient solutions to the 
long-term energy and climate challenges ahead (Lund 2007). Technological advances 
such as in the field of renewable energy technology are seen as one of the most 
important tools for fighting climate change. This is stressed time and again in 
international research. Scenario analyses by IPCC (IPCC 2007a) and Shell International 
Limited (Shell International Limited 2001) suggest for example that rapid increases in 
new renewable energy will be crucial to a successful global response to climate change. 
Furthermore, particularly those who preach most intensively in the name of technology 
salvation are looking forward to back-stop technology, which stands for technology that 
might resolve the energy problem and/or the climate change problem once and for all 
(Nordhaus 2008).    
Nevertheless, often potential new technological innovations are not able to penetrate to 
the market because they are not cost-effective. This is not seen as a market failure as 
long as scarcity rent and abatement costs are added to prices. As we have seen above, 
quite often they are not added. Other barriers also cause market inadequacy; in this case 
especially imperfect information and path dependency causes lock-in failures to enter 
the stage.  
Decisions we make are never path-independent. They are often steered by the choices 
that we have made before. This path dependence, leading to lock-in of existing 
technologies and so forth, arises because of system or network externalities, combined 
with the fact that technologies are closely liked to their economic and social 
environment (Foxon, Pearson 2008). In this way, new technologies must compete not 
only with components of an existing technology, but also with the overall system in 
which it is embedded. A further point is that the established companies may have high 
market power to safeguard their position (IEA 2003, Foxon, Pearson 2008). This is 
particularly highlighted in the fossil fuel case, and has been called carbon lock-in.  
Because the future is uncertain and companies lack perfect knowledge, what is known 
and how it is known becomes central in the innovation process (Foxon, Pearson 2008). 
If technological learning is not given an opportunity, market forces might underestimate 
a potentially important new technology that could bring people a huge amount of 
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wellbeing in the long run. This is because they are staring among other things at the 
present cost-effectiveness. Hence if there are no other ways than the mainstream market 
for the new potential technology to penetrate and develop itself by learning and with the 
help of economies of scale19, it might be passed over.  
When we consider for example new renewable energy technology competing against 
ignorance, technology lock-ins, and so forth, we have to add to this equation also the 
double barrier that is caused by the market inadequacy of internalizing the negative as 
well as the positive externalities (Jaffe, Newell et al. 2005). Hence this situation might 
require policy instruments to generate incentives for new technologies and to overcome 
the obstacles created by the prevalence of more incumbent technology.  
3.6  Institutional and Policy Failure 
Even though polices should be implemented to help achieve positive goals there exists 
the possibility that they may function in the opposite fashion. This end-result is 
especially common in the situations where policies are implemented to help certain 
goals, but where they may have catastrophic effects on other goals.  
We could take the example of fossil fuels being subsidised very heavily in some 
countries. Iran and China alone subsidised oil consumption to the tune of 60 billion 
dollars in 2007 (International Energy Agency 2008). This may have been a good 
incentive to boost local industry, but from a climate change abatement viewpoint this 
incentive effect is totally different.     
Another example of imperfect government policy from the environment viewpoint is 
the former economies of Eastern Europe, where the banishing of short-sighted profit 
motive was hailed as an opportunity to implement policies truly generated to 
maximising welfare. However, the policies achieved the exact opposite effect, partly 
because of a simplistic appliance of Marxist theory where value is only created by 
                                                 
19 Economies of scale: The increase in efficiency of production as the number of goods being produced 
increases.   
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labour. By treating natural resources as free goods of no value, the intrinsic value of 
those resources was, in quite a few cases, effectively destroyed. The Aral Sea is a sad 
symbol of such policy. The gigantic inland sea has been turned into “a poisonous dust 
bowl” as a result of irrigation projects, defective management, and excessive cotton 
production (Sterner 2003).    
One possible and quite plausible explanation for the frequency of bad policy is lack of 
information or understanding about the technical, ecological, and economic 
relationships that are used to pick and design policy instruments (Sterner 2003). Other 
explanations stem from the fact that policies are not in all cases designed by altruistic 
welfare-maximising policymakers. It would be naïve to think that they would be free 
from personal economic or political interest. Furthermore, institutions are not perfect, 
and it would be hard to say that the government or any other institution would be neutral 
and the perfect agency to enforce the general wellbeing of society (Sterner 2003).  
Still, it is crucial that governments try to correct market failures by using policy 
instruments. It is highly important that the private sector as well as civil society brings 
out policy failures and helps governments to pinpoint and correct them.    
3.7  International Aspects of Climate Policy and Renewable Energy 
Generation 
We are living in the middle of a strong globalisation trend. Investment and businesses 
among others move beyond domestic and national markets to other markets around the 
globe, thus increasing the interconnectedness of different markets. Global trade has 
increased efficiency20, but at the same time it has made care of the environment a highly 
                                                 
20 From a comparative advantage view point a country has a comparative advantage in an activity if the 
country can perform the activity at a lower opportunity cost than any other country. Hence the theory 
suggests that countries should specialize in the goods they can produce most efficiently, rather than trying 
for self-sufficiency, and argues strongly in favour of free international trade (Ricardo 1817, Porter, van 
der Linde 1995). 
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complex issue.  It has also increased international interdependency, which is especially 
highlighted in energy issues, but has not always been seen as a positive phenomenon.      
3.7.1  International Climate Policy Formulation 
Global warming is a global public good or commodity. Its impacts are indivisible and its 
impact is felt all around the world, rather than affecting only one nation or town 
(Nordhaus 2007b). Equally, carbon dioxide (CO2) is a global pollutant. A ton of 
emissions from any point on the globe at any given time would have the same effect on 
the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and thus cause the same amount of damage 
(Congressional Budget Office 2008). Hence it is only rational that international 
measures are needed.  
The need for global decision-making leads to the “Westphalian sovereignty dilemma”. 
Under international laws as were developed in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and 
evolved thereafter in Western Europe, obligations may be imposed on a sovereign 
nation-state only with its own consent. Hence there is no legal mechanism by which 
countries could be coerced to provide for the global public goods. The Westphalian 
system is therefore one that allows free-riding. We must therefore take an entirely 
different approach to global public goods compared with those taken for regional, 
national or local public goods.  
Because international treaties must be negotiated under the restrictions of sovereignty, 
the structure and design of environmental and other treaties are usually analysed with 
recourse to game theory21. There is a strong element of “prisoner’s dilemma”22 in the 
                                                 
 
21 Game theory: attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, in which an 
individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others (Sterner 2003, Hanley, Folmer 
1998, Finus 2001).  
22 One example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Two prisoners jointly charged with a crime are held apart, and 
each is given the option of confessing, or of not confessing. If each confesses, the prosecutor/judge 
convicts them both, and they will serve six years each. If neither confesses, the prosecutor will find a 
lesser charge, and each will serve two years. (Continues next page) 
  
35 
structures of the games, because although countries jointly benefit from collaboration, 
there are also incentives to free-ride. National sovereignty (Sterner 2003) means that 
treaties must be written so that compliance is in the interest of each nation, because 
there is no possibility for enforcement. 
However, because the games are repeated, countries have an interest in building good 
reputations and relations, which facilitates the achievement of collaborative equilibrium 
(Sterner 2003). Trigger strategies may be used, and there may be various opportunities 
for retaliation as nations “play” many different “games”, which may be interconnected 
(Hanley, Folmer 1998). For example, one country might react to unfavourable 
regulations in climate policy by retaliating in another field, such as trade (Sterner 2003). 
The coordination between international treaties and regional as well as domestic 
policies is often complicated. Environmentalists often wish to be proactive and suggest 
that their own countries set a good example, and to show that certain goals or 
technologies are feasible (Sterner 2003). These people most likely believe in the Porter 
hypothesis23.  However, altruistic emission reduction in one country may easily be 
undone by increasing production and emission in a competing country (Sterner 2003).    
If an international but not fully global climate policy results in differences in marginal 
compliance cost among countries, then emissions may leak from participating high-cost 
countries to non-participating low-cost countries through one of two economic channels 
(Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). Firstly, a policy by participating countries may shift 
                                                                                                                                               
 If A confesses and B does not, A is released and B serves an aggravated ten years. If B confesses and A 
does not, B is released, and A serves an aggravated ten years. The surprising truth about the game is that 
whatever the other prisoner does, a prisoner does better by not confessing. The dilemma is easy to 
generalise for example in relation to an emissions treaty and the positive side of cheating in it.    
23 Porter’s hypothesis: environmental regulation will increase productivity as a result of its implicit effects 
on innovation, mostly because cleaner technologies have not previously been explored and generally turn 
out to be more efficient and hence lead to cost savings. The effort of having to adapt to strong regulation 
forces a company to increase its productivity, which gives the firm a strong position vis-à-vis competitors 
(Porter, van der Linde 1995)  (Sterner 2003). 
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comparative advantage in carbon-intensive goods toward non-participating countries, 
and therefore the production of such goods, and the emissions, may grow outside the 
participating countries. Secondly, a policy may lower world demand for carbon-
intensive fuels, and may thereby reduce the world price for such fuels traded in 
international markets. As a result, demand for such fuels as well as emissions can rise 
outside of the coalition (Stavins 1997). Hence a “narrow-but-deep” agreement may not 
significantly reduce net emissions, but may largely redistribute them instead (Aldy, 
Barrett et al. 2003). Estimates of the magnitude of emissions leakage vary widely (Aldy, 
Barrett et al. 2003). In the case of a unilateral reduction in emissions by the European 
Union, estimated leakage rates range from 2 to 80 per cent (Fisher, Barrett et al. 1996). 
This among other things might indicate that a global treaty would be highly important to 
be able to have radical results in cutting greenhouse gas emissions.     
3.7.2  Renewable Energy Generation Policy  
One of the most important individual factors affecting renewable energy generation’s 
expansive market penetration and competitiveness is the international non-renewable 
energy price (mainly: coal, gas, & oil). As seen from Figure 8, oil prices have been 
rising during the past few years, though now partly as a result of global recession they 
have fallen dramatically. The IEA has predicted that in the long run this price might 
settle to be close to $60/barrel24 (Valtioneuvosto 2008). This price, and especially the 
present figure of $42.00/barrel, from sixteenth of December 2008 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2008), might not be enough on its own to excite new fast-
track investment in renewable energy generation (Valtioneuvosto 2008). This seems 
likely, because there was no huge rush towards new renewable energy generation even 
when the oil price was close to $150/ barrel and some were even speculating it would 
climb to  over $ 200/barrel in the near future (Fortson 2008). 
                                                 
24 EUR/USD = 1.3617  Æ EUR 0.02 = USD 0.0147 (8.1.2009) (Bank of Finland 2009). 
  
 
Figure 8: Brent Crude Oil Closing Price ($/barrel) Average Monthly Data from 1988 to 
200825  
Energy is a mainstay of an industrial society (Kreith, Goswami 2007).  Most 
governments have sought to keep energy policy as a domestic responsibility, intervening 
either directly or through national firms to maintain some degree of sovereignty. Energy 
is regarded by many as being too crucial to leave to international market forces 
(McGowan 1996). Nonetheless, the average energy independence of European Union 
(EU-15)26 member-states has been around 50 per cent during the last decade, and it has 
been expected to rise without intervention.  This fact has to a greater or lesser extent 
increased EU interest in boosting renewable energy generation in the name of energy 
security.  Interest has mainly varied depending on the international situation. The energy 
crises during the 1970s speeded up the concern to a peak. In addition, recent crises with 
Russian gas delivery cuts have given similar incentives to the EU (CIVITAS 2008). 
Since the structural changes in energy generation towards local renewable energy 
generation have not taken place with the current conventional energy prices, change - if 
desired - might have to be widely subsidised. On the other hand, if the external costs of 
non-renewable energy would be internalized as well as market barriers hindered, this 
                                                 
25 Based on data from (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008). 
26 EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
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might be enough at least to accelerate the change towards a higher share of renewable 
energy generation (IEA 2003). Nevertheless, policy instruments are needed in this case 
as well.        
3.8  Optimal Policy Instrument 
The sub-chapters above have scrutinized the reasons why we need local as well as 
global policy intervention, focused on climate policy and renewable energy generation 
policy. Now that we have justified the intervention, the next step is to choose the best 
possible policy instrument. Nonetheless, before we start to scrutinize real policy 
instruments (presented in Chapter 6), as a good baseline we should first examine how 
the optimal policy instrument would work.  
In the climate policy case, the optimal policy instrument is in theory found by 
pinpointing the marginal abatement cost of emission and the marginal damage cost of 
emission and resolving their intersection point. This is exemplified in Figure 9 below.  
 
Figure 9: Optimal Tax or Fee (Pigovian Tax)27 28
                                                 
 
27 The figure strongly imitates one presented in (Sterner 2003). Curves are hypothetical and their structure 
could be totally different. Both variables are in reality subject to great uncertainty.   
28 Marginal cost is the change in total cost that arises when the quantity produced changes by one unit. 
Thus, here in the marginal damage cost of emission case this means total damage cost increase when we 
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To be able to forecast these curves we would need perfect knowledge of the market and 
the environment. In reality, these curves could look totally different29. Nevertheless, if 
we could somehow predict the curves, this intersection point would reveal two things: 
an optimal quantity-type policy instrument to cut back emission from initial emissions 
(E0) to an optimal level of emissions (E*) and a price-type policy. This would impose a 
fee or tax (T*) on polluters, and therefore motivate them to cut back emission to E* 
(Sterner 2003). This optimal tax that internalizes the externalities is called a Pigovian 
tax. If we set the tax too low, then we allow too much emissions and our welfare will 
suffer. On the contrary, if we set the tax too high, we perform too much abatement from 
the welfare maximization viewpoint and our welfare will suffer once again (Stern 2007).    
If the tax provides an incentive to reduce emissions, one can also encourage certain 
behaviour patterns by subsidizing them. In this case, the optimal subsidy would be the 
same size as the Pigovian tax and for this reason it is sometimes called negative 
Pigovian tax (Sterner 2003). The motivation for such a subsidy is to try to reach 
economic efficiency. When a positive externality is present in the form of new 
technology knowhow, energy security, or energy generation reliability, a company's 
solution of its utility maximization problem does take account of the additional utility 
produced as a by-product, which causes wealth to others. This causes the company to 
invest less than the Pareto-efficient level (Jaffe, Newell et al. 2005). The Pigovian 
subsidy thus “pays” the positive externality to the company, thereby giving the company 
an incentive to invest more than it otherwise would. 
While the real world optimal policy instrument(s) or level of intervention with climate 
policy, energy generation policy, and other issues remain unresolved (and probably will 
be so forever), empirical experiences show that economies with an extensive degree of 
intervention fail gravely in attaining efficiency. On the other hand, economies with a 
highly free and unregulated market may also fail conspicuously with both efficiency and 
                                                                                                                                               
pollute with one more ton of carbon dioxide. The marginal cost of abatement on the other hand here 
means the total abatement cost increase when we abate one more ton of carbon.  
29 Debate about the possible outlook of these curves is discussed in Chapter 4.  
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social issues (Sterner 2003).   Therefore, in our imperfect world, the right solutions will 
probably be found somewhere in the middle.  
    
  
4 Economics of Climate Change 
Economics is the social science that surveys the choices that individuals, businesses, 
governments, and entire societies make as they cope with scarcity and the incentives 
that affect and reconcile those choices (Parkin, Powell et al. 2005).  Because our 
resources are limited, we are not able to satisfy all our wants, and we have to make 
choices between multiple interests. The economics of climate change, if over-simplified, 
is the choice between two different variables and their weights: damage adaptation and 
the abatement of climate change, as shown in Figure 10 below.  
 
Figure 10: Economics of Climate Change: Baseline versus Strong Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement 
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From this viewpoint we can select either to take strong action against climate change in 
advance in the form of greenhouse gas abatement, and thus most likely cut our damage 
adaptation costs, or then we can save in abatement and put the money to use in damage 
adaptation or something else. The business as usual (BAU), in other words the baseline, 
is the emission growth path or trajectory that would happen if we continue without 
radical change in emission intervention. The business as usual or even negative results 
for abatement (less abatement than in BAU) do not imply doing nothing, but rather 
point out that investing in damage adaptation is stressed (Pearce 2002). On the other 
hand, choosing the strong abatement path implies that we simply want to avoid possible 
large damage adaptation expenditure. With other things being equal, we should end up 
choosing the path that leaves us with a smaller triangle (smaller cost). 
Still, as the IPCC synthesis report (IPCC 2007b) points out, there is high confidence that 
neither adaptation nor abatement alone can avoid all climate change impacts. Adaptation 
is necessary both in the short term and longer term to address impacts resulting from the 
warming that would occur even for the lowest stabilisation scenarios assessed. This 
would suggest that we should choose the smallest summarized area of both triangles to 
cope with. 
The challenge is that the size of these triangles is very hard to estimate. The difficulties 
of expressing non-market impacts like human health or effects on ecosystems in money, 
the long life of greenhouse gases, possible catastrophic damages, and generational and 
sustainable development aspects, as well as millions of other features all conspire to 
make this case even more complex.  
Climate change affects many different agents on various different levels. For example 
ecologists may see it as a threat to ecosystems, ski resorts or coal-miners as a hazard to 
their livelihood, or small island states as a threat to their very existence. On the other 
hand, some northern farmers may see it as an extended agricultural opportunity, golfers 
as a possibility for year-round recreation, and renewable energy companies as a new 
business opportunity (Nordhaus 2008). 
This really does not help with our quest to determine the optimal path and the size of the 
triangles in Figure 10. We can, however, try to estimate them, but in this task we 
encounter many dilemmas: 
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• Ethical, e.g. what to conserve? 
• Liberty, e.g. to what degree must people be restricted from causing emissions?  
• Efficiency, e.g. how much environmental damage is acceptable? 
• Evaluation, e.g. how to compare different effects of various options or actions? 
• Equity, e.g. who benefits from the mitigation, and who pays? 
These are the dilemmas we have to cope with whenever we are thinking about policy 
intervention. However, the key dilemma and the keyword for climate change economics 
is uncertainty. How can we choose the best course of action without adequate 
knowledge or data about what will happen in the future?  
Much research has highlighted the fact that “repairing” or “curing” ecosystems is 
normally much more expensive than prevention, and in certain cases the damage from 
emissions might be irreversible (Sterner 2003). On the other hand, over-investment and 
over-reaction might cause profound social welfare loss. Hence allocating resources 
unwisely and unfairly could cause in some cases irreversible social and economical 
losses (Nordhaus 2008, Pearce 2002).   
However, economists recognize that although scientific understanding of the climate 
system is not complete and we have multiple dilemmas on the path to an optimal 
solution, it is appropriate to take measures now to address potential climate change. 
Economics can even provide guidance on how to deal with these uncertainties. 
Economic reasoning and evidence can help delineate the scope of the climate change 
problem, and can point the way to a rational societal response (DeCanio 1997). 
Economic estimation of the climate change case is done by trying to figure out the three 
important variables that were already introduced in Figure 10: 
• The baseline (Business as usual), 
• The (marginal) damage cost of emissions 
• The (marginal) abatement cost of emissions 
  
The baseline is important, in order to be able to have a relevant frame of reference for 
damage costs as well as for abatement actions. Hence in order to estimate the impacts 
and success30 of possible interventions, it is necessary to estimate what would have 
happened in the absence of the intervention. And because such counterfactual baselines 
cannot be observed, they have to be estimated.   
The marginal abatement and damage cost are crucial for us to be able to estimate the 
optimal price (the social cost of emissions) and the target level of emission. This is the 
intersection of these two variables, as sketched in Figure 11 as well as in Chapter 3 
(Figure 9). This is the same as optimizing the triangles in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 11: The Uncertainty in the Optimal Level of Abatement31
The curves in Figure 11 are not based on real estimations, but they describe the current 
estimation debate. Some researchers believe that the variables are smooth, while others 
have suggested that there might be threshold values as portrayed in diagram C on the 
right. Because of the great uncertainty of future damage as well as with the adaptation 
                                                 
30 The Helsinki Protocol, for example, required that parties reduce their sulphur dioxide emissions by 30 
percent (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003).  This might suggest that agreement succeeded environmentally, but the 
agreement did not significantly affect behaviour (Barrett 2005). In the absence of the treaty, most of the 
emission reductions would probably have occurred anyway (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). 
31 p: optimal price for emission, q: optimal amount of emission, (see Chapter 2, Figure 9).  
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cost, different studies and models32 give very different results of the optimal 
intervention level. At the same time, the values that different models give are affected 
primarily by the starting values. However, different models have special characteristics 
that affect the output value; for example Tol (Tol 2005) gathered 103 estimates of the 
marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide from 28 published studies. All studies 
combined, the mode was $0.54/t CO233, the median $3.8/t CO2, the mean $25.3/t CO2, 
and the 95 percentile $95.4/t CO2. The highest estimation was as high as $1666.7/t CO2 
introduced by (Hohmeyer, Gartner 1992, Tol 2005).  Because of the great variance, it is 
evident that essential questions still remain unresolved and the reasons for this great 
variance need closer examination.  
4.1  The Academic Debate on the Economics of Climate Change 
In Table 4 below, the authors and the studies that are stressed in this chapter are 
presented, as well as a summary of the main focus and results of the articles. These 
studies were selected to get a good overall view of the economics of climate change as 
well as to map the current field of debate. With the help of these studies it is also easy to 
spot the research that might offer more in-depth knowledge about some special issues 
like the science of uncertainty. 
Table 4: Selected Appraised Authors Their Main Focus and Results. (Continues next 
page) 
Author Main Focus Main Result 
(Gore 2007) How to respond to 
climate change 
US should join an international treaty within the next two years that 
cuts developed countries’ GHG emissions by 90% and more than 50 
% worldwide in reasonable short run. 
(Nordhaus 
2008) 
Modelling the 
economics of 
climate change 
Climate change is a complex phenomenon, subject to huge 
uncertainty. It has to be taken seriously, though too fast and too 
furious acts in the short run might do more harm than good. 
  
                                                 
32 For more information about different models see (Nordhaus 2007a, Sterner, Persson 2007). 
33 Scientists and economists have usually measured carbon prices in terms of carbon weight. In this thesis 
on the contrary I use carbon prices in terms of carbon dioxide weight, as is used in the EU emission 
trading scheme. Carbon dioxide has a mass 3.67 times that of carbon. To convert from the CO2 units to 
the units of carbon, divide the mass or multiply the price by 3.67. 
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(Nordhaus 
2007a) 
Critical review of 
the Stern review 
on the economics 
of climate change 
Article professes that the main argument of Stern review (2007) that 
we need urgent, sharp, and immediate reductions in GHG emission is 
based on vague research. Nordhaus argues that discount rates and 
consumption elasticities that were used were not realistic and should 
be substituted with ones that are more consistent with today's 
marketplace real interest rates and savings rates.  He prefers “climate-
policy ramp”, in which policies to slow down global warming 
increasingly tighten over time and fulfil where and when efficiency.    
(Pearce 
2002) 
The social cost of 
climate change  
It is possible to estimate the aggregate and marginal cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions. These estimations should be used when 
appraising climate change policy, especially to see whether too much 
or too little abatement is being considered. Equity weighting and 
discounting have a strong effect on to the marginal social cost of 
carbon. These should be wisely selected and if used they should be 
equally applied across all policies like aid and trade because it is not 
defensible to argue that global warming is a “special case” compared 
with these.  Some models give negative results for climate policy. 
These results do not imply “doing nothing” but rather stress a 
reappraisal of the balance between investing in emission reduction 
and investing in adaptation, especially in developing countries.    
(Stern 2007) The economics of 
climate change 
Climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever 
seen. Strong action to reduce GHG emission should be undertaken 
right away, as the benefits of strong, early action considerably 
outweigh the costs.  
(Sterner, 
Persson 
2007) 
Critical review of 
the Stern review 
on the economics 
of climate change 
and its critics  
 
Review defends results of  Stern review (2007) and sheds light on 
discounting methods that have been under criticism. Furthermore, 
authors are concerned that Stern review might not give sufficient 
weight to non-market damage, and changing relative prices are not 
analysed by Stern report, both which might make the damage cost 
even higher. Taking these variables into account, damage optimal 
emission paths would be even more radical than Stern review 
reported, even though discount rates would be set as high as market-
based trajectories yield.   
(Tol 2005) The marginal 
damage costs of 
carbon dioxide 
emissions 
It is possible to estimate magnitude of marginal damage cost (MC) of 
carbon dioxide emissions. Review analyses 103 estimates of the MC 
gathered from 28 published studies. The best guess for MC of carbon 
dioxide emissions is $5/tC (1.4$/tCO2), but the mean is $104/tC 
(28$/tC02). Two “ethical” parameters have high impact on estimate 
differences as well as on uncertainty. These are equity weighting and 
especially discounting. As a conclusion, the author estimates that 
even though climate change impacts may be very uncertain, it is very 
unlikely that the MC of carbon dioxide emissions exceeds $50/tC(14 
$/tCO2).           
(Weitzman 
2007) 
Critical review of  
the Stern review 
on the economics 
of climate change 
The review gives credit to the Stern review for appraising the level of 
public disclosure by increasing general awareness of the gravity of 
climate change. Weitzman argues that even though from some 
perspective the discount rate that Stern used can be approved, it is not 
a mainstream economist view and thus should not be presented as if 
it were. He shares Stern’s view that the implications of large 
consequences with small probabilities are important. Hence gathering 
information about uncertainties representing rare climate disasters 
and developing a realistic emergency plan were they to materialize 
should be a priority of research. Weitzman sees that the review’s 
informal emphasis on climate-change uncertainty could be recast into 
sound analytical arguments that might justify some of its conclusions. 
However, spending money now to slow global warming should not 
be stressed primarily as being about optimal consumption smoothing 
as Stern sees it, but as an issue of how much insurance to buy to 
offset the small chance of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to 
compensate by ordinary savings.  
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Although there has been research into the economic effects of climate change for 
decades now and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been 
functioning for 20 years, the economic research debate rose to a new level two years 
ago after Stern published his famous review (Stern 2007). It gave a more general face to 
the economics of climate change and to the possible effects on the economy. The reason 
may have been that it offered such high estimated damages from climate change relative 
to earlier studies and models that it was not easy to overlook without a mention. Earlier 
studies and Stern critics have estimated the cost of climate change impacts on the order 
of one per cent of the future Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Sterner, Persson 2007).  
Stern (2007) asserts by contrast that the business as usual (BAU) emissions of 
greenhouse gases will lead to a minimum damage of  5 per cent of  GDP and might be 
as high as 20 per cent of GDP now and forever (Stern 2007).  
This result stimulated widespread debate. The big picture of the debate is how radical 
are the actions we should take immediately on climate change abatement.  Stern’s 
(2007) conclusions suggest that strong collective action should start right now. We 
should invest about 1 per cent of GDP in abatement each year. Stern (Stern 2007) 
estimated that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweigh the cost. 
On the other hand, the major findings of earlier studies and models have been that an 
efficient optimal path would involve modest rates of emission abatement in the near 
term, followed by sharp reductions in the medium and long term. This is also called a 
climate-policy ramp, in which actions to slow down global warming increasingly ramp 
up over time, when for example the technology develops (Nordhaus 2007a).    
The reason for this great difference between opinions as to what kind of strategy to use 
derives from the fact that Stern (2007) sees that the marginal damage cost and marginal 
abatement intersection point is at the present a factor of ten higher ($85/t C02, year 
2005) than that which Nordhaus (Nordhaus 2008) among others has estimated ($7.4/t 
CO2, year 2005).  Minor criticism of the Stern review is concentrated on the point that 
Stern has over-estimated the cost of adaptation and underestimated the cost of 
abatement (Honkatukia 2006).  
While the estimation of our three main variables the baseline, marginal abatement cost 
of emissions and the marginal damage cost of emissions is seen as a complex task, 
owing to the uncertainty, the most debated factor affecting these estimations, i.e. the 
  
48 
discount rate34, is a relatively simple concept in economics.  The main criticism of the 
Stern review has not focused on its assessment of the cost and benefits of climate 
change abatement or the climate science embodied in the report, but rather on the low 
discount rate used in the analysis (Sterner, Persson 2007).  
4.1.1  The Discount Rate 
The discount rate does indeed cut to the core of the fundamental questions regarding 
global environmental change: how much weight we should put on the welfare of future 
versus current generations? Will growth continue so that future generations are really 
richer than we are today? How important is the distribution of impacts? That is, how 
should we value costs that fall disproportionately upon the poor or the rich? (Sterner, 
Persson 2007)  
The rate at which we discount the future will have a huge impact on the extent to which 
emissions reductions today are warranted economically (Sterner, Persson 2007). Using a 
discount rate of 1 per cent, in 300 years the discounted value of $1,000,000 would be 
close to $50,000. If the discount rate were 5 per cent, the discounted value of 
$1,000,000 would be less than 50 cents (0.44 cents) (Sterner, Persson 2007).  
While some researchers stress that we should discount the climate change damage with 
values close to the market rates (Nordhaus 2008, Tol 2005, Weitzman 2007), others 
stress that in the case of environmental issues the discount rates should be lower (Stern 
2007, Sterner, Persson 2007, Cline 1992). In fact it is not an exaggeration to say that the 
biggest uncertainty of all in the economics of climate change is the uncertainty about 
which interest rate to use for discounting (Weitzman 2007).  
                                                 
34 See definitions: discounting    
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Despite the controversy, most participants in the debate about what constitutes an 
appropriate discount rate for estimating climate change damages acknowledge that a 
good starting point is the Ramsey rule35.  
r = δ + g ×η         (2) 
The Ramsey rule holds that the discount rate should be set equal to the sum of two 
factors: the pure rate of time preference, δ, and the product of the growth rate of income, 
g, and the elasticity of the marginal utility of money (also, equivalently, the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion and equity weighting), η. The first component, δ, implies 
discounting of future utility per se, while the second implies discounting the value of 
future consumption goods based on the notion that we will be richer in the future and 
that the rich gain less welfare than the poor from a given quantity of money (Nordhaus 
2007a, Sterner, Persson 2007). Table 5 shows Ramsey equation variables used by Stern 
and two of his critics. 
Table 5: The Ramsey Equation Variable Used by (Stern 2007), (Nordhaus 2007a), and 
(Weitzman 2007). 
Author The pure rate of 
time preference 
(δ) 
The growth rate 
of income (g) 
The elasticity of 
marginal utility 
of money (η) 
Discount rate (r) 
(Stern 2007)  0.1% 1.3% 1 1.4% 
(Nordhaus 2007a) 1.5% 2% 2 5.5% 
(Weitzman 2007) 2% (inter alia) 2%(inter alia) 2(inter alia) 6%(inter alia) 
4.1.2  The Pure Rate of Time Preference (δ) 
In using a value of 0.1 with the pure rate of time preference (δ) Stern takes a very 
egalitarian view of intergenerational distribution. This view is also favoured by (Sterner, 
Persson 2007, Ramsey 1928, Dasgupta 2006). Weitzman (2007) and Nordhaus (2007a) 
among others argue that the Stern principle of treating all generations equally takes no 
                                                 
35 For more in-depth information see (Ramsey 1928).    
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account of preferences for present over future utility, which people seem to exhibit in 
their everyday savings and investment behaviour. They thus suggest that higher values 
be used. As a response, Sterner and Persson (2007) highlights that the 0.1 per cent pure 
rate of time preference is compatible with the risk of extinction of humanity of about 10 
per cent per century, or 65 per cent per millennium.          
4.1.3  The Growth Rate of Income (g) 
For the growth rate of income (g) Stern (2007) uses 1.3 per cent. Thus in Stern’s case, 
per capita consumption is projected to grow from $7,600 today (2005) to $94,00036 in 
the year 2200. Here Sterner and Persson (2007) raises the question “can growth go on 
for so long?” In certain fields of industry like oil or cement, this kind of path might be 
hard to sustain, but in those areas that need insignificant physical resources this kind of 
growth might be feasible (Sterner, Persson 2007). Here the value for the growth rate of 
income (g) of 2 per cent preferred by Nordhaus (Nordhaus 2007a) would project the per 
capita consumption to $361,000 in the year 2200.  
 Even though we have here highlighted Weitzman’s (2007) example value of 2 per cent 
for the growth rate of income (g), he has also argued in his study that there is a 
possibility that g could even become negative because of possible catastrophic events 
and that this factor should be studied more precisely. This kind of viewpoint would 
partly back up Stern’s (Stern 2007) results that more relevant action should be taken 
now. Nevertheless, compared to Stern (2007), Weitzman (2007) stresses that spending 
money now to slow global warming should not be seen primarily as being optimal 
consumption smoothing, as Stern sees it, but rather an issue of how much insurance to 
buy to offset the small chance of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to compensate by 
ordinary savings.    
                                                 
36 Here we have used a formula for future discount that is: Future value = (1+ discount rate)^number of 
years between present and future point of time Æ $94,331 = (1+0,013)^195 
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4.1.4  The Elasticity of the Marginal Utility of Money (η) 
The elasticity of the marginal utility of money (η) is also known as the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion and equity weight variable. Equity weighting has been one of the 
greatest issues in the climate change abatement debate, because the biggest effects of 
climate change are felt in poor countries and they have least money for the adaptation.  
The higher the value of the elasticity of marginal utility of money (η), the less we care 
for a dollar more of consumption, and the richer we become. If we expect that we will 
be richer in the future, when climate damages will be felt, a higher value of the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of money (η) implies that damages will be valued lower. Hence it 
implies less greenhouse abatement today. Conversely, in the case that we will be poorer 
in the future, a higher elasticity of the marginal utility of money (η) would imply that 
more abatement would be warranted (Sterner, Persson 2007).     
The idea that a rich person would have less marginal utility for money than a poor 
person is deeply rooted in economic theory and is empirically well-founded. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect it would have is still controversial (Pearce 
2002, Sterner, Persson 2007). The practical implications of this are actually quite 
radical: already the elasticity of marginal utility of money value - η=1 - that Stern 
(2007) has used means utility is logarithmic (Sterner, Persson 2007). If we assume that 
person R is 10 times richer than person P, then taking $1.00 from R and giving it to P 
would increase P’s utility 10 times more than the loss of utility to R. This could well be 
the case when comparing developed and developing countries. However, with a η of 
two as is used by Nordhaus (2007a), P’s utility would be 100 times more (Sterner, 
Persson 2007). 
Thus, when η is large, then the aggregate welfare would be much higher in an economy 
with an even income distribution, and it would suggest that high and progressive taxes 
as well as large transfers of development assistance to poor countries should be 
implemented (Sterner, Persson 2007). This income distribution has been the utopia in 
both foreign aid and in trade protection, where we have used an η value close to zero.  
Hence it is argued if higher values are used with climate change policy, they should be 
used with other policies as well (Pearce 2002). Pearce (2002) continues that, if so, then 
values from 0.5 to 1.2 seem reasonable for η. It follows that it is somewhat strange that 
Stern critics have criticised the η value of 1 that Stern has used, claiming that it is too 
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low, when in other contexts economists have used a η value of zero (Sterner, Persson 
2007).   
If we use the discount rate to lower the estimates of the costs that our descendants will 
face, leaning on the argument that they will be so much richer and the utility function is 
so curved, we should logically give extra weight to any low-income people affected 
(Sterner, Persson 2007). This is noticed and also integrated into many of the cost 
estimation models. As the Tol (Tol 2005) and Pearce (2002) studies show, if equity 
weights are used, other things being equal, it may increase the damage cost estimations 
from 20 to 70 per cent, though the effect is not as radical as when the discount rate is 
changed.  
Thus, by taking a different perspective to our dilemmas, we can make huge changes to 
our estimations by a using different discount rate or equity weighting. Even though here 
we have used Stern as one extreme and some of his critics as another, there are also 
views that the Stern’s values are too low and that an even more radical intervention 
would be needed. Sterner and Persson (2007) for example point out that because of 
Stern’s underestimation of the relative prices,37 even stronger intervention may be 
needed. In addition, even Stern himself has implied in June 2008 that because global 
warming is happening faster than predicted, the cost to reduce carbon would be even 
sharper or about 2% of GDP instead of the 1% in the original report (Jowit, Wintour 
2008).     
                                                 
37 Sterner and Persson (2007) points out that Stern (2007) might have underestimated the relative prices of 
fossil fuels as well as especially non-market resources in his estimations. Water, biodiversity, or other 
essential ecosystem services are hard to replace, and consequently their price elasticity might be much 
lower than the 1 that is conventionally used for income or -0.65 for fossil fuel. Were these resources to 
become scarcer, their relative price might rise very fast. For example, currently global agriculture is said 
to represent 24 per cent of global GDP (Stern 2007). Hence a 10 per cent loss might be approximated as 
costing 2.4 per cent of the global GDP. Everyday logic, however, tells us that a 50 per cent loss would be 
worth much more than 12 per cent of the global GDP, and a 100 per cent loss would be worth more than 
24 per cent of the GDP. As food became more and more scarce, its relative price would rise so fast that 
the dwindling food supplies would crowd out everything else and would approach 100 per cent of the 
total GDP  (Sterner, Persson 2007). 
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Even if there are radical differences between the views of Stern and those of his critics, 
there is also a high degree of unanimity that climate change is a grave phenomenon that 
needs to be taken seriously. Weitzman for example, one of Stern’s critics, has stated that 
Stern might be right but for the wrong reasons, but that he has nevertheless done a good 
job in heightening the level of public awareness by increasing general awareness of the 
seriousness of climate change (Weitzman 2007).  The majority of the critics see that it 
would be important to set a global price for the carbon dioxide emissions, invest much 
more in environment-friendly technology, and remove barriers of behavioural change 
(Nordhaus 2007a, Sterner 2003, Stern 2007, Weitzman 2007). They merely have quite 
different weights and time-scales for these remedies.  
Now that economists have opened up the debate and discussed the major questions, the 
next step is for the policy-makers to decide what kind of emphasis they prefer and 
consequently how strong actions they will take. Thereafter, when the politicians and 
others are deciding which kinds of instruments to use, economists will once again have 
much to say regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the various instruments 
(McGowan 1996), as will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
  
54 
5 Different Policy Instruments for Climate Politics and 
Renewable Energy Generation  
This chapter describes briefly the operational principles of different climate and energy 
policy instruments. Only the standard models of different instruments are highlighted. 
In reality, the policies are most often adjusted with different additional features and they 
are used as a portfolio together. They may in practice overlap with each other as well as 
with other policies, thus causing indirect effects for each other.  
This is not the first study ever made on renewable energy policy instruments for the 
Finnish Energy Industries. A Masters’ thesis (Arasto 2006) and a report (Green Stream 
Network 2007) predating this study have been taken into consideration. Arasto’s (2006) 
thesis generally presents the operational principles of energy policy instruments among 
others from economic perspectives, stressing the investor’s point of view in economic 
support schemes. The Green Stream Network report (2007) then again investigates 
implementation perspectives, for which they have gathered a large amount of empirical 
data to back up their research. Hence to avoid unnecessary overlapping, in this chapter a 
lot of the emphasis is on the climate policy instruments. Instruments for renewable 
energy generation have been presented more briefly. The reader may wish to consult 
(Arasto 2006), (Green Stream Network 2007), or (Sawin 2004) to be able to get a 
deeper understanding of the principles of how renewable energy generation policy 
instruments function, and what kind of applications have been used.  
Before examining different instruments more closely, we should try - for the sake of 
simplicity - to categorise the instruments, in order for us to be able to perceive them 
better. Many policy matrices have been proposed as organising principles for the 
systematic comparison and collection of policy instruments (Sterner 2003). One much-
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used typology is the World Bank (World Bank 1997) model, grouping policy 
instruments into four categories: (1) using markets, (2) creating markets, (3) 
implementing regulations, and (4) engaging the public. On the other hand, some 
political scientists argue that there are only three basic categories for policy instruments: 
“sticks, carrots, and sermons”, symbolising regulation instruments, economic 
incentives, and informative instruments (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist et al. 2003). No single 
taxonomy is necessary preferable, but each can be used in different contexts (Sterner 
2003).  
Even though policy instruments for climate policy and renewable energy generation are 
introduced together in this chapter, we have to remember that they can have different as 
well as similar targets. While the main target of climate policy instruments is to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions, the main target of renewable energy generation instruments 
is to enhance renewable energy generation. This is done for various reasons: for the 
environment, for energy security, as well as for the substitution of fossil fuel energy 
generation with renewable energy generation as a cheap source of energy generation. 
Hence their categorisation together might give rise to some confusion. 
However, policy instruments for climate policy and renewable energy generation have 
been organised into 5 categories as seen in Figure 12 below. In addition to the “stick, 
carrot, and sermon” categorisation, I have used research and development, other 
policies, and voluntary instruments alongside of them. Because instruments for climate 
policy and renewable energy generation have different targets, different colours have 
been used to point out the primary use-function of categories or sub-categories. 
  
 
Figure 12: Policy Instruments Categorisation 
Economic instruments have been further divided into 7 sub-groups. These are classified 
as either price or quantity categories. The choice of category to use is one of the main 
debates when choosing the policy instruments for climate policy or for renewable 
energy generation, as we will soon find out.   
5.1  Emission Trade 
The theoretical foundation of emission trade is Coasian (Coase 1960). Coase argued that 
markets could solve the pollution problems as effectively as taxes set by public 
administration, provided that rights were well enough specified. An emission permit, in 
other words an emission allowance, is a bounded and transferable right granted by 
central authority for an agent to emit a certain amount of emission into the environment. 
The emission trading refers to the trade that takes place with these emission permits 
between agents (Nykänen 2006).    
The idea of emission trade is to execute the emission abatement actions where it is the 
most cost-efficient. In other words, where the marginal abatement cost is the lowest 
(Nykänen 2006). The key principle here is that agents are given allowances to emit 
absolute volumes over a fixed period. Agents that can cheaply abate their emissions to 
below the set limit may sell surplus emission allowances to others that are facing only 
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more expensive options of reducing emissions. As a result, the total cost incurred by all 
parties in meeting the mandated reductions is below that of pure environmental 
regulation. In this way, this efficiency benefits society as a whole (International Energy 
Agency 2005). 
The broad concept of emission trading is introduced in Figure 13 below. The emission 
trade covers “cap-and-trade” and “rate-based” regimes, and sometimes “project-based” 
mechanisms (International Energy Agency 2005). These are more closely introduced in 
Table 6, also below. The flex mechanism, allocation mechanism, and participation will 
be introduced and explained further on.   
 
Figure 13: Structures of the Emission Trading Scheme  
Table 6: Different Emission Trading Schemes (International Energy Agency 2005) 
 Cap-and- trade Rate-based trading Project-based trading 
Application Applies to all emissions 
 
 
Applies to emission 
relative to some defined 
standard 
(e.g. emissions per unit 
of output) 
Applies to emission reductions 
below defined baseline 
Allocation 
method  
 
Allowances are allocated by 
the regulatory authority 
Credits are generated 
when a source reduces its 
emissions below the 
norm 
Credits are generated 
when a source reduces its 
emissions below an agreed 
baseline 
Market 
dynamic 
Participants (and possibly 
outsiders) can buy and sell 
allowances 
Participants (and 
possibly 
outsiders) can buy and 
sell allowances 
Project hosts sell to those 
participants obliged to 
purchase external reductions 
Examples Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, US SO2 allowances 
programme, European 
emission trading scheme 
US phase-out of lead in 
gasoline 
Clean development 
mechanism and joint 
implementation (Kyoto 
Protocol) 
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Aside from the “cap and trade” and “rate based” division, emission trade can be divided 
between cap and trade and “baseline and credit”. Baseline and credit works similarly to 
project-based mechanisms in Table 6 (above), though it can be expanded to concern the 
entire market. It can also be adjusted to work either on a intensity basis similar to a rate-
based regime, or on an amount basis similar to the cap and trade regime.     
5.1.1  Participation 
The quintessential question with emission trading is who is taking part. There are four 
main models: upstream, downstream, hybrid, and mixed models. In an upstream 
scheme, the producers, processors, and transporters of fossil fuels are regulated (Faure, 
Gupta et al. 2003). In a downstream scheme consumers of fossil fuels can trade 
emissions and in a hybrid scheme the large consumers of fossil fuels are directly 
regulated, while the remainder of fuel consumption is regulated through an upstream 
scheme. In a mixed scheme, large emitters are regulated through a emission trade 
system, while small emitters are regulated through some other instrument (Faure, Gupta 
et al. 2003).     
The upstream scheme would virtually capture all fossil fuel use and carbon emission in 
a national economy.  It would be easy to administer, owing to the relatively small 
number of companies that have to be monitored for compliance. On the other hand, the 
downstream scheme would offer greater competition and stimulate more robust trading. 
However, it is harder to administer, and is thus regarded as problematic (Tietenberg, 
Grubb et al. 1999).   
5.1.2  Allowance Allocation 
With cap and trade the important issue is how allowances are allocated. Allowances can 
be allocated for free on the basis of historic emissions (grandfathering). Alternatively 
they can be allocated according to a benchmark, or thirdly they can be auctioned.  In the 
case of grandfathering, the actual emissions of producers in a certain period in the past 
are used as a basis for the allocation of allowances. One method of deriving the 
allocations is to apply a reduction factor to the historic emissions. The outcome of this 
method is that for example electricity producers have the choice to use the allowances 
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for production, or to not produce and to instead sell the allowances. The value of the 
allowances represents an opportunity cost, which - at least theoretically - will be taken 
into account (Rathmann 2007). The EU emission trading scheme is one example of a 
system using grandfathering.  
Allowances can also be allocated for free using a system based on benchmarking. A 
useful benchmark is for example the CO2-intensity of the electricity production (e.g. 
350g CO2/kWh). Benchmarks can be specific for different techniques and/or fuels. In 
order to determine the amount of allocated allowances, the benchmark can for instance 
in the electricity generation case be multiplied by the expected electricity production 
before the related period commences (ex ante) or by the realised electricity production 
after the period has ended (ex post) (Rathmann 2007). 
An ex ante allocation based on benchmarking has no real material differences relative to 
grandfathering, as long as the amount of allocated allowances is not altered. In the case 
of non-production, the allocated allowances can be sold and thus the value of all 
allowances needed for electricity production materialises as opportunity costs. An ex 
post allocation based on benchmarks reduces the opportunity cost to electricity 
producers substantially. This is due to the fact that in the case of non-production, no 
allowances can be sold because allocation is based on actual production. Only the 
difference between the benchmark and actual emissions - in other words the amount of 
allowances that can be sold or needs to be bought - materialises as an opportunity cost 
(Rathmann 2007).  
Allowances can also be allocated by means of an auction. In the case of electricity 
generation this means that electricity producers buy allowances from the auctioneer, 
which is usually the state. The price and the amount of allocated allowances are then 
determined through an auction. In this case the value of all allowances needed for 
electricity production materialises as a cost to the producer. Opportunity costs for 
allowances no longer exist. (Rathmann 2007). Hence this form of allocation reduces 
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distributional distortions that free allocation and accompanying windfall profits38 may 
create. It is the purest embodiment of the “polluter pays” principle39. Auctioning would 
also raise considerable revenue, which could be used either as a source of revenue for 
the government, recycled back to the sources, or used to reduce other taxes on 
employment or investment (Tietenberg, Grubb et al. 1999).  
From an international viewpoint, another important allocation issue is how allowances 
are allocated amongst countries. Höhne, Phyllipsen et al. (Höhne, Phyllipsen et al. 
2005) has compared the effect of the choice of stabilisation goal against different 
allocation methodologies on the quota distribution for emissions reductions between 
countries. Here in particular the difference between the ability to pay of developed and 
developing countries plays an important role. More complication throws up other equity 
questions, such as who should be responsible to pay and who benefits the most from 
emission mitigation (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). These will be some of the biggest 
stumbling-blocks in the path of international agreement. 
5.1.3  Flex Mechanisms 
Compared to say “command and control”, emission trade itself is a flex mechanism. 
Emission trade can, however, be made even more flexible by additional flex features or 
by integrating different emission trade mechanisms. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, 
there were three flex mechanisms: cap and trade, clean development mechanism 
                                                 
38 Windfall profits are unexpected earnings not due to the efforts and expenditures of the entity that 
benefits, but due to the indirect affects of for example some policy instrument. With the EU emissions 
trading scheme, the term windfall profit is used to describe the price increase of all electricity sold to the 
market (Kara, Syri et al. 2008), thus generating extra profits for those who are not affected by the cost of 
emission trade, like for example hydropower generation. However, in terminology windfall profit means 
sudden unexpected profit and thus it is highly arguable that emission trading scheme effect on electricity 
price is not windfall profit but normal economical causalities.    
39 The principle that the party responsible for producing pollution should also be responsible for paying 
for the damage done to the natural environment. 
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(CDM), and joint implementation (JI) (UNFCCC 2008b) (UNFCCC 2008a). Additional 
flexibility features that could be used are banking, borrowing, ceiling price (also known 
as “safety valve”), and floor prices.     
The JI mechanism allows countries to cooperate on projects and transfer emission 
allowances on the basis of them. Furthermore, the CDM allows countries to finance 
projects in developing countries in exchange for credits towards meeting their own 
emission reduction targets (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). In effect, these add flexibility to 
meeting cap and trade targets. 
The banking of allowances offers a greater degree of intertemporal flexibility, a 
flexibility that tends to reduce costs considerably. The banking of allowances involves 
allowing parties to carry forward allowances that are unused in one commitment period, 
in order that they can be used in the next period. There has been heavy use of banking in 
both the acid rain programme and the lead credit trading market in the United States. 
Banking is especially significant for industries in which major capital expenditures must 
be made. It allows individual agents flexibility in the timing of such major investments.  
Borrowing, then again, involves using allowances assigned for one commitment period 
in an earlier commitment period (Tietenberg, Grubb et al. 1999). 
The “ceiling price”, typically referred to as a “safety valve”, is an optional design 
element of a cap-and-trade programme that seeks to provide cost containment by 
triggering certain actions if costs turn out to be higher than expected. One form of a 
safety valve is a price ceiling, which makes allowances available at some threshold 
price to ensure that the allowance price does not rise above a certain level and thus 
cause an excessive burden for emitters (Congressional Budget Office 2008). When 
safety valve or price ceiling is used, the instrument is often called a hybrid instrument. 
This is because it is no longer a pure quota-based instrument. It is a mixture of quota 
and price-based instrument.  
As well as a price ceiling, a price floor could be maintained by selling a significant 
fraction of allowances in an auction and specifying a reserve price (Tietenberg, Grubb et 
al. 1999).  This might help to safeguard abatement investments.  
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5.2  Taxation, Taxation Subsidies and Carbon Tax 
Economists often view environmental taxes as the most probable instrument for 
environmental policy, and they thus tend to use them as a point of reference for other 
instruments. A pure environmental tax is referred as a Pigovian tax if it is set equal to 
the marginal social damage of activity, e.g. emissions40 (Sterner 2003).  
Greenhouse gas emissions can be taxed, and their taxation can be levied as input or 
output taxation (Sterner 2003). Under a carbon tax, policymakers would thus levy a fee 
for each ton of CO2 emitted or for each ton of carbon contained in fossil fuels. The tax 
would motivate agents to cut back on their emissions if the cost of doing so was less 
than the cost of paying the tax. As a result, the tax would place an upper limit on the 
cost of reducing emissions, but the total amount of CO2 that would be emitted in any 
given year would be uncertain (Congressional Budget Office 2008). 
As a substitute for the international emission trade’s binding international or national 
emissions limits, harmonized carbon taxes could be implemented. Under this approach, 
countries would agree to penalize carbon emissions at an internationally harmonized 
carbon price or carbon tax. The carbon price might be determined by estimates of the 
price necessary to limit GHG concentrations or temperature changes below some level 
thought to be dangerous interference, or it might be the price that would induce the 
efficient level of control (Nordhaus 2008). 
There is no international experience of this approach in the environmental arena. 
Nevertheless, there is extensive international experience of the use of harmonized price-
type measures in fiscal and trade policies, such as the harmonization of taxes in the 
European Union (EU) and harmonized tariffs in international trade (Nordhaus 2008). 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that European Union seriously considered a 
carbon tax prior starting the Emission Trading Scheme.    
                                                 
40 See Chapter 3.8, Figure 9 
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Renewable energy generation can be supported directly or indirectly via the tax system. 
Forms of direct taxation include tax exemptions or refunds of energy taxes, tax 
deductions for renewable energy power buyers, renewable energy generation, or tax 
exemptions for investments in small-scale renewable energy generation. SO2, CO2 and 
NOX taxes, on the other hand, favour indirectly the development of renewable energy 
generation (Paun 2004, Enzensberger, Wietschel et al. 2002). 
One example of a highly effective, tax-based instrument for renewable energy 
generation is the United States’ production tax credit (PTC). The PTC reduces the price 
of wind-generated electricity by roughly 2 cents/kWh41 on a 20-year level basis (Wiser, 
Bolinger et al. 2007). Connected to other subsidies, such as renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS) “the United States green certificate”, it has been quite generous and has 
thus made wind power investments attractive to electric utilities and other investors. 
Created through the Energy Policy Act of 1992, after 1999 it was always reinstated for 
short time periods only. This led to boom-bust cycles in the industry (Lauber 2004). 
PTC’s effect is well presented by Figure 14, which shows the remarkable changes in the 
new annual capacity.  
                                                 
41 EUR/USD = 1.3617  Æ USD 0.02 = EUR 0.0147  (8.1.2009) (Bank of Finland 2009) 
  
 
 
Figure 14:  United States Annual and Cumulative Wind Capacity (Wiser, Bolinger et al. 
2007) 
Even though PTC was seen as being effective when active, Wiser, Bolinger et al. (2007) 
points out that it did not create a very healthy market base for the long-term renewable 
energy generation investment development. There are quite a few possible negative 
impacts of the PTC expirations and short-term extensions that generated boom-bust 
cycles. Uncertainty in the near-term future availability of the PTC may have 
undermined rational industry planning, project development, and manufacturing 
investment. In addition, it might have eroded the long-term research and development 
spending and made rational transmission expansion planning very difficult, as well as 
causing peak construction prices during the boom period, thereby leading to higher 
supply costs and lower levels of new wind project capacity additions (Wiser, Bolinger et 
al. 2007).  
5.3  Green Certificates 
The green certificate (GC) is a market-based quota mechanism that is established in 
Belgium, Italy, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in Europe 
(Fouquet, Johansson 2008) (see Figures 2 and 3).  It is also used in the United States 
where it is called the renewable portfolio standard (RPS).  In these systems a defined 
member of the electricity supply chain, be it consumer, retailer, distributor, or producer, 
has to present a fixed minimum quantity of certificates each year, as set by a public 
authority (Morthorst 2003a). The certificates originate per MWh of renewable energy 
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electricity generated. An obligated party thus may generate himself or purchase 
certificates on a certificate market. The obligated party may pass on the cost of 
certificates to the consumer (Fouquet, Johansson 2008).  
The idea behind this mechanism is that a renewable electricity producer may receive 
financial benefit in two ways: by selling the electricity on the network at market price 
and by selling certificates on the green certificate market (Menanteau, Finon et al. 
2003). This means that the target of renewable energy under the green certificate system 
is set by the government and the certificate price is determined by the market as 
presented in Figure 15 (Fouquet, Johansson 2008). 
 
Figure 15: How Green Certificate Works (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004).  
With more renewable electricity generated than required by the target, the price will fall 
close to zero, and the investments in renewable energy will have to rely on the revenue 
collected from electricity sales only. Conversely, if the amount of renewable electricity 
is not reached, the price might climb very high (Fouquet, Johansson 2008). In the same 
manner as the emission trade with green certificates, similar flex mechanisms can be 
used to secure a certain price ceiling or floor price. Furthermore, banking of certificates 
can be used to cut the volatility of the certificate market price (Amundsen, E. S. 2006).  
5.4  Feed-in Tariff 
The United States was the first country to introduce a national feed-in law, the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), in 1978. Feed-in policies were next mobilised 
in Denmark, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland in the early 1990s. 
By 2007, at the very least 37 countries had adopted such policies (REN21 2007). 
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A feed-in tariff is a “pricing law”, under which producers of renewable energy are paid 
a set rate for their electricity. Normally this rate is differentiated according to the 
technology used and the size of the installation. The suitable rate is defined as well as 
possible, in order to ensure profitable operation and to avoid an unreasonable burden for 
consumers (Mendonça 2007).  
The quantity of renewable energy produced is decided by the markets as Figure 16 
describes (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004). The payments are guaranteed for long 
periods that normally cover the significant proportion of the working life of the 
installation. Grid operators are often obliged to provide priority access to the grid for 
renewable energy installations (Mendonça 2007). Therefore if the price is set too high 
the quantity might expand a great deal and cause high total cost of the instrument. 
Contrarily, if the price is set too low, the targeted quantity might not be reached or even 
approached (Green Stream Network 2007).    
 
Figure 16: How a Feed-in Tariff Works (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004). 
The additional costs of the schemes are paid by suppliers in proportion to their sales 
volume and are passed through to the consumers by way of the premium on the kilowatt 
hour (kWh) end-users’ price (Mendonça 2007). A modification of the feed-in tariff 
scheme is the fixed premium mechanism currently used for example in Spain as an 
optional mechanism (del Río 2008b). The premium mechanism guarantees producers of 
renewable energy a fixed-rate premium above electricity market prices (del Río, Gual 
2007). 
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5.5  Other Economical Incentives 
The main focus of this thesis is with the above-introduced policy instruments. 
Especially in the case of renewable energy policy instruments, the academic debate has 
centred around different modifications of feed-in tariffs and green certificates and their 
relative superiority. In the case of climate politics, the academic debate is still highly 
concentrated around emissions trade. A few studies are arguing on behalf of carbon tax. 
As noted above, these instruments are not functioning in a vacuum, and thus other 
policy instruments might play a highly significant role on their side or as a primary 
instrument. They also offer a good comparison template and their good qualities might 
be integrated into the above-mentioned instruments.  
5.5.1  Investment Grants 
Governments can grant companies, corporations and municipalities assistance for 
investment projects and surveys that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, promote 
renewable energy generation, or help to secure and diversify the energy supply. For 
example in the Finnish case, where this instrument is actively used, the investment 
assistance can be between 25% and 40%, depending on the nature of the undertaking 
(Hiltunen 2004).  
5.5.2  Bidding Process 
Competitive bidding systems have been used in the United Kingdom under the Non-
Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) set up in 1991. This was concerned with different 
renewable energy technologies. Similar schemes existed in France with the Eole 2005 
programme that was set up in 1996 to promote wind energy (Menanteau, Finon et al. 
2003). 
In the case of competitive bidding processes, the regulator defines a reserved market for 
a given amount of renewable energy generation and organises a tender between 
renewable producers to allocate this amount. After the tender, electric utilities are 
obliged to purchase the electricity from the power producers. The tender focuses on the 
price per kWh proposed during the bidding process. Proposals are classified in 
increasing order of cost until the amount to be contracted is reached. Each of the 
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renewable energy generators selected is awarded a long-term contract to supply 
electricity at the pay-as-bid price. The implicit subsidies attributed to each generator 
correspond to the difference between the bid price and the market price (Menanteau, 
Finon et al. 2003). The difference compared to a feed-in tariff is that the price is not set 
upfront, but through tender. The additional costs are ultimately borne by electricity 
customers or taxpayers (Winkler 2005).  
5.5.3  Niche Market Creation 
Niche market creation is used for creating markets for currently expensive emission 
mitigation technologies or renewable energy technologies that may have future potential 
but which cannot compete yet in the market place (del Río 2008a, Barreto, Kemp 2008). 
The niche market principle is to allow technology to benefit from learning effects so 
that costs reduce and the technology’s performance can improve. In time the new 
technology may then become competitive with the existing technology in the wider 
market. In other words, the niche market offers a safe growth base for technologies to 
develop and become competitive in order to be able to compensate incumbent 
technologies in future (Kemp, Schot et al. 1998) (Foxon, Pearson 2008). For example, a 
niche market can be developed by setting government technology procurement 
programmes, such as the heat pump programme in Sweden (1995-1996) or compact 
fluorescent lightning programme in the United States in 1998 (Lund 2007). 
Niche market creation is not a precise instrument, and hence it could be upgraded to be 
one of the sub-categories. Green certificates, for example, are one way to create niche 
markets (Midttun, Gautesen 2007). In this thesis I have down-graded it inside other 
economic incentives. However, it could be put under the regulations and standards 
category as well. The best categorisation for niche market creation would be creating 
markets.   
5.6  Regulations and Standards 
Regulation and standard policy instruments are based on demand and control, and 
nicknamed “sticks”. This refers to forcing the relevant actors to behave in the desired 
manner. The market players are forced by law to reduce their business options to a set of 
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behaviours defined to be acceptable for the authority concerned (Enzensberger, 
Wietschel et al. 2002). Regulations might make producers responsible for their waste 
production, prohibit the use of certain harmful substances, set limits on emissions, 
enforce certain technical standards, restrict certain activities in special areas such as 
nature reserves or designate car-free areas in cities, and control land use planning 
(Ministry of the Environment 2009). 
Regulatory standards are the most common form of environmental regulation. Two 
broad classes of regulatory standards are technology and performance standards. 
Technology standards for example may mandate specific emission abatement 
technologies or production methods. For example, environmental permit permission 
may be based on Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Costs 
(BATNEEC). Performance standards demand specific outcomes per unit of product. In 
this context, where a technology standard might demand specific CO2 capture and 
storage methods from a power plant, a performance standard would limit emissions to a 
certain number of grams of  CO2 per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated (IPCC 
2007a).  
Most often, economic policy instruments are based on regulative policy. The EU’s 
emission trading scheme is based on the Kyoto Protocol, and European member-states’   
national renewable energy policy schemes are guided strongly by EU directives42.  
5.7  Information Instruments 
“Sermons”, such as public disclosure, labelling programmes, or awareness and 
education campaigns are implemented to guide consumers as well as companies to 
make better-informed choices. Information instruments can be used on their own or to 
improve the effectiveness of other instruments (IPCC 2007a). 
                                                 
42 See Chapter 2.2.2  
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5.8  Research and Development 
Versatile research and development (R&D) can enable the emergence of new 
innovations and the advancement of existing technologies. The key principle of most 
policy instruments for climate policy and renewable energy generation is to boost R&D 
indirectly (IPCC 2007a). Hence R&D can be seen as a by-product of almost all the 
above-mentioned policy instruments. However, R&D can and should also be subsidised 
directly. Direct R&D policies, for example R&D grants, should be implemented 
especially in the cases of new potential technologies that are in the early innovative 
phase of the product cycle (Midttun, Gautesen 2007).  Other direct R&D policies 
include for instance the enhancement of international co-operation and knowledge 
sharing. 
5.9  Voluntary Instruments 
Companies and other organisations may want voluntarily to adopt a variety of market-
based measures to highlight their own contributions towards improving the environment 
(Ministry of the Environment 2009).  This is done for public relations, insurance rebate, 
and especially for image reasons (Sterner 2003, IPCC 2007a, Ministry of the 
Environment 2009). Voluntary instruments can appear highly attractive, especially in 
the cases when there is for instance a lack of resources to control and monitor polluting 
behaviour. Furthermore, they can be implemented by authorities to show the future way 
and give a hint that “Sticks” may be used in the future if voluntary instruments do not 
have the desired effect (Sterner 2003). Voluntary instruments include energy-saving 
agreements as well as commitments to continuous environmental improvements through 
EMAS or ISO 14001 environmental management systems (Ministry of the Environment 
2009).   
5.10  Other Policies 
It is often noticed that other policies may play a key role in how well policy instruments 
for climate policy and renewable energy generation work. As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, the impact of climate policy can be adversely affected by non-compliance by 
major emission countries, but as well as by policy failures with other policies like fossil 
fuel subsidies. In addition, policies for land use, structural reforms, population, and 
  
international trade among many others play a crucial role in how well climate policy can 
work (IPCC 2007a).          
Planning permission procedures, land rent, or loan granting and grid connection polices 
can play a extremely important role for the success of renewable energy generation 
policy instruments (Butler, Neuhoff 2008). Stumbles with these might cancel out the 
success of an otherwise well-planned policy.  
Policies such as those affecting trade, consumption, and social development goals have 
a strong impact as well. For example, the most cost-efficient equipment might be hard 
to acquire, or the best service impossible to import if high trade barriers exist. Thus it is 
crucial to an understanding of the big picture to try to resolve in the best way possible 
the direct and indirect causes and effects that other polices have on policy instruments 
and vice versa. 
5.11  Main Issues Affecting Policy Decision 
When policies are implemented, stakeholders are primarily interested in two things: 
how it will affect us, and how it will affect our “competitors” (Sterner 2003). Different 
stakeholders have different interests when policies are implemented.  Figure 17 below 
showcases some of the different interests renewable energy generation policy creates.   
 
Figure 17: Stakeholder Interests in Renewable Energy Policy Instruments 
(Enzensberger, Wietschel et al. 2002). 
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Different stakeholders stress very different issues. For example, investors and bankers, 
who can provide equity and loans for new renewable energy projects will require 
interest and a risk-adequate profit for their investment. Project developers and plant 
suppliers are interested in the future market volume. The conventional energy 
businesses are interested in what will happen to their present situation. Consumers are 
interested in low or lower costs. System operators have to ensure a reliable and 
technically efficient electricity supply within a market. In this respect, system operators 
will be especially interested in the high technical efficiency of a policy instrument 
(Enzensberger, Wietschel et al. 2002). 
The settlement of the necessary administrative tasks related to policy instruments can 
result in significant transaction costs. Agents may thus request financial compensation, 
a high administrative efficiency of a policy instrument, and/or a possibility to pass these 
costs on to their end-customers. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
politically active ecologists may on the other hand demand a high effectiveness from a 
new environmental policy instrument without considering in detail what costs a specific 
measure might cause for certain market players. Finally, national as well as international 
policy-makers have to try to find a compromise that is possible to implement 
(Enzensberger, Wietschel et al. 2002). 
For this reason, the viewpoint from which we scrutinise the situation depends in great 
measure on what policy instrument is preferred. The next chapter will examine further 
what are the suitable criteria that might be used for wider evaluation of policy 
instruments. Depending on the predominant market circumstances, there are some rules 
of thumb that are enjoy a high degree of consensus from the viewpoint of total 
wellbeing, and which can be used when selecting policy instruments. 
Firstly, with heterogeneity in abatement costs and everything else remaining the same, 
economic instruments are preferred over regulations and standards (Sterner 2003, 
Nykänen 2006, Romstad 2000). On the other hand, if abatement costs are highly 
homogeneous, possible cheaper administrative costs might make regulation and 
standards a better solution compared with economic instruments (Romstad 2000). In the 
case of greenhouse gas emissions, the abatement costs are seen to be highly 
heterogeneous, and as such economic instruments may be preferred. 
  
Secondly, turning to the uncertainty about marginal costs and/or benefits, when 
marginal costs are steeper than the marginal benefits, price-type policies should be 
preferred. On the other hand, if marginal costs are flatter than the benefits curves, 
quantity-based policy instruments should be preferred to meet the targets most 
efficiently (Weitzman 1974) (Sterner 2003, Söderholm 2008a). Figure 18 below 
illustrates a framework for analysing the economic efficiency of the two climate policy 
support mechanisms: price- and quota-based, with uncertainty on abatement costs 
and/or benefits prevailing.43
 
Figure 18: Deadweight Loss of Price versus Quantities44
An economically efficient abatement requires that the price or quota be at the level 
where the marginal benefits (MB) equal marginal costs (MC)45. As shown in Figure 18, 
                                                 
43 For the same proof from the renewable energy generation policy instruments’ point of view, see 
(Söderholm 2008a). 
44 Imitates figures presented in (Weitzman 1974) and (Sterner 2003). 
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the price and quota instruments do not lead to symmetric under- and over-regulation, 
but to radically different end results. With overestimated marginal cost (dashed lines), 
the regulator will aim for Oe instead of O, and the price level (P) will be too high, 
leading to over-abatement (Ap). On the other hand, regulation will be too light (at AQ), 
but the size of the economic welfare cost caused, as measured by deadweight46 losses, 
depends on the relative slope in the marginal abatement and cost curves. “If errors in 
judgement are assumed and the sum of expected consumer and producer losses 
minimised, then the expected losses turn out to be different with price- and quota-based 
instruments, as shown by the relative size of the deadweight triangles” (Sterner 2003, 
Söderholm 2008a). 
Thus, if the marginal benefits of abatement are flat and the marginal abatement cost 
steep, then one can predict with quite good accuracy that the “price” for emission and 
the loss due to the price-based instrument will be small. The exact quota level is 
difficult to predict precisely, and the risk of large cost is considerable with the quota-
based instrument. The opposite applies when the marginal cost of abatement is flat and 
the benefit of abatement (or pollution damage) is steep. The deadweight loss is large, 
owing to the excessively high level of the price-based instrument, whereas the error 
level caused by a quota-based instrument is small (Sterner 2003).        
Thirdly, in the case of fast technological progress, a quota-based instrument, e.g. 
emission trade, may result in less abatement than a price-based instrument, e.g. tax, 
because progress makes allowances cheaper, and lowers the incentives more than a tax 
would. For similar reasons, emission trade might lead to stronger price-based incentives 
in the presence of economic growth or inflation, as these factors raise the allowance 
price above that of a fixed tax.    
                                                                                                                                               
45 See Chapter 3.8, Figure 9. 
46 Deadweight losses: “Can be applied to any deficiency due to an inefficient allocation of resources. Lost 
production due to inaccurate forecasting for labour is an example of a deadweight loss” (Investopedia 
2009).  
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Last but not least, the long-term and short-term goals should be examined from various 
perspectives. For example, in the short-term the renewable energy generation instrument 
should be designed to encourage penetration of currently available renewable energy 
technologies. Furthermore, this should drive the long-term technological improvement 
of the renewable energy technologies in order that these can compete directly without 
usage of price or quota instruments. “The difficulty confronting policymakers is that 
these short-term and long-term goals are unlikely to be perfectly aligned, since 
technological progress is endogenous. In other words, policies enacted today affect 
current and future R&D behaviour, which in turn affects innovation rates and 
technological progress” (Lesser, Su 2008). Most importantly, these effects might be 
counterintuitive: increasing subsidies may, in fact, adversely affect the rate of 
technological progress. This is because the relative expected returns to renewable 
energy technology investments favour technologies that are more promising in the long 
term rather than in the short term; too great a subsidy may encourage more rapid growth 
of near-term renewable energy technologies, thus diverting investment resources away 
from medium-term renewable energy technologies. Too great a subsidy may also 
encourage investment in renewable technologies that are highly speculative and far 
removed from practical application. “If so, the probability of technological setbacks will 
increase, leading to increased perceived financial risk of investment in such 
technologies and reducing incentives for further investment” (Lesser, Su 2008). 
Therefore policymakers must determine what will maximize the rate of technological 
improvement for each technology encompassed (Lesser, Su 2008). 
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6 Criteria for Judging Policy Instruments 
This chapter first explores the requirements for judging the criteria for selecting policy 
instruments, and introduces the criteria that were chosen for this survey. In this thesis, 
seventeen different criteria have been selected, from effectiveness to technology 
maturity neutrality. These criteria are then used in the next chapter to highlight what 
criteria were used in selected research papers, what criteria have been omitted, and what 
might have been good to include.    
In the decision-making context, criterion is defined as some sort of standard by which 
one particular choice or course of action would be judged to be more pleasing than 
another (Belton, Stewart 2002). Sterner (Sterner 2003) emphasises that economists 
generally presume that the most important criterion for society is welfare maximisation, 
and that this welfare can be measured as a function of individual utilities. Because the 
utility and welfare functions might be too complicated to be operational, it is common 
to have several unrelated sub-criteria (Sterner 2003).   
Another way to express and see welfare maximisation is cost-benefit logic. It 
summarises neatly the general principle in selecting policies that cost money one way or 
another. Policy benefits should be higher than the policy costs (Pearce 2002). Here a 
cost can be seen as any lost of wellbeing and a benefit is any gain in wellbeing. Hence it 
could be the ultimate criterion to judge an instrument. Just select the one policy or the 
policy portfolio that gives the highest benefit/cost ratio. It is very difficult to calculate 
all the benefits or costs in monetary terms and thus it is common to set the targets and 
choose the policy instrument based on some subjectively relevant principle(s), in other 
words sub-criteria (Pearce 2002).     
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This thesis presents a selection of seventeen sub-criteria that can be seen in Table 7. 
These criteria are neither perfectly clear nor completely separable. Nevertheless, they 
should give at least a wide theoretical test and estimation of the basis for different 
policy instruments, and in this way help to spot the right policy for certain goals and 
situations.  
Table 7: List of Criteria for Judging Policy Instruments (Continues two next pages) 
1)Effectiveness 
How well goals that support initial vision, mission, and strategy are achieved. In 
other words, the instruments that achieve desired goals better and produce more 
powerful effects than alternative instruments can be said to have a higher degree 
of effectiveness (Sterner 2003, Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003, IPCC 2007a, 
Menanteau, Finon et al. 2003).  
2)Cost-Efficiency 
The instrument that achieves goals at the least cost has the best cost-efficiency. 
Indeed, being cost-efficient means producing results with as little wasted effort 
as possible. Specifically it is the ability to carry out actions with least marginal 
cost. From a time perspective it can be divided into two sub-units, statistic cost-
efficiency and dynamic cost-efficiency.   
      
A) Statistic cost-efficiency 
Today, a single time period’s costs are minimised. It is described well by the 
equi-marginal principle, which expresses that a necessary condition for the 
least-cost provision of a particular quantity is that the marginal costs of the 
multiple sources of supply equate (Kildegaard 2008). 
 
B) Dynamic cost-efficiency 
It requires that the present value of the costs of the delivery of the flow of 
practices be minimised. In other words, dynamic cost-efficiency takes into 
consideration impacts and outcomes of today’s decisions for the future. It 
weighs up cost-efficiency from the point of view of what will be the path or 
strategy that gives the lowest cost in the long run (del Río 2008a).  
3)Lack of Bias  
Are the desired changes similar to the goals? Are there many side-effects that 
were not predicted beforehand? This criterion evaluates more the instruments’ 
implementation than the instruments themselves. With the help of empirical 
studies it might be possible to determine which instruments have had more 
tendencies to have biases between desired and achieved goals.       
4)Equity and Fairness 
Estimates how fairly costs and benefits are directed to the right agents, if these 
can be specified. In the case of equity and fairness it may be hard to be 
objective, because they are seen differently by different people, for example 
subject to the cultural background of the observer (Sterner 2003, IPCC 2007a, 
Nordhaus 2008). 
5)Effects on Economy 
Estimates how strongly the instrument changes the economic balance between 
initial consumer, investor, and government in the short as well as in the long 
run, i.e. intertemporally. Economists typically point out that there is no such 
thing as a free lunch. In one way or another things that seem to be free or even 
wealth-enhancing are always paid for in some way. Finding an all-positive 
solution inside of economies is often impossible. Criterion functions as a referee 
of where the money is taken from and where it is distributed. Therefore, it 
should be strongly in conjunction with consumers’, investors’, and 
government’s instrument approval prospects at the same time as it overlaps 
strongly with the fairness and equity criterion.    
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6)Flexibility 
 
Judges how easily the instrument is adjusted in the presence of new 
information. Is there is a possibility to adapt and correct an instrument 
afterwards in a situation where some new item of information proves that the 
instrument is not functional, and is the instrument rigid and hard to adjust to a 
changed environment. This criterion is partly an antonym for investor’s 
predictability.      
7)Rent-Seeking  
The criterion judges how much the instrument may cause manipulation attempts 
among promoted stakeholders. Are subsidy levels strictly specified by this 
instrument, or are there possible ways to affect individual subsidy amounts, for 
example by lobbying? (Sterner 2003).         
8)Investor’s 
Predictability 
Judges how foreseeable the instrument’s effects are. How well can investors 
take into account beforehand the instrument’s impacts for the investments and 
how possible are the changes during the investment life-cycle (Arasto 2006).  
9)Author’s 
Predictability 
The criterion judges how foreseeable the instrument’s effects are from the 
authority’s point of view. How well instrument’s future cost effects can be 
predicted to avoid an unexpectedly severe burden. Author’s and investor’s 
predictability will collide in most of the cases.   
10)Decision-Making 
Feedback 
Estimates how well and how easily authority can get ex post feedback of the 
instrument, and how simple is the ex post feedback to understand. For example, 
can cost be calculated rapidly from a budget or does the total cost hide behind 
multiple factors? 
11)The Complexity of 
Decision 
Does the authority or international organisation have to make decisions without 
well-documented and unambiguous background data? Is it easy for the authority 
to make wise decisions that relate to the instrument or does the authority have to 
resort to guesswork? How hidden is the future prediction and is it possible to 
make major mistakes that might have radical effects in the future?        
12)Ease of Control 
 
Judges how simple policy implementation, monitoring, and surveillance are. For 
example, does the author need a light or heavy administrative structure around 
the instrument and how much of new resources have to be added? Is it 
expensive and does it need administration during the whole life cycle? Are there 
lots of decisions to be made, for example small projects, or is it well harmonised 
from that point of view?           
13)Functionality in 
Market Environment 
Judges how well the instrument works in a market environment. Neither free 
market competition hinders the instrument’s effectiveness nor does the 
instrument hinder market functioning. This overlaps partly with the 
connectability criterion.  
14)Connectability 
How easily the instrument can be integrated, used, and implemented with other 
instruments and policies. Features of good connectability are that the instrument 
does not overlap or generate confusion between other instruments or policies 
and it functions well in an open market environment (Arasto 2006).  
15)Harmonisation 
Qualities 
Measures international connectability. How easily is the instrument made 
consistent internationally? For example, features of good harmonisation ability 
are that it is possible easily, speedily, and fairly possible to apply the instrument 
internationally, even when different legislation-, culture-, political-, historical-, 
or infrastructure environments have been taken into consideration. How well 
does the instrument work in an open market environment? Hindering the effect 
of other instruments or transgressing international or national legislation are 
also important viewpoints when estimating an instrument’s harmonisation 
ability.   
16)Production                   
Neutrality 
Estimates whether all technologies get the same equitable support, or are some 
technologies preferred over others? (Arasto 2006) 
17)Technology    
Maturity Neutrality   
The criterion evaluates how well the instrument takes the technology life-cycle 
and maturity stage into consideration. Do different technologies, regardless of 
the maturity stage, have similar possibilities to penetrate into the market and in 
particular does the instrument diminish the cost gap between different stages of 
technologies? This criterion can partly be seen as antonym for production 
neutrality.(Arasto 2006) 
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These sub-criteria can help us to judge more profoundly how well different policy 
instruments ex ante would and ex post have reached their goal. As the report of Working 
Group III (IPCC 2007a) points out, criteria may be applied for example in making ex 
ante choices among policy instruments as well as in ex post evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments.  
However, in this thesis the following criteria have been used for the sake of comparing 
different research. The basic idea is that the occurrence of the criteria helps in defining 
outcomes. If a certain criterion is not included in the analysis of the research, its non-
presence may, at least in part, explain the conclusion. If important criteria for analysis 
have been left unnoticed, this might change the final result drastically. This might also 
help to understand the possible differences between the research results if it occurs.  
Indeed, criteria selection can play a crucial role in both research and decision-making, 
and should be done objectively. However, when choosing policy instruments, the 
estimation of different criteria weightings in a multi-criteria situation is complicated, 
and frankly it is impossible to be objective. Criteria weights are considered through 
different parties’ dissimilar interests, favoured choices, and the importance they attach 
to different things.  For example, culture, history, other policies, psychology, and 
expectations all add their own spice to the decision-making and might make different 
criteria weightings more favourable depending on these factors (Sterner 2003). Hence 
even though a certain criterion is taken into consideration, how much it is stressed may 
influence considerably the conclusion of the research.  In this respect remembering the 
big picture plays a crucial role. In the case of a policy instrument performing well with a 
sizeable share of different criteria and achieving seemingly important goals, this might 
still be worthless if at the same time “total” welfare is eroded greatly.  
Another caution that has to be highlighted is that when analysing policy instruments, 
most policy instruments do not have identical benefit streams. In this case, we have to 
be careful when using and especially stressing certain criteria to compare different 
policy instruments.  For example, in the case of relying on the cost-efficiency as a key 
criterion between two policies, we might end up selecting a low-cost policy instrument 
that is not fundamentally economically smart. That is to say, it can advise us to take “a 
fast train to the wrong station” (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). Owing to matters like this, 
once again, mapping the big picture is important. 
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7 Comparison of Applied Approaches in Policy Instrument 
Research 
This chapter introduces the debates, important questions, and phenomena that arise from 
the academic research inside the scope of this thesis. How these questions, debates and 
phenomena were selected is explained in the research methodology in Chapter 1.5. Each 
sub-chapter introduces one interesting academic debate or phenomenon that I have seen 
important to highlight, also introducing new research. Depending on the subject, the 
analysis criteria are either included or left out. In each chapter, each piece of research is 
examined and introduced one by one and the main focus and results for each of them 
concerning the chapter’s topic are highlighted. In some sub-chapters the empirical data 
used in the researches is highlighted. Because of the extensiveness of some of the 
questions, debates, or phenomena, all relevant new pieces of research have not been 
included. Some of the most relevant research that was found, but not included because 
of limited resources, is added at the end of the introduction tables.  
The selection process for the significant questions, debates, and phenomena has 
included partly subjective processing. Thus it is only natural that there might be some 
important issues within the scope of the thesis that are not included in this chapter. It is 
possible that another researcher might have ended up with a different focus altogether. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the issues introduced below are of great importance 
and should be given further evaluation in the future research.           
7.1  Taxation versus Emission Trade versus Hybrid 
After emission trading was locked as a main policy instrument for the Kyoto Protocol 
and implemented in the European Union (EU), there has not been too much public 
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debate about a possible turnaround with the main international climate policy 
instrument. Hence it is obvious and understandable that a major share of the current 
academic debate is concerned with criticising, repairing, or applauding emission trade. 
However, research exists concerning whether harmonised carbon tax or hybrid 
mechanisms47 would in fact function as better policy instruments for climate policy than 
emission trade. Some researchers have challenged the emission trade path and argued 
that there are better ways to fight climate change and implement a price on greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions than the present Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. In addition it is 
interesting point that before Emission Trade Scheme was implemented, Europe was 
quite enthusiastically driving a tax based instrument as an alternative for emission trade. 
However, this thesis emphasises only the current debate. Table 8 presents the found and 
selected research concerning the issue.  
Table 8: Selected Appraised Authors Their Bias, Main Focus and Results (Continues 
next page) 
Author Bias tax / 
emission 
trade 
Main focus Main result for sub-chapter’s 
issue 
What criteria where 
included in the analyse 
(Aldy, Barrett 
et al. 2003) 
tax/ 
hybrid 
A critical 
review of the  
Kyoto 
Protocol and 
13 
alternative 
policy 
recommenda
tions 
Climate policy implementation 
should concentrate on a market-
based approach. Price-based 
mechanisms might be more 
functional (carbon tax or hybrid). 
Review concludes that new 
information about climate change 
should be used to modify Kyoto 
agreement in the future.   
Effectiveness, Cost-
Efficiency, Lack of Bias, 
Equity and Fairness, 
Effects on Economy, 
Flexibility, Rent-Seeking 
 
(Congressional 
Budget Office 
2008) 
Tax Evaluation 
of tax, 
emission 
trade, and 
hybrid 
mechanism 
From efficiency, ease of 
implementation, and international 
consistency criteria perspectives, a 
carbon tax seems to be the most 
feasible alternative. 
Effectiveness, Cost-
Efficiency, Equity and 
Fairness, Effects on 
Economy, Flexibility, 
Rent-Seeking, Decision- 
Making Feedback, The 
Complexity of Decision, 
Ease of Control, 
Connectability, 
Harmonisation Qualities 
 
 
                                                 
47 A hybrid instrument is an instrument where an initial quantity target is coupled with a price ceiling, 
safety valve, or trigger price introduced in emission trade sub-chapter. A hybrid instrument: “will perform 
at least as well as either a pure tax or permit scheme” (Pizer 2002).    
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(Ellerman, 
Joskow 2008) 
Emission 
trade 
Evaluation 
of the 
European 
Union 
Emission 
Trading 
Scheme’s 
trial 2005 to 
2007 period 
With the help of the European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme’s 
(EU ETS) trial period experiences, 
cap and trade-based emission trade 
can be repaired to function well. 
Although having plenty of rough 
edges, it was still able to put a 
transparent price on carbon dioxide. 
With the help of different allocation 
(more auctioning) and banking 
methods, it can be adjusted to meet 
the windfall profit and the price 
volatility problems. This concrete 
experiment from EU-ETS might 
foster cap and trade forward in the 
international selection process.  
All except Production 
Neutrality and 
Technology Maturity 
Neutrality 
(Nordhaus 
2007b) 
tax/ 
hybrid 
Prices versus 
quantities in 
economies 
of climate 
change 
Article suggests that a price-type 
instrument such as harmonised 
carbon tax would be more efficient 
than a quantity-type, such as those 
found in Kyoto Protocol. 
Harmonised carbon taxation 
mechanism should be considered 
and brought to the table when 
discussing beyond the Kyoto 
agreements, because of its 
advantage in volatility-, efficiency-, 
implementation- and anti-
corruption issues amongst others. 
All except Production 
Neutrality and 
Technology Maturity 
Neutrality 
(Nordhaus 
2008) 
Tax The 
economics 
of climate 
change 
modelling 
International treaty should be made 
as close as possible to optimal 
policy, thus avoid locking into 
poorly designed policy like Kyoto 
protocol. One possible efficient 
approach could be internationally 
harmonised carbon taxes. 
All except Lack of Bias,  
Production Neutrality, 
and Technology Maturity 
Neutrality 
(Pizer 2002) tax/ 
hybrid 
Comparison 
of efficiency 
of price and 
quantity 
climate 
policy 
instruments.  
Simulations indicate that the 
expected welfare gain from the 
optimal price policy is five times 
higher than the expected gain from 
the optimal quantity policy. 
Equally, politically attractive hybrid 
policies offer great gains compared 
to quantity policy. Therefore, 
hybrid policy might be an 
interesting alternative for either 
quantity (cap and trade) or a pure 
price (tax) system.   
Effectiveness, Cost- 
Efficiency, Flexibility, 
Effects on Economy, 
Investor’s Predictability  
(Stern 2007) Emission 
trade/ tax 
The 
economics 
of climate 
change 
The key issue is to implement price 
for emissions; this can be done 
either with emission trade or tax. 
All criteria included. 
Nevertheless, some have 
argued that Stern has 
been optimistic about the 
abatement costs while 
overestimating the 
adaptation costs.   
(Vehmas 2005)* 
(Wagner, Wegmayr 2006)* 
*Additional relevant material that was found 
but not included in the analysis 
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To the question of which instrument - emission trade, carbon tax, or hybrid - would be 
the best, Weitzman answers the following: “From a strictly theoretical point of view 
there is really nothing to recommend one mode of control over the other” (Weitzman 
1974). Then again, in the real world, the preferred instrument depends on several 
factors, which are far from being clear-cut. The handiest way to solve which of these 
instruments is the best would be by calculating the cost and benefit ratio or welfare 
gains for all of them. This has been done in several studies. For example in the 
simulations carried out by Pizer (2002), he pointed out that welfare gains from optimal 
price-type climate policy (carbon tax) would be five times higher than the expected 
gains from the optimal quantity-type policy (emission trade). Furthermore, a hybrid 
policy would be an attractive alternative to either a pure price or quantity instrument. 
Nordhaus (2008, 2007b) ended up with similar results in his simulations.  
However, these kinds of simulations are adjusted with initial value guesswork. It also 
requires that everything is measured in monetary terms, which is extremely complicated 
and imposes a huge amount of dilemmas that cannot be resolved by unambiguous 
definitions. Thus to be able to understand the differences between the instruments it is 
preferred to examine the instruments using different criteria (Pearce 2002).  
Emission trade is a highly effective climate policy instrument if there is a strict quota, 
which will ensure that the target will be met. Carbon tax, on the other hand, might 
produce a result where the target is not reached if the tax is too low, or then it is 
overshot if the tax is set too high (Congressional Budget Office 2008). However, “right” 
quantity limits are hard to predict, particularly because targets must adapt to different 
levels of economic growth, uncertain technological change, and evolving science. Thus 
there will be a great challenge in how to take due account of changing conditions while 
setting the target (Nordhaus 2008). 
Emission trade is an efficient and unbiased way to meet the set target. The price of 
allowance will adjust in accordance with the supply and demand (Ellerman, Joskow 
2008). The carbon tax, on the other hand, might cause an oversized burden for emitters 
if the level is set too high (Congressional Budget Office 2008). However, in the case of 
high uncertainty of the right target, the cost-efficiency of emission trade is seen to 
deteriorate.  
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“The reason is that the benefits of emissions reductions are related to the stock of 
greenhouse gases, while the costs of emissions reductions are related to the flow of 
emissions. This implies that the marginal costs of emissions reductions are highly 
sensitive to the level of reductions, while the marginal benefits of emissions reductions 
are insensitive to the current level of emissions reductions” (Nordhaus 2008). 
In other words, this means that the marginal benefits of emissions are flat and the 
marginal abatement cost are steep, which indicates that carbon taxes are more efficient 
than quantitative mechanisms such as emission trade, as was demonstrated earlier in 
Chapter 5 (Nordhaus 2008).  If marginal benefits would be steep compared to marginal 
abatement costs, quantity instruments would be preferred, which might well be the case 
after a certain temperature increase has occurred (Stern 2007). However, in that case, 
i.e. under a strongly kinked benefits curve, the paramount concern would be to make 
drastic cuts in emissions and the actual choice of policy instrument would be relatively 
unimportant (Pizer 2002).  
To avoid competitive advantages and unfairness between different national industries, 
similar carbon tax rates or emission trade schemes should be preferred (Aldy, Barrett et 
al. 2003, Congressional Budget Office 2008). However, Nordhaus implies that “Strong 
and internationally harmonized steps to raise the price of carbon, whether by taxes or 
by quantitative restrictions, will have substantial impacts on the distribution of income. 
This raises issues of fairness and ability to pay, both among nations and across 
households within a nation” (Nordhaus 2008). In addition to this, questions about who 
is to be responsible for paying and who will get the biggest distribution of benefits from 
abatement might cause conflict between both nations and households (Aldy, Barrett et 
al. 2003). Especially developing countries might be reluctant to cooperate at least at the 
same level as developed countries, for the obvious reason that they have not caused the 
problem and they have the most to lose (Nordhaus 2008). To some extent, these issues 
can be handled by favourable allocations of emissions allowances under the emission 
trade scheme. In the same way, part of the carbon taxation revenues could be used to 
alleviate the economic hardships of developing countries (Nordhaus 2008). This could 
be done as well with the emission trading scheme, if an auction mechanism were to be 
used (Ellerman, Joskow 2008). 
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As new knowledge comes along, neither fundamental emission trade nor carbon tax 
proves to be very flexible policy instruments. It often takes time to change tax 
regulations, and the normal preference is to set emission trade periods for at least a few 
years (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003). However, with both cases, adjustment mechanisms 
could be implemented.   
To avoid rent-seeking with the carbon tax, emission trade, or hybrid schemes the 
participating countries should implement similar systems that would include a similar 
level of monitoring and enforcement provisions. If this is not the case, rent-seeking 
would most probably emerge (Congressional Budget Office 2008). Rent-seeking might 
be especially high with the emission trading scheme, because there is a huge money 
flow in the allowances, and cheating could be worth billions. Carbon tax might not 
cause such a high inducement for rent-seeking, because there are no allowances 
transferred to countries (Nordhaus 2008).       
Uncertainties affect prices. Because supply, demand, and regulatory conditions develop 
unpredictably over time, emission trade schemes are likely to cause volatile trading 
prices of carbon emissions. “Price volatility for allowances is likely to be particularly 
high because of the complete inelasticity of the supply of permits, along with the highly 
inelastic demand for permits in the short run”(Nordhaus 2008). This has been the case 
with the European emission trading scheme as well with the U.S. sulphur dioxide 
trading scheme. This has therefore hampered predictability for both the investors as well 
as the author. However, this could be partly avoided with hybrid mechanisms or by 
implementing banking mechanisms (Ellerman, Joskow 2008). 
Both emission trade and carbon tax will cause a vast amount of indirect effects. Hence it 
is quite hard to get well-aimed decision-making feedback. However, in the case of 
emission trade the price of carbon - and conversely in the case of carbon tax the amount 
of emissions - will give very good view of the big picture and inform decision-makers 
how well the prediction went. 
There is high complexity when deciding the optimal price of the carbon tax as well as in 
determining the cap in emission trade schemes. Depending on how one sees the 
uncertainty situation mentioned above, the inefficiency risk is higher or lower with 
carbon tax. Allocations made by grandfathering, relative to auctioning, make the 
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complexity increase in the case of emission trade. Here the hybrid mechanism may help 
decision-makers avoid serious mistakes that depend on the level of uncertainty 
(Congressional Budget Office 2008, Nordhaus 2008, Sterner 2003). A hybrid instrument 
will perform at least as well as either carbon tax or emission trade (Pizer 2002).      
The ease of control depends to a large degree on how the instrument is implemented: 
upstream, downstream, or somewhere in the middle. Upstream, i.e. high level, carbon 
tax or emission trade would not require monitoring emissions as well as being relatively 
easy to implement. However, emission trade will need a new administrative 
infrastructure to check allowance transfers and holdings. On the other hand, carbon tax 
might be easy to build on the administrative infrastructure for existing taxes 
(Congressional Budget Office 2008).  When we move to downstream, the actors are 
multiplied considerably. This brings a greater control base. In conclusion, the ease of 
control is highly dependent how the instrument is implemented. 
Emission trade, carbon tax, and hybrid solutions will distort markets by entailing new 
balance that is supposed to be at least more environmentally friendly. Compared with 
strict regulation, they are much more market-friendly. However, this of course once 
again demands that at least all similar global markets are treated fairly, and thus carbon 
leakage and other negative effects are not encouraged (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003).     
When carbon tax and emission trade are connected with other policies or they are 
harmonised internationally, they bring different dilemmas into play. For example, in the 
case of carbon tax, if an international carbon tax is set to 50$/ton of carbon dioxide, it 
can be easily undermined if a country sets for example a 50$ subsidy on coal. Thus, 
consistency would require comparable verification and enforcement. In the emission 
trading case, national subsidies or other policies would not have the same effect and 
would not therefore cause difficulties. However, as mentioned above, rent-seeking 
might emerge as a problem, because a few countries could undermine the entire linked 
trading system by inconsistent monitoring and enforcement (Congressional Budget 
Office 2008). Hence, once again the hybrid instrument could help to abate the 
incentives for rent-seeking (Nordhaus 2008). 
Emission trade and carbon tax as well as hybrid instruments are all production-neutral 
from a renewable energy generation point of view. In the case of conventional 
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production, low emission production is of course supported. However, in the case of 
emission trade, if the allowances are grandfathered, some production mechanism might 
be preferred over another, depending on how the user allocates the allowances. 
Furthermore, depending on how the instruments are implemented, inconsistencies in 
production neutrality can occur.  
Neither carbon tax, emission trade, nor the hybrid path will take technology maturity 
into consideration. Thus, if there is a wish to support immature technologies, there need 
to be technology-specific instruments. However, high carbon taxes and strict emission 
trade caps give high incentives for low-emission innovations. Nevertheless, they are 
seen to promote too much by way of short-run innovations and they do not give enough 
incentive for long-run technology development and innovation (del Río 2008a). 
In well-designed policies, abatement and adaptation costs can be kept reasonable. Badly 
designed ones, then again, are unlikely to make a difference. They will generate 
substantial costs and might cool the enthusiasm for the whole adaptation process and 
thus hurt the future possibility to use more efficient approaches. In addition, it is often 
seen that overly ambitious projects are likely to be full of loopholes, exemptions, and 
compromises, and thereby might cause more economic damage than benefit (Nordhaus 
2008). 
Defining which policy should be selected is definitely no easy task.  There is evidence 
that by learning, adapting new information from former experiences, and by correcting 
observed errors, emission trade can be made to function nicely as a climate policy 
(Ellerman, Joskow 2008). However, there are academic arguments that price 
mechanisms, either carbon tax or hybrid tax-quota, should be preferred over emission 
trade (Congressional Budget Office 2008, Nordhaus 2007b, Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003, 
Nordhaus 2008, Pizer 2002). For this reason, before locking in emission trade as a 
number one choice it might be valuable at least to have serious global discussion about 
the possible alternatives (Aldy, Barrett et al. 2003).  
7.2  Feed-in Tariff versus Green Certificates 
In the field of renewable energy generation, two policy instruments and their derivatives 
are currently at the centre of the academic debate. This debate can be summarised as 
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follows: which instrument should be preferred as a primary renewable energy policy 
instrument, the feed-in tariff or green certificate? Even though there is a great amount of 
theory in addition to some empirical results to resolve this question, the final statement 
is far from unambiguous. Depending on how different criteria are weighted or how the 
instrument is implemented, one can end up with very different conclusions. In the case 
of feed-in tariff what will be the output depends totally on what is the selected tariff 
price level. Same case is with the green certificate’s selected quantity. It should be also 
emphasised that even though the focus is with feed-in tariff and green certificates, other 
instruments should not be forgotten. They might act as valuable components or even as 
substitutes. Below a selection of authors and their studies are presented.   
Table 9: Selected Appraised Authors: Their Bias, Main Focus & Results and Criteria 
Included (Continues three next pages) 
Author Bias Green 
Certificate / 
Feed-in 
Tariff 
Main focus Main result for sub-chapter’s issue What criteria 
were included 
in the analysis 
(Arasto 
2006) 
Neutral Policy 
instruments for 
renewable 
energy 
generation – 
investor’s 
viewpoint 
Feed-in tariff is demonstrated to be 
functional and effective. 
Nevertheless, it is normally 
connected with relatively high 
subsidy level and it does not function 
well in open electricity markets or 
with other promotion policy 
instruments. Green certificates, on the 
other hand, function well in open 
electricity markets and in theory it is 
cost-effective, though other results 
are also gained.      
All except Rent-
seeking & 
Author’s 
Predictability 
 
 
(Butler, 
Neuhoff 
2008) 
Feed-in 
tariff 
Comparison of 
feed-in tariff, 
green 
certificate, and 
bidding 
mechanism to 
support wind 
power 
Empirical study shows that the 
German feed-in tariff to date 
managed cheaper price/wind MWh, 
greater competition, as well as 
deployment compared with bidding 
process and green certificate system. 
Effectiveness, 
Cost-Efficiency, 
Lack of Bias, 
Equity and 
Fairness, Effects 
on Economy, & 
Predictability  
(Carlén 
2006) 
neutral Comparison of 
different feed-in 
tariff and green 
certificate 
models under 
uncertainty  
If future electricity price is highly 
uncertain, feed-in tariff based on 
premium is likely to be inferior 
instrument. On the other hand if 
future electricity consumption is 
highly uncertain, green certificate 
bound to electricity consumption is 
likely to be inferior instrument. Based 
on actual market functioning, the 
green certificate instrument based on 
fixed quota obligation connected with 
banking and safety valve mechanism 
seems to be the most efficient policy 
instrument to promote renewable 
energy generation.   
Effectiveness, 
Cost-efficiency 
(especially 
dynamic), 
Effects on 
economy, 
Flexibility & 
Harmonisation 
Qualities 
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(Finon, 
Perez 2007) 
Neutral Feed-in tariff, 
bidding, and 
green certificate 
instruments: 
comparison 
from public 
economic and 
transaction cost 
perspectives 
Neither green certificate nor feed-in 
tariff offers an optimal solution in 
public economic perspective, nor in 
transaction cost perspective. Hence 
government should select an 
instrument in accordance with the 
relative importance of its objectives. 
All except Rent-
seeking 
(Green 
Stream 
Network 
2007) 
Neutral Review of costs 
and advantages 
of different 
policy 
instruments for 
renewable 
energy 
generation 
Policy instrument’s individual 
implementation is as important as the 
selection of which instrument to use. 
By adjusting the instrument’s 
characteristics, either feed-in tariff 
can be made to look like green 
certificate or vice versa.  
All except Rent-
seeking 
(Haas, 
Eichhammer 
et al. 2004) 
Feed-in 
tariff 
Renewable 
energy 
technology’s 
successful and 
effective 
promotion  
Empirical evidence has shown that in 
the real world, carefully designed 
gradual feed-in tariffs are the 
preferable instrument for a mature 
technology. However, more 
important than the choice of the 
system is the proper design and 
monitoring of the support system 
adopted; in this respect the 
functionality, stability and continuity 
of a policy-support system are crucial 
features.  
All except  
Rent-seeking 
(Kildegaard 
2008) 
Neutral Green certificate 
effect of  over 
investment risk 
and long-term 
contracts  
To cut the investor’s risk, when green 
certificate (GC) markets are 
composed of mostly high-fixed cost 
technologies, long-term contracts are 
characteristic for the markets. These 
long-term contracts will, however, 
cancel the principal cost-efficiencies 
claimed for GC markets. In the case 
that low-fixed-cost technologies have 
high market share inside GC market, 
long term contrast will not take place 
and the low-cost technologies will 
inefficiently drive high fixed-cost 
technologies out of the green 
certificate market, because of the 
over-investment risk that would drop 
the certificate prices.  
Effectiveness, 
Cost-efficiency, 
Lack of Bias, 
Effects on 
Economy, & 
Functionality in 
Market 
Environment  
(Lesser, Su 
2008) 
Neutral Feed-in tariff 
development 
Author introduces two part feed-in 
tariff system that includes 
auctioneered subsidy payments that 
are adjusted with capacity efficiency 
and market price. This would help 
feed-in tariff with efficiency and 
price transparency. 
All except Rent-
seeking & 
Harmonisation 
Qualities 
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(Lipp 2007) Feed-in 
tariff 
Feed-in tariff 
versus green 
certificates 
Denmark, Germany, and United 
Kingdom case study shows that feed-
in tariff seems to outperform green 
certificate in effectiveness as well as 
in cost-efficiency. 
Effectiveness, 
Cost-efficiency, 
Lack of Bias, 
Equity and 
Fairness, Effects 
on Economy, 
Production 
Neutrality & 
Technology 
Maturity 
Neutrality 
(Menanteau, 
Finon et al. 
2003) 
Neutral Quota versus 
price 
instruments 
The great efficiency of feed-in tariff 
mechanisms to achieve renewable 
energy development targets is 
confirmed by the gradual 
disappearance of competitive bidding 
systems in the wake of low project 
implementation rates. However, the 
possible superiority especially in 
cost-efficiency of green certificate 
will be left to be proved when 
empirical results arrive from 
implemented systems.   
All except Rent-
seeking, 
Decision- 
making 
Feedback & 
Ease of Control 
(Midttun, 
Gautesen 
2007) 
Neutral Innovation 
product life-
cycle and 
technology 
maturity as a 
starting point 
for multi-policy 
implementation. 
 
Feed-in tariff and green certificate 
system should not be seen as 
competing alternatives, but rather as 
complementary regulatory 
instruments targeting subsequent 
steps in the product cycle. 
Cost-efficiency, 
Equity and 
Fairness, 
Production 
Neutrality & 
Technology 
Maturity 
Neutrality 
(Mitchell, 
Bauknecht et 
al. 2006) 
Feed-in 
tariff 
Different risk 
rates between 
feed-in tariff 
and green 
certificates  
Even though the prices available 
within the United Kingdom’s green 
certificate system are similar to those 
available under the wind tariff of the 
German feed-in tariff, the green 
certificate is much more ineffective 
because it creates less attractive 
conditions for investors that stem 
from its price, volume and balance 
risk. 
Effectiveness, 
Cost-efficiency, 
Investor’s 
Predictability, 
Production 
Neutrality & 
Technology 
Maturity 
Neutrality 
(Rickerson, 
Grace 2007) 
Feed-in 
tariff/ hybrid 
Feed-in tariff Rather than focusing on the 
weaknesses of green certificates (GC) 
as designed and implemented in 
Europe, it may be more helpful for 
U.S. states to focus on the strengths 
of feed-in tariffs (FIT), and on how 
elements of FIT could be 
synergistically integrated into the 
U.S. framework. This might mean 
introducing fixed-price elements into 
existing GC policies or designing 
new FITs or GC/fixed-price hybrids 
for states that now lack policies to 
support renewables. 
 
 
All except Rent-
seeking, 
Author’s 
Predictability & 
Harmonisation 
Qualities 
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(Toke 2007) Feed-in 
tariff 
German feed-in 
tariff versus the 
United 
Kingdom 
renewable 
obligation 
(green 
certificate) 
Author points out that the United 
Kingdom renewable obligation (UK 
green certificate) is not more cost-
effective than German feed-in tariff. 
This argument is based on empirical 
data using capacity factor as a 
multiplier when subsidy amounts are 
calculated. 
Effectiveness, 
Cost-efficiency, 
Lack of Bias,  
Equity and 
Fairness, Effects 
on Economy, 
Functionality in 
Market 
Environment & 
Harmonisation 
Qualities  
(Chen, Wiser et al. 2009)* 
(del Río 2008b)* 
(Dinica 2006)* 
(Enzensberger, Wietschel et al. 2002)* 
(Fouquet, Johansson 2008)* 
(Langniß et al. 2009) 
(Lauber 2004)* 
(Ringel 2006)* 
* Additional material that was found but not included in the analysis 
One of the most cited academic studies about renewable energy generation policy 
instruments is Menanteau, Finon et al. (2003). In this study the authors highlight the 
great efficiency of feed-in tariffs in achieving renewable energy development targets, 
which is confirmed by the gradual disappearance of competitive bidding systems in the 
wake of low project implementation rates. However, they emphasise also that green 
certificates might threaten the triumphal march of feed-in tariffs in the future. The 
possible theoretical superiority of green certificates, especially in cost-efficiency, was 
left to be proved when empirical results arrive from systems where they have been 
implemented for some time (Menanteau, Finon et al. 2003). 
 A few years later, in 2005, the Commission of the European Communities released its 
report comparing the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of different policies. The report’s 
main point was that green certificate policies implemented in Europe were, in general, 
less effective and cost-efficient than feed-in tariffs (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005). These kinds of results have been highlighted as well in recent 
studies. The studies have been mostly comparing German and Spanish feed-in tariffs 
and the United Kingdom’s green certificate systems, especially from the wind power 
viewpoint (Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006, Lipp 2007, Toke 2007, Butler, Neuhoff 
2008). Figure 19 presents the effectiveness rates from the wind power perspective and 
as it can be seen the German and Spanish schemes have boosted tenfold bigger capacity 
than the British scheme.    
  
 
Figure 19: Effectiveness Figures of Germany Spain and UK. Source: (Stenzel, Frenzel 
2008)  
Figure 20, on the other hand, describes the expected subsidies for wind power per kWh. 
As we can see from the figure, with the scenario48 that Butler and Neuhoff (2007) have 
selected, the average subsidy per kWh paid for wind projects over a 20-year project 
lifetime for a project build in a given year is higher under the British green certificate 
scheme until year 2017 than under the German feed-in tariff scheme. 
 
Figure 20: Expected Average Wind Power Subsidy under the German and British Policy 
Instrument. Source: (Butler, Neuhoff 2008) 
                                                 
48 More about starting values, assumptions detailed data about the German and British policy instruments 
are available (Butler, Neuhoff 2008)  
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Similar results are delivered in the other empirical studies as well. Year 2004 average to 
maximum support levels for wind power in Germany were from 70 €/MWh to 105 
€/MWh, and in the UK from 110 to 120 €/MWh (Lipp 2007). These results and 
estimations have been something of a surprise, because it has been strongly argued that 
the guaranteed prices with feed-in tariffs do not encourage competition and therefore 
renewable power would not be generated at the lowest possible price. On the other 
hand, this kind of competition is inherited in a green certificate scheme (Lipp 2007). 
Nevertheless, as seen above German and Spanish feed-in tariff schemes have been 
outperforming the United Kingdom’s green certificate (renewable obligation) scheme 
and similar systems in Belgium and Italy in the cost per new electricity produced. 
However, it has to be emphasised that the huge effectiveness of feed-in tariff has made 
the total cost of the scheme higher (Lipp 2007, Green Stream Network 2007, Toke, 
Lauber 2008). 
The impact policy has on investor’s risk is one of the primary reasons that have been 
offered as an explanation in Europe for feed-in tariffs’ superiority in effectiveness (see 
Figure 19) and efficiency in cost-per-new-capacity-produced (see Figure 20). In contrast 
to the fixed prices of feed-in tariffs, the price as well as the volume risk connected to a 
green certificate scheme can raise the cost of capital used in financing the new 
renewable investments, and can therefore increase the total costs of a green certificate 
scheme (Commission of the European Communities 2005, Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 
2006, Rickerson, Grace 2007, Toke 2008, Kildegaard 2008). 
Another reason for the flat performance of green certificates in the field of cost-
efficiency could be that the long-term power purchase contracts that have been used 
under the scheme have hindered the efficiency gains (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004). 
Even though feed-in tariffs do not boost price competition between renewable energy 
generators and electricity suppliers, there will be competition between renewable energy 
generation plant manufacturers, and, for example in the case of wind energy, over the 
best locations (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004, Butler, Neuhoff 2008). However, as 
Figure 21 shows, wind producers friendly feed-in tariffs have enabled the building of 
wind power sites in places where wind conditions are not optimal. For example even 
though Germany has one of the Europe’s worst wind conditions, it has the biggest 
installed capacity in Europe. It has been the same way especially with the solar power in 
Germany. 
  
 
Figure 21: Wind Power Generation from Installed Capacity.  Source: (Butler, Neuhoff 
2008) 
This is seen as an advantage from a diversity point of view, but also as leading to highly 
inefficient investments (Toke 2008, Butler, Neuhoff 2008). Figure 21 describes the level 
of generation per unit of installed capacity MW in UK and Germany between 1990 and 
2006. Low figures at the beginning of 1990 in UK were mostly because of low turbine 
ratings at experimental sites. In Germany after 1993, the rate has been falling because 
developers have used less windy sites that lucrative subsidies have made possible 
(Butler, Neuhoff 2008).   
By contrast with the United Kingdom green certificate scheme’s ineffective 
performance, in the United States - especially in Texas - there have been very positive 
experiences of green certificate instrument use. However, it has been argued that in the 
Texas case, the low targets and overall tax incentives have had more to do with meeting 
the targets than the green certificate instrument itself (Wiser, Bolinger et al. 2007, Chen, 
Wiser et. al 2009). At the same time, it should be remembered that there have likewise 
been other policy incentives boosting the effectiveness of the feed-in tariff scheme for 
example in Germany. These have included investment grants, grid connection policies, 
and research and development incentives among others (Green Stream Network 2007).       
From an equity and fairness viewpoint, feed-in tariffs have helped small players take a 
part in the renewable energy generation market, while the green certificate scheme has 
seemed to forward the big players’ advantage, mostly because they can handle the risk 
better (Lipp 2007, Toke 2007). This characteristic of the green certificate scheme has 
been seen as diminishing competition (Toke, Lauber 2007). Supporting small companies 
and individuals is, in fact, a good way to allocate wealth as long as cost-efficiency does 
not suffer noticeably (Toke 2007). However, there have been arguments that even 
94 
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though the feed-in tariff might work well in the short run, from the cost-efficiency 
viewpoint this might end up causing troubles in the longer term because of the growing 
cost originating from an instrument’s possible over-effectiveness, static structure, and 
the instrument’s tendency to distort markets (Green Stream Network 2007).  
The feed-in tariff schemes’ guaranteed prices are set for long time-periods, thus new 
acquired knowledge or a new cost structure will not correct those prices. Green 
certificate prices on the other hand will reflect the production cost changes and therefore 
according to some studies GC is seen to be more dynamically efficient and this way 
more flexible than the feed-in tariff (Green Stream Network 2007). However, Toke 
(2007) and many other academics argue that because feed-in tariffs are seen to promote 
the innovation in renewable energy technology better than green certificates they can be 
seen to be more dynamically efficient than green certificates. This is partly because the 
“overall” money earned could be used to invest in research and development and 
because the effectiveness of an instrument has an endogenous effect of speeding up the 
learning process and cost reductions of different technologies (Finon, Perez 2007, del 
Rio, Gual 2007). Hence the static quality of the feed-in tariff might become an 
advantage in terms of dynamic efficiency. However, there is not much solid research 
done how much new innovations can be pinpointed to be caused by feed-in tariff.  
Either way, guaranteed prices with feed-in tariffs and locking the quota with green 
certificates will cause inflexibility. Thus, neither fundamental feed-in tariff nor green 
certificate schemes are naturally flexible, that is they do not automatically correct start 
values under new knowledge, and thus they need adjustment if this kind of flexibility is 
required. 
With our two renewable energy policy instruments, rent-seeking is more focused on the 
time before policy instrument implementation. Companies are lobbying for the one 
instrument that is seen to suit their purposes in the best way. However, green certificates 
are seen as superior from the rent-seeking perspective, because with the feed-in tariff 
policymakers fumble with the problem of how to get truthful information from the 
industry without auction or market, since it is to the industries’ advantage if the subsidy 
prices are set high. Hence they might be prone to exaggerate the investment and 
production cost, if asked for figures (Lesser, Su 2008).  
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Investor’s predictability is seen to be feed-in tariffs’ biggest asset compared to green 
certificates and the major reason for its high effectiveness (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005, Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006, Rickerson, Grace 2007, Lipp 
2007). From the authors’ point of view the fundamental green certificate and feed-in 
tariff are in the same line, because in reality when setting the quota very high the price 
will rise high and vice versa. Because both mechanisms are more often than not funded 
by the authority, they will not have a direct effect on government’s monetary base. 
However, because the indirect effects might be radical, a flex-mechanism might be 
preferred, as it has been for example in the United Kingdom - where a “safety valve” 
penalty price is set - or in Spain, where there is an upper limit for subsidised renewable 
energy under the feed-in tariff (Green Stream Network 2007). 
In the case of the green certificate or the feed-in tariff, decision-making feedback is not 
as clear as for example in the case of investment grants. This is mainly because the 
scheme costs are postponed outside of the government budget. For this reason, the total 
cost and effects of the instrument are not always that easy to spot. Nevertheless, the 
green certificate gives an easily understandable price and the feed-in tariff will make 
clear the utility of the selected price by effectiveness. However, because of the 
inflexibility of the fundamental instruments, correction is not that simple. In addition, 
inefficiencies or high price might not be simply the fault of the instrument, but the lack 
of proper implementation (Green Stream Network 2007). 
Feed-in tariffs require policymakers to define payments for individual technologies 
(e.g., wind, solar, geothermal), payment structures (e.g., fixed or declining), and 
payment duration. “All three attributes can require significant “guesswork” on the part 
of policymakers as to future market conditions and rates of technological 
improvements” (Lesser, Su 2008). With green certificates this “guesswork” is left at 
least partly for markets to handle, and the hard part is to select the optimal amount of 
renewable energy to promote. This optimal amount is, for example in the European 
case, already given by the directive. “Essentially, traditional feed-in tariffs designs 
require government policymakers to substitute their judgment for that of markets in the 
selection of long-term technological “winners and losers.” However, long-term 
forecasting is notoriously imprecise and inaccurate, given the multitude of uncertainties 
that affect the future. Moreover, once specific price paths (i.e., level, structure, and 
duration) are specified, changing those paths is both difficult and costly, as it creates 
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excessive regulatory uncertainty that, in turn, increases investment costs” (Lesser, Su 
2008).  
However, even though the “guesswork” is relatively resource-consuming after 
implementation, the feed-in tariff needs relatively little monitoring and supervision. The 
green certificate scheme, on the other hand, needs quite a lot of preparation work, as 
well as monitoring and other control after the implementation. This is because there are 
more actors and transactions involved (Green Stream Network 2007). This has resulted 
in green certificate schemes having had higher administrative costs than feed-in tariff 
schemes (Toke, Lauber 2008). 
Functionality in a market environment is seen to be one of the green certificates’ 
advantages. Feed-in tariffs distort the market by taking the renewable energy generation 
out of the market competition. There are ways to modify the feed-in tariff so that it 
functions better with the market environment. For example, the Spanish premium 
scheme will expose renewable energy generation to market competition (Green Stream 
Network 2007, del Rio, Gual 2007). However, Carlén (2006) argues that if future 
electricity price is highly uncertain, a feed-in tariff based on premium is likely to be an 
inferior instrument compared with a green certificate or guaranteed price feed-in tariff 
scheme, at least from an efficiency standpoint.      
Harmonisation qualities and connectability are discussed further in the next sub-
chapters. Production neutrality, letting the market decide and therefore not picking the 
winners, is why the green certificate is preferred and yet on the other hand criticised. 
However, green certificates can be modified just as well as feed-in tariffs to offer a 
different amount of subsidy for different technologies, for example by granting more 
than one certificate for more immature technologies (Green Stream Network 2007).  
Different price levels for different technologies at different maturity stages is 
nevertheless more often associated with the feed-in tariff schemes. It is argued to be fair 
and in some other instances to be dangerous because resources, money, and effort are 
used for technologies that might gradually develop with time, not with force (Lesser, Su 
2008). This dilemma is discussed more thoroughly in the last sub-chapter.       
As a conclusion, for the feed-in tariff versus green certificate debate, the superiority of 
the instrument is greatly dependent on which criterion is emphasised. It has to be 
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remembered that whichever instrument is chosen, the success of the instrument is 
mostly attributable to how well it is implemented (Butler, Neuhoff 2008, Arasto 2006, 
Green Stream Network 2007, Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004). Both instruments can be 
modified to look like each other and these modified ones might function much better 
than the basic or fundamental ones (Green Stream Network 2007). In addition, good 
qualities of other support instruments could be connected to these instruments to make 
them function even better (Lesser, Su 2008, Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004).  Because of 
the limits of the real world, one always has to make some compromises with the criteria 
and targets since, at the end of the day, it is the consumer who pays the bill. Hence after 
criteria weights are decided, whichever instrument or a mix of instruments gives the 
smallest cost for the consumer should be selected (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004).  
7.3  Harmonization of Renewable Energy Generation Policy 
Instruments in EU Scope  
“…it is too early to compare the advantages and disadvantages of well-established 
support mechanisms with systems with a rather short history. Therefore, and 
considering all the analyses in this Communication, the Commission does not regard it 
appropriate to present at this stage a harmonised European system” (Commission of 
the European Communities 2005). This conclusion, and especially a few other earlier 
ones made by the Commission of the European Communities, meant at least a short 
break for those discussions that were steering the European Union towards a 
harmonised policy instrument for renewable energy. For those who believed in feed-in 
tariff superiority, these decisions were a relief, but for those who had changed their 
policy depending on the former signals from Brussels, it made for quite a headache. For 
example, Denmark had terminated its feed-in tariff and had finalised its plans for a 
green certificate scheme. But after the Commission stated in May 2002 that the feed-in 
tariff did not constitute state-aid, it took the Danish government only a month to bury its 
plans for the certificate scheme (Angnolucci 2008).  
Harmonised support systems have almost solely focused on quota systems with EU-
wide tradable green certificates (Söderholm 2008). However, there have been a few 
academic comments about implementing a harmonised feed-in tariff scheme as well 
(Muñoz, Oschmann et al. 2007).  
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Harmonisation, if implemented, has been seen to drive huge efficiency gains and thus 
help the European Union to gain momentum in meeting the renewable energy 
generation targets in the most cost efficient way (Söderholm 2008). However, in 
addition to the competition between national instrument preferences, the problems with 
national advantages and national CO2 limits have been at least partly in the way of 
harmonisation. The pros and cons of harmonisation have been analysed in several 
studies, and the studies selected for comparison in this thesis are presented below. 
Table 10: Selected Appraised Authors - Their Main Focus and Results (Continues next 
page) 
Author Main focus Main result for sub-chapter’s issue 
(Haas, 
Eichhammer 
et al. 2004) 
Renewable 
energy 
technology’s 
successful and 
effective 
promotion  
With a given target of a certain amount of renewable energy (RE) at a 
certain time, neoclassical economic theory predicts that a European 
Union-wide quota exclusively for new RE installations with an 
accompanying international trading scheme would be the most 
efficient approach in terms of minimising additional costs. For 
European-wide trade of certificates with maximum efficiency gains, 
an EU-wide harmonisation is undoubtedly necessary for a European 
RE quota. Currently, however, it appears unlikely that such a 
harmonised strategy will be implemented in the short-term because 
certificates will not contribute to national CO2-reduction unless it is 
closely co-ordinated with an emission quota-system, and even then it 
is the emission quota which gives the CO2-reduction. Secondly, the 
value of CO2-reduction will not be included in the price of green 
certificate (GC). Hence the only reason to track GC is to enforce the 
development of sustainable long-term technologies. Thirdly, at present 
the GC-systems introduced in the EU are very different. 
(Muñoz, 
Oschmann et 
al. 2007) 
 
Feed-in tariff 
model that could 
be harmonized in 
the European 
Union  
Feed-in tariffs (FIT) are an effective and cost-efficient way to increase 
the generation of renewable energy and achieve RE targets. FITs are 
compatible with European Union state-aid, competition rules, and 
commensurability, and compatible with a liberalized electricity 
market. Harmonization of FIT that would include national as well as 
EU-wide adjustment factors would provide long-term market stability 
and flexibility and promote technology innovation. 
(Söderholm 
2008a) 
 
Renewable 
energy policy 
harmonisation in 
the European 
Union. Critical 
analysis of the 
paper by Muñoz 
et al. (2007) 
Paper argues that there exists a strong case for disregarding national 
benefits of renewable energy (RE) production in the design of  a 
harmonised policy instrument. Among other things, local deployment 
schemes would be most effectively handled with direct policies, not 
with RE policy instruments. Article stresses the “one policy one goal” 
basic idea. If national benefits are stressed it might be more 
convenient to stay with national support schemes. One of the most 
important factors when choosing the policy instrument between the 
quota- and price-based instrument is the steepness of the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost curve. This point was argued to be 
overlooked by Muñoz et al. 2007. 
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(Söderholm 
2008b) 
 
Harmonisation of 
green certificates 
market 
Söderholm concludes that the EU-wide support scheme is unlikely to 
take place in the near future, but evolution towards a more harmonised 
green electricity support scheme might start when a few countries take 
the lead and introduce either bilateral or multilateral joint support 
schemes. This support scheme has the potential for achieving goals 
like energy security, a more diversified production portfolio, and 
reduced environmental degradation more cost-effectively than a 
national one. To achieve these goals, participating countries have to 
put lots of effort into designing common game rules so that they will 
not hamper the cost-efficiency, for example with colliding subsidies. 
Politically sensitive issues like local employment might work as a 
barrier that has to be crossed to win public approval. 
(Toke 2008) A critical survey 
of the view of 
the new EU-wide 
green certificate 
harmonisation 
proposal called 
guarantees of 
origin 
Toke objects that there is plausible possibility that the proposed EU-
wide renewable target - 20 % of the energy has to be produced by 
renewables by the year 2020 - would not be achieved cost-effectively. 
Thus proposed trading by linking together national support systems by 
guarantees of origin, or in other words green certificates and trading 
with national surplus, might cause very high certificate prices and 
price volatility - mostly because of great under-supply of certificates. 
This would yield high money transfers from one member-state to 
another and thus cause undermining of national support systems. 
Trade with guarantees of origin may strongly disadvantage 
independent renewable operators and give extra returns to major 
electricity companies.     
(Toke 2008) The down sides 
of green 
certificate 
harmonisation 
Here Toke sees that the real problems would begin if the green 
certificate- based system is harmonised European Union-wide. A 
harmonised system would allocate investment weight more to major 
investors and in this way expel local small scale investors, which 
would in turn most probably, especially in Germany and in The 
Netherlands, reduce renewable investment figures. Local investment is 
seen as important among others because it may increase local social 
and environmental benefits and reduce planning as well as 
implementation opposition. 
(Verhaegen, 
Meeus et al. 
2007) 
The advantages 
and challenges of 
harmonisation of 
green certificates 
system 
EU-wide harmonised renewable energy support system would have a 
few advantages compared to member-state independent ones. 
Harmonisation of green certificate (GC) system would result in more 
stable prices and higher cost-effectiveness. However, this kind of 
harmonised system could be subverted by production targets per 
member-state, preventing the market from functioning in a cost-
effective manner. Furthermore, while integrating existing different GC 
systems, any remaining differences should be carefully considered. 
How hard the possible integration would be is illustrated by the case 
of Belgium, where four different systems are in place nowadays. If the 
integration seems to be hard even inside one member-state,  it is very 
likely that harmonising it EU-wide would present a serious challenge 
and possible implementation would be still far in the future. 
(del Río 2005)* 
(Morthorst, Jensen 2007)* 
(Nielsen 2002)* 
(Unger, Ahlgren 2005)* 
* Additional material that was found but not included in the analysis 
European-wide harmonisation of renewable energy generation policy is seen to boost 
cost-efficiency and especially static cost-efficiency (Verhaegen, Meeus et al. 2007). For 
example, various analyses show that already a common Nordic green certificate market 
could save around 0.5 billion euros in contrast to all four Nordic countries operating 
separately with renewable electricity targets (Rydén 2006). However, some academics 
  
101 
are afraid that it might lead to picking so-called “low hanging fruits”. Potential 
immature technologies might not be invested in and thus might never have a chance to 
get onto the “shelf”. Hence the dynamic efficiency might suffer (Verhaegen, Meeus et 
al. 2007). 
Among the key problems in the way of harmonisation are the national benefits and 
national renewable targets. It has been seen that harmonisation might steal these 
national benefits and that consumers in some countries might end up paying for 
renewable energy projects that take place in other countries and thus “only benefit those 
countries” (Toke 2008).    
One of the major requirements for the implementation of harmonised Europe-wide 
renewable energy policy instruments is that the electricity markets are fairly well 
integrated (Söderholm 2008a). This kind of integration has already taken place in the 
Nordic countries. Other European countries have been opening the regulated markets 
and the direction is more and more towards integration. However, the guaranteed 
timetable to even fairly smooth-running EU-wide electricity markets is still a question-
mark. There is a good deal of faith that this will happen, but owing to the current market 
situation it just might take a bit more time.  
In the presence of an integrated electricity market, it should be obvious that benefits of 
green electricity promotion will not be at risk of disappearance if the certificate market 
is integrated.   This is because any capacity addition in, say Norway, lessens the need for 
conventional capacity expansion in for example Finland. On the contrary, in a way the 
country where the new green production is implemented is the one that has to bear the 
negative environmental effects of new green production that comes along with the plant 
implementation (Söderholm 2008b). The issue is not of course quite this black and 
white. There are positive impacts as well, such as employment and industry emergence 
when renewable investments are made (Muñoz, Oschmann et al. 2007).   
However, it is highly uncertain that energy policies would be an effective and 
particularly efficient way of reducing unemployment or boosting industry. “Moreover, it 
is hard to see why renewable electricity should be subsidised on these grounds; a 
multitude of measures can spur local employment including investment in fossil-fuelled 
power plants.”  The best way might be to use one policy instrument for one policy goal. 
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From an EU perspective, this primary goal is the specific target for renewable energy 
(Söderholm 2008a).     
One rather justified worry concerning harmonisation is that it might place investment 
weight more on major investors and in this way shut out local small-scale investors. 
Local investments are seen as important, because they may both increase local social 
and environmental benefits, as well as reducing planning and implementation 
opposition (Toke 2008). The interaction with emission trading is seen as problematic as 
well. This will be studied more closely in the next sub-chapter (Haas 2004, Morhorst 
2001).   
As a conclusion, it is unlikely that we will witness a harmonised EU-wide support 
scheme in the foreseeable future (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004, Söderholm 2008b, 
Verhaegen, Meeus et al. 2007). The possible implementation of a harmonised system 
will constitute a huge challenge, regardless of which support system is chosen 
(Söderholm 2008a).  Especially national green certificate schemes are highly 
differentiated and at this moment national schemes are seen to be diverging rather than 
becoming harmonised (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004).   For example, in the case of 
Belgium it has appeared to be an insuperable problem to integrate four different national 
green certificate systems, something that should be easy compared with EU-wide 
harmonisation (Verhaegen, Meeus et al. 2007). However, when electricity markets move 
towards harmonisation, this subject might gather momentum once again. In the 
discussion of harmonisation, it would be important that price instruments like feed-in 
tariffs should be seriously considered as well, not least because arguments against the 
feed-in tariff lack empirical evidence (Söderholm 2008a, Muñoz, Oschmann et al. 
2007). 
7.4  Interaction between Emission Trade and Green Certificate or 
Feed-in Tariff  
Climate policy is implemented to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The 
implementation of renewable energy generation instruments is partly justified because 
they should help in this task. However, from a “one goal, one policy” perspective, 
European directives for renewable energy generation are narrowing inefficiently the 
national space to meet emission mitigation targets, because they lock the ways with 
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which to mitigate emissions.  However, they might still be needed because although 
effective in the short-term, the emission trade might lead to weak long-term efficiency 
by blocking currently expensive but potentially useful mitigation technologies (del Río 
2008a). One example is that a tax as high as 272.5 $/ton carbon dioxide (1000 $/ton 
carbon) would increase the price of coal power by about 200 $/MWh, which is less than 
half of the price of current solar photovoltaic energy (Sandén, Azar 2005). On the other 
hand, renewable energy promotion systems would not on their own function most 
effectively as an emission reduction instrument (Morthorst 2003b). Thus to achieve 
optimal intertemporal efficiency in emissions abatement, a wise policy combination 
between technology-oriented and technology-neutral policies might be needed (del Río 
2008a).  
In multi-policy situations, some compromises have to be made. This sub-chapter does 
not try to go deeply into this important and complicated optimisation challenge, but 
briefly to explain the interaction between emission trade, the green certificate, and the 
feed-in tariff, which are the most popular primary renewable energy generation 
instruments at this moment. An interesting future study would be to have a wider 
examination of this scope by adding different modifications of the above-mentioned 
instruments, in addition to other instruments, and to analyse especially the carbon tax 
and hybrid instruments for both climate policy and renewable energy generation. 
As hinted above, in the short-run the cost of achieving a given emission level called for 
in the emission trade is likely to be higher with renewable energy policy instrument 
schemes than without (Harrison, Sorrell et al. 2005). In particular the feed-in tariff 
scheme might increase the uncertainty of an emission allowance price, because the level 
of renewable energy implementation is unknown. The green certificate’s dynamic nature 
adjusts this with the emission trade and thus this will not cause as radical an effect 
(Green Stream Network 2007). 
 One important notion is that even though renewable policy instruments might boost the 
dynamic efficiency of emission mitigation, it should be remembered that the green 
certificates or the feed-in tariff schemes do not contribute any additional carbon dioxide 
reductions in a given compliance emission trade period, if emissions are fixed by the 
cap. Emission savings made in the electricity sector will be used in some other sector 
(Harrison, Sorrell et al. 2005).  
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The feed-in tariffs cannot be smoothly integrated with emission trade. However, 
possible integration with carbon tax might be worth further examination. With the green 
certificate scheme, there have been ideas that the certificates/allowances of various 
trading schemes could be made recoverable across schemes. Such recoverability has in 
a way already been implemented, for example in the European emission scheme 
through the Linking Directive, which makes Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean 
Development Project (CDM) credits valid for compliance. It has been suggested that 
trading could be allowed between the emission trade and green certificate schemes in 
EU member-states. Such a proposal would allow companies to use the emission 
reduction implicit in a green certificate for EU emission trade scheme compliance 
(Harrison, Sorrell et al. 2005).   However, the problems of double counting of emission 
reductions and lack of common approval within the EU might shelve this idea from the 
foreseeable future. 
When we scrutinize this interaction from a renewable energy perspective, already the 
emission trade on its own increases the competitiveness of renewable energy generation. 
This means that a given amount of renewable generation can be achieved with less 
support from renewable energy generation instruments, which has a direct impact on the 
market for green certificates. For any given renewable quota there is a difference 
between the marginal cost of renewable production and the marginal revenue available 
from the wholesale electricity price. Because emission trade raises the wholesale 
electricity price, it thereby decreases the cost-gap for a given renewable quota. With a 
competitive green certificate market, certificate prices should also decrease, 
automatically adjusting to the lower level of support required. In normal circumstances, 
the price of emission trade allowances and the price of green certificates are therefore 
negatively correlated. Thus, a sufficiently high allowance price could promote enough 
green generation to meet the green certificate quota, in which case the certificate price 
would fall to zero. This interaction thereby results in a smaller cost of the green 
certificate scheme (Harrison, Sorrell et al. 2005).  From a feed-in tariff perspective, 
emission trade raises electricity prices, and tariff prices do not change except in 
premium cases, thus even in this instance the cost of renewable support scheme 
declines. Hence the feed-in tariff premium could be seen to work in the worst way with 
emission trade. 
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As a conclusion, climate policy and renewable energy generation policy instruments 
should not be seen as substitutes but as complements to each other. Even though they 
may have similar goals, we have to remember that they also have different goals. 
However, because they have strong interactions and effects on each other’s functioning 
and targets, it is important that when either of them is implemented, these interactions 
are emphasised, examined, and understood. Table 11 introduces valuable studies about 
the subject that could further deepen this analysis. 
Table 11: Additional Material That Was Found but Not Included in the Analysis  
(Blanco, Rodrigues 2008) 
(de Vos 2004) 
(del Río, Hernández et al. 2005) 
(Kara, Syri et al. 2008) 
(Unger, Ahlgren 2005) 
(Van Horn, Remedios 2008) 
7.5  The Influence of Renewable Energy Generation Policy 
Instruments on Electricity Prices 
It always costs money to build subsidy schemes, and that money has to come from 
somewhere. In the case of renewable energy generation, it is either taken from 
government, customers or the pockets of the producers of conventional energy 
generation.  Most often the subsidies are paid by the consumers in their electricity bill, 
which means it is built into the retail price (Haas, Eichhammer et al. 2004). Especially 
in countries like Germany, Spain, and Denmark where a significant amount of 
renewable power generation has been implemented under support schemes, there has 
been growing concern over the increasing financial burden for electricity consumers 
caused by them (Sáenz de Miera, del Río et al. 2008). However, more recently there 
have also been arguments that renewable energy generation policy instruments might 
have totally opposite direct and indirect effects on electricity prices. Instead of raising 
retail prices, renewable energy support schemes might end up actually lowering them. 
Even though this is an important issue - especially from a popularity perspective for 
renewable energy generation policy instruments - the empirical literature on the 
interactions between renewable energy policy instruments and the electricity market is 
surprisingly thin (Sáenz de Miera, del Río et al. 2008). This sub-chapter shortly presents 
the academic debate found about this issue.  
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Table 12: Selected Appraised Authors - Their Main Focus, Key Argument, Data Set, and 
Results 
Instrument effect on: Author  Data set 
Wholesale 
Prices 
Retail 
Prices 
Main result for sub-chapter’s issue 
(Chen, Wiser et al. 
2009)  
US 
Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard 
(2003) 
Negative or 
Positive 
Negative 
or 
Positive 
Studies made in US about direct cost impacts of 
Renewable Portfolio Standard mostly give low 
impact values. Among authors’ sample-studies 
the median increase in retail electricity rates was 
0.8 %. Largest estimated decrease impact was 
5.2% and highest increase estimate was 8.8%.   
(Bode 2006) Theory Negative Negative 
or 
Positive 
Feed-in tariff mark-up increases the power costs. 
However, owing to the merit order effect, feed-in 
tariff lowers the wholesale price. Therefore the 
market equilibrium changes. The net effect of 
these three variables might cause either positive 
or negative change in retail price, depending on 
the structure of the market.      
(Böhme, 
Dürrschmidt 2008) 
Germany 
feed-in tariff 
(2007) 
Negative Negative 
or 
Positive 
Even though the German feed-in tariff scheme 
costs have been rising every year, it can be argued 
that already the merit order effect, which exerts 
downward pressure on the wholesale electricity 
market, might have caused that retail prices are 
lower than without the scheme. If the analysed 
savings in external cost are included, the scheme 
has been extremely economical. 
(Rathmann 2007) Germany 
(2005-2007) 
Negative Negative Renewable electricity promotion instruments can 
reduce indirectly EU emission trade-driven 
electricity prices by lowering the amount of 
emissions caused by power production. The effect 
is weakened if allocation is done ex-post based on 
a benchmark, and it would cease to exist when 
emission reductions due to renewable electricity 
are correctly anticipated.  In the German case, the 
feed-in tariff scheme has reduced the wholesale 
prices in 2005-2007 by 6.4€/MWh and retail 
prices by 2.6€/MWh.   
(Sáenz de Miera, 
del Río et al. 2008) 
Spain feed-
in tariff 
Negative Negative 
or 
Positive  
In the case of Spanish wind electricity promotion, 
it can be shown that there is an absolute negative 
correlation between wholesale price and 
renewable energy promotion. Because of this, the 
renewable promotion scheme cost may be offset 
by the reduction in wholesale price, thus leading 
to reduction of retail prices.  
(Wiser, Namovicz 
et al. 2007) 
US 
Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard 
(2003) 
Negative or 
Positive  
Negative 
or 
Positive 
To date, it is reasonably clear that cost impacts of 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) - that is the 
US green certificate scheme - have varied 
substantially by state. However, there is little 
evidence of sizeable impact on average electricity 
retail prices. In quite a few instances it not certain 
whether RPS is leading to higher or lower retail 
electricity prices, but lower prices are certainly 
possible.  
(Unger, Ahlgren 2005)* 
(Harrison, Sorrell et al. 2005)   
* Additional material that was found but not included in the analysis 
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The consumer costs, from here on retail prices, are the result of combining the 
wholesale price with the renewable power generation support price (Sáenz de Miera, del 
Río et al. 2008). In addition, retail prices include distribution and other service costs as 
well, which might be affected by increasing the share of renewable energy, but they are 
left outside this analysis. Therefore, the additional burden for consumers could be 
calculated for example in the case of feed-in tariff with the formula: 
Renewable power generation support cost = [Support Quota * (Average support fee – 
wholesale market price) + Transaction costs]/ Total Power Generation  (3) 
And with the case of the green certificates with formula: 
 Renewable power generation support cost = [Support Quota * Average certificate 
price + Transaction costs]/ Total Power Generation     (4) 
Table 13 presents additional costs accruing from German feed-in tariff schemes.  
Table 13: German Feed-in Tariff Scheme Cost Figures. Source: (Böhme, Dürrschmidt 
2008)  
  Feed-in Tariff Scheme Cost Addition to the Electricity Price 
Year Billion Euro Cent/kWh 
2000 1,0 0.2 
2001 1,2 0.3 
2002 1,8 0.4 
2003 1,9 0.4 
2004 2,5 0.6 
2005 2,8 0.6 
2006 3,3 0.8 
2007 4,3 1.0 
Here the wholesale market price, or as presented by Böhme and Dürrschmidt (2008) the 
value of conventionally-produced electricity that is substituted by supported electricity, 
is estimated to be 5 cents/ kWh (EUR 0.05/kWh). In Germany, for example in the year 
2007, the supported quota was 67 TWh and the average support fee was 11.4 
cents/kWh. Therefore, the support cost is approximately 4.3 billion Euros according to 
the indicator of Formula (3)49. This raises the retail electricity prices by 1.0 
                                                 
49 Transaction cost are excluded 
  
108 
Cents/kWh50. This is not an insignificant figure. It is 20% of the used wholesale 
electricity price. 
However, the impact of a renewable energy generation policy instrument may be much 
more ambiguous than this (Sáenz de Miera, del Río et al. 2008). This is because 
increasing the amount of renewable electricity has direct and indirect downward effects 
on electricity price as well. Direct downward effects are caused by the fact that 
renewable power generation often has a lower variable cost than conventional power 
generation (Sáenz de Miera, del Río et al. 2008). This, then again, is because renewable 
power generation normally has lower fuel, operating, and maintenance costs51 (Wiser, 
Namovicz et al. 2007). If conventional energy plants - which are usually the marginal 
generation plants and thus the ones setting the wholesale electricity price - are 
substituted by the renewable electricity plants, the wholesale electricity price would be 
reduced (Sáenz de Miera, del Río et al. 2008, Bode 2006). In other words, as Böhme 
and Dürrschmidt (2008) have clearly put it: “The market price of electricity is 
determined by the most expensive power station still needed to satisfy the demand for 
electricity (merit order).” This is neatly demonstrated with the simplified Figures 22 
and 23, which illustrate the electricity price formation in an imaginary wholesale power 
market and the effect caused by boosting low marginal cost renewable energy. 
                                                 
50 Gross electricity consumption in Germany was 617.5 TWh in 2007. However, because industry was 
exempt from feed-in tariff cost the additional consumer cost, that is the retail price was higher than 4.3 
billion Euros/ 617.5 TWh that would have given 0.7 cents/kWh implemented to formula (3).   
51 However, the effect would not be similar in cases if the new renewable would be for example bio 
power, which has a relatively higher marginal cost than for example wind or even combined heat and 
power production (CHP) with coal or gas. Therefore, the direct effect would not be similar to what is 
presented here. 
  
 
Figure 22: Imaginary Electricity Price Formation in the Short-term Wholesale Power 
Market      
 
Figure 23: Imaginary Short-term Effect on Electricity Price of Adding Low Marginal 
Cost Renewable Power  
In Figure 22 the electricity price is set by the coal condense, which is normally the case 
for example in the Nordic countries, although this depends greatly on the situation of 
hydropower. Therefore, if low-marginal-cost renewable power generation is added, this 
would in the short and medium-term shift the supply curve to the right as shown in 
Figure 23 and thus lower the price. According to a study by Sáenz de Miera, del Río et 
al. (2008) this direct effect could have been as high as 0.475 to 1.244 cents/kWh caused 
by wind power alone, between 2005 and 2007. Similar effects are noted by Böhme and 
Dürrschmidt (2008), who estimated that this direct effect could have been between 0.25 
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and 0.78 cents/kWh in Germany, between 2004 and 2006.  However, it should be 
remembered that in the long run this effect might be diminished because of the need of 
peak load generation, which is at this moment quite often at least in part provided by 
coal or oil condense. Therefore, because for example wind energy is not highly capable 
of functioning in peak load generation, under the need for new investment the old 
equilibrium would be once again approached (Sáenz de Miera, del Río et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, emission trade raises conventional power generation costs. This 
effect can be approximated by multiplying emission cost with the average emission 
factor of the power generation plant (Rathmann 2007).  Therefore the increase of 
renewable power generation has an indirect downward effect on electricity prices 
because renewable energy cuts down carbon emissions by substituting conventional 
production. Thereby, the renewable power generation reduces the number of carbon 
dioxide allowances needed. This will reduce allowance prices and thus compliance cost, 
putting an additional downward pressure on the electricity price (Sáenz de Miera, del 
Río et al. 2008). This effect is presented in Figure 23 by cutting the total carbon dioxide 
surcharge. The size of this effect on total carbon market price is uncertain, but for 
example Rathman (2007) sees that it might be as high as 27%. Thus it might have 
reduced wholesale electricity prices in Germany by as much as 0.64 cent/kWh in 2005-
2007 (Rathman 2007). Here we have to emphasise that this is of course relevant only in 
the areas where the environmental externality effect of greenhouse gas emissions is 
connected to electricity prices through for example emission trade.  
Other indirect effects have been found as well that might provide a downward push on 
electricity retail prices. A study by Byrne (2007) pointed out that Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS), which are the US green certificate system, might have actually 
decreased retail electricity rates over time, by reducing the demand of natural gas. 
Naturally, a similar effect would occur even with other conventional fuels that are used 
in power generation. There are also several estimation studies made about the direct 
effects of renewable energy promotion in the US. See Figure 24, which presents the 
review of 28 such studies. Among the studies, the median increase in retail electricity 
rates was 0.8 per cent, the largest estimated decrease impact was 5.2 per cent, and the 
highest increase estimate was 8.8 per cent (Chen, Wiser et al. 2008).  Similar results are 
introduced in a study by (Wiser, Namovicz et al. 2007).    
  
 
Figure 24: Renewable Energy Promotion Effect on Retail Price (Chen, Wiser et al. 
2008)52
However, in the US case as well as in the European case, comprehensive empirical 
evidence has not yet been compiled. In quite a few instances it is not certain whether 
RPS is leading to higher or lower retail electricity prices, although lower prices are 
certainly possible (Wiser, Namovicz et al. 2007).    
One important consideration is that the same effect caused by supporting low variable 
cost renewable energy would also surface if low marginal cost conventional energy 
would be supported (Green Stream Network 2007). Furthermore, studies above have 
compared the new situation with the old, where there was less production. Higher 
production has the natural effect of lowering the price. Hence, if other producers are not 
getting oversized wins at the moment, this kind of development might threaten their 
existence. Therefore, it should be strongly emphasised that this above mentioned shift 
also brings up the highly important question of peak load supply security, which should 
not be casually overlooked. It leads us to the question of what would happen to a 
healthy investment base if all new investments were done under a subsidy. Also, we 
have to consider what the effect is and who pays the new distribution challenges.  
                                                 
52 Initial figure source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory  
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Nevertheless, this issue is highly relevant and would be worth further examination. 
Furthermore, it would be very interesting to connect the whole renewable portfolio, the 
supply security, and distribution issues to these future studies as well.       
7.6  A Technology Life Cycle Perspective Driving Renewable Energy 
Generation Policy Instruments 
Right now, surrounded by climate concerns, energy security apprehensions, and fast-
spreading economic recession, some researchers have begun to look for salvation from 
technology development. “Innovation is the principal source of economic growth and a 
key source of new employment opportunities and skills, as well as providing potential 
for realising environmental benefits” (Foxon, Gross et al. 2005 pp.2124). The 
renewable energy revolution would not be the same as the information technology 
revolution, which opened the way to a completely new industry. However, there is great 
potential for future wins waiting to be mobilised from the renewable energy system 
sector (Lund 2008). If we want to be able to boost technology development, we should 
improve our innovation policy processes (Foxon, Pearson 2008, Lund 2008). While the 
chapters above have mostly put an emphasis on how different policy instruments might 
effect the technology development process, this sub-chapter turns the coin and gives a 
short glimpse on how things would be if the technology were the one that decides how, 
when, and what policies are implemented. Challenges related to this task are manifold. 
Anticipated and needed new innovations would most likely end up “on the shelf”.  How 
could we boost the learning effects and at the same time be able to avoid the inferior 
technology lock-ins caused by path dependency? This is a subject that has been much 
studied, mostly from the viewpoint of environmentally-friendly technologies. However, 
in this chapter we concentrate mostly on the arguments put forward by Midttun and 
Gautesen (2007). This is because they give an interesting view to the renewable energy 
debate that might be worth further extensive study in the future.        
What is the fuss about debating which instrument is better - feed-in tariff or green 
certificate? Midttun and Gautesen (2007) argue that these instruments should not be 
seen as competing alternatives, but rather as complementary regulatory instruments 
targeting subsequent steps in the product cycle. This kind of view is also emphasised in 
a study made by Foxon, Gross et al. (2005). They see that effective policy instruments 
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should have an understanding of an innovation system that meets different challenges 
during each maturity stage. Thus the main idea enabling new technologies to triumph is 
to give multiple technologies a chance by helping them in the right way in each maturity 
stage (Sandén, Azar 2005, Foxon, Gross et al. 2005, Midttun, Gautesen 2007). Hence 
implementing the right kind of policies at the right time will play an important role, not 
least because for example research and development policies might be many times 
cheaper than economy-wide policies (Sandén, Azar 2005, Lund 2007). 
In the early innovative phase of the product cycle, the focus should be on dynamic 
innovation-oriented policy instruments. Using this point of view, the stimulus of early 
deployment, following the research and development phase, might be best supported by 
targeted measures such as feed-in tariffs or specialised auctions. Tariffs could have the 
advantage of allowing differentiation and specific pricing of individual technologies, 
thus permitting simultaneous development of a broad spectrum of technologies. In later 
phases, where some technologies develop their cost-efficiency closer to that of 
established incumbent technology, certificate markets might provide a more adequate 
stimulus to further commercialisation before full competitiveness in the mainstream 
market is achieved. This way the new green technologies would be exposed to the 
general inter-technology competition and would have to win in this competition before 
being exposed to regular energy market competition in the next round (Midttun, 
Gautesen 2007). With this in mind, Midttun and Gautsen (2007) emphasise that the 
feed-in tariffs and the green certificate could be used to target different stages in the 
product cycle between early research and development and later full market 
deployment. They might therefore backup each other’s failures. Even though effective, 
feed-in tariffs only expose the technology to a benchmark cost model for the relevant 
technology, sometimes even boosting sub-optimal conditions by, for example, giving 
extra support for wind power in locations with poor wind conditions (Midttun, Gautesen 
2007). “The certificate-market, on the other hand, exposes to cross-technology 
competition and gives no handicap-privilege” (Midttun, Gautesen 2007).  
So, at what stages are different technologies and when should technology go forward in 
the support scheme? To this question Midttun and Gautsen (2007) present an interesting 
option that uses learning curves. The idea is presented in Figure 25. 
  
 
 
Figure 25: Complementary Support System Based on Learning Curves (IEA 2000) 
(Midttun, Gautesen 2007)  
Highly uncertain learning curves are often seen to be the only way to predict technology 
development. Thus, they might be relevant tools to use if policy decision processes are 
centred around technology processes. However, there are big challenges with this kind 
of proceeding. It is very hard to know what the right size is of the circles are in figure 
25, or in other words, when the right time is to change instrument? Furthermore, one of 
the greatest question-marks remains over whether the learning effect has taken place 
because of the time factor or because of volume, which is argued for in Figure 25. 
Forcing innovation might not be at least the most cost effective way to proceed (Lesser, 
Su 2008). This is hinted at by the price growth of wind turbines under European 
schemes as well as under the US Production Tax Credit scheme, which might have 
overheated the market (Green Stream Network 2007, Wiser, Bolinger et al. 2007).  
However, with the economies of scale and scope, it is the learning effect that will push 
the new technology prices down (Sandén, Azar 2005, Foxon, Gross et al. 2005, Midttun, 
Gautesen 2007). It would be highly interesting to see further studies about an integrated 
technology-focused approach in the debate on renewable energy technology policy 
instruments, as well as with the climate policy instruments debate. This is not least 
because in the field of climate policy many researchers have put a great deal of trust in 
humankind being able to develop in the long run a so-called backstop technology, which 
would change the direction of climate development (Nordhaus 2008, Popp 2006). 
However, regardless of whether the new innovation is either a new way of producing 
clean energy or a carbon eating plant, it still has to be invented first. 
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8 Conclusions 
Summing up all the perspectives of policy instruments, it has become quite obvious that 
a sound political climate as well as energy intervention is needed to hinder market 
failures and furthermore to lead development in a more sustainable direction.  
The primary objective of this thesis was to find relevant current research about climate 
policy and renewable energy policy instruments and to present what has been 
investigated in them. In order to analyse the research and academic debate, different 
criteria were introduced. Even though the criteria were used to carry through the 
selected sub-topics, there were issues that were left open, and for the reader to analyse. 
Deeper criteria analysis concerning individual research papers was mostly left for future 
study. Furthermore, as the issues explored were partly selected by my own subjective 
elaboration, presumably if the research were conducted by some other researcher, 
different issues may have been weighed and found important. Nevertheless, below are 
some important conclusions and recommendations for future study that can be made on 
the basis of this thesis. 
The section on the economics of climate change presented several complicated issues 
concerning baseline scenarios, abatement costs, damage costs, and discount rates. It was 
emphasised that in the future there will be substantial costs arising out of abatement and 
adaptation. As to what the optimum balance between these two will be, we need more 
robust research. However, this should not work as a barrier to starting the action. Even 
if there was evidence of radical controversy between different academic studies, there 
was also a high degree of unanimity that climate change is a grave phenomenon that 
needs to be taken seriously. It is emphasised that we will hopefully be able to hear the 
proverbial alarm in climate policy issues before we have our back against the wall. To 
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prevent this scenario we will primarily need political will, global as well as local 
cooperation, and wise decisions in the fifteenth Conference of Parties in Copenhagen at 
the end of  2009.       
Policy instruments have everything to do with this. However, before this policy 
implementation stage, the desired targets should be rigorously examined and chosen. 
The principle of “one policy, one main target” should be emphasised. As Leonardo has 
summed it up “Simplicity is the highest form of sophistication.”  It is obvious that every 
policy instrument has positive and or negative side-effects. However, many times these 
side-effects are emphasised even more than the direct effects, when promoting a certain 
instrument. Even though side-effects might be of great importance from a policy 
acceptance perspective, the main focus should be on the core issue. In the case of 
renewable energy generation policy instruments, the most natural target would be to 
enhance new technology penetration. In the case of climate policy instruments, then 
again, the target of choice would be to cut greenhouse gases.  
Research conducted hitherto about climate policy and renewable policy instruments 
informs us that even though we have been locally taking steps towards carbon pricing, 
technology innovation boosting, and behavioural changes, there is still lot to do. The 
silver bullet of a single technology or policy leading us to the right track is yet to 
materialise. If the will were strong enough, raising the carbon price immensely could 
change the direction in climate policy issues as well as partly with renewable energy 
issues. However, this would end up having a bad influence on the economic and social 
fronts, and might ultimately destroy the willingness to further environmentally positive 
development. Hence to fight climate change it is important to make clever moves that 
drive us towards the right greenhouse gas prices, change human behaviour, and boost 
technological innovation. 
Regarding international climate policy instruments, this thesis has highlighted that there 
is evidence that at least serious thought and research should be given to other policy 
instruments than emission trade. This is based on the fact that there are academic 
arguments that price mechanisms, either carbon tax or hybrid tax-quotas, should be 
preferred over emission trade, as they hold several advantages compared to emission 
trade, not least because of the supposed superior efficiency under uncertainty. For this 
reason, before locking in emission trade as the number one choice, it might be valuable 
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to once again have a serious global discussion about the possible alternatives or major 
corrections for Kyoto instruments. This should not, however, postpone the important 
decisions that need to be made in the short run. Consequently, great effort should go into 
this matter as soon as possible. A good starting point for further study could be to begin 
analysing what factors caused the turnaround in the European Union, i.e. to drop carbon 
tax instruments, which were strongly considered prior to the Emission Trading Scheme, 
and are these factors still seen in the same way. In the case that conclusions lead to 
continuing with emission trade, there is evidence that by learning, adapting to new 
information from former experiences, and by correcting observed errors, emission trade 
can be made to function nicely as a climate policy. 
With technological change, then again, we need to address non-economic barriers, with 
transparent and predictable policy instruments that are transitional, system friendly, and 
at least partly tailored to suit different technologies. Because conventional energies still 
have the strongest foothold in business we should not underestimate their need to 
survive. We should be able to integrate them, as well as those responsible for 
transmission lines, to push for change or at least acknowledge there is a need for some 
change. In reality this is being done at this very minute. There is a strong wind of 
change blowing in Europe. In 2008, wind energy set a new record by being the number 
one newly-installed power source in Europe. Some 40 % of all new power installations 
were wind power. However, this raises the question of to what extent new power 
investments made in the EU are subsidised. Are the policy instruments boosting 
renewables so hard that new healthily (natural merit order) cost-efficient investments 
are not being made at all? It has been pointed out that strong short-term subsidies for 
renewables might cause highly inefficient development and create costly bottlenecks. 
This has happened in the United States Production Tax Scheme and partly also with the 
European wind energy boost. These may be highly interesting tasks for further 
investigation. This is not least because it should be strongly stressed that this energy 
generation change should happen without jeopardising energy supply security. 
As well as with climate policy, in the field of renewable energy generation the 
superiority of the instrument is greatly dependent on which criterion is emphasised the 
most. Furthermore, one has to remember that whichever instrument is chosen, the 
success of the instrument is mostly attributable to how well it is implemented. When 
comparing the feed-in tariff and green certificates, both instruments can be modified to 
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look like each other. And modified instruments may even function much better than the 
basic or fundamental ones. In addition, positive qualities of other support instruments 
could be connected to these instruments to make them function even better.  Because of 
the limits of the real world, one always has to make some compromises with the criteria 
and targets, since in the final analysis the consumer is the one paying the bill. Hence 
after the wise criteria weights are decided, whichever instrument or mix of instruments 
gives the smallest cost for the consumer should be selected.  
Here harmonisation should be seen as one possible answer. However, it is unlikely that 
we will witness a harmonised EU-wide support scheme in the foreseeable future. The 
possible implementation of a harmonised system will constitute a huge challenge, 
regardless of which support system is chosen.  Especially national green certificate 
schemes are highly differentiated and at this moment national schemes are seen to be 
diverging rather than becoming harmonised. However, when electricity markets move 
towards harmonisation, this subject might gather momentum once again. In the 
discussion of harmonisation, it would be important that price instruments such as feed-
in tariffs should be given serious consideration as well, not least because arguments 
against the feed-in tariff lack empirical evidence. In the long run anything is possible. 
For example, before the 1990s in Scandinavia few would have thought that an 
integrated electricity market would come into being, and now when it exists, it is hard to 
imagine things any other way.  
Climate policy and renewable energy generation policy instruments have strong effects 
on the way they each function. Climate policy and renewable energy generation policy 
instruments should not be seen as substitutes but as complementary to one another. 
Since they have strong interactions and effects on each other’s operation and targets, it 
is important that when either of them is implemented, these interactions are emphasised, 
examined, and understood. An interesting future study would be to have a wider 
examination of this area by comparing different modifications to the climate policy and 
renewable energy generation instruments, and by analysing the cross-effects in these 
cases. In particular the carbon tax and hybrid instruments for both climate policy and 
renewable energy generation should be further studied.  
Literature shows that renewable energy generation policy instruments clearly affect 
wholesale and retail electricity prices. However, more robust aggregate empirical 
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research should be conducted the issue. Furthermore, it would be important to connect 
the whole new-renewable portfolio, supply security, and distribution issues to these 
future studies as well. 
It would also be most interesting to see further studies about an integrated technology-
focused approach, as was presented in the last sub-chapter.  Attention should be paid to 
this in the debate on renewable energy technology policy instruments. Furthermore, this 
might be essential from the climate policy viewpoint in particular if some kind of 
backstop technology is sought. Equally, if a broad range of researchers and U.S. 
President Barack Obama are to be believed, this could have great impact on the 
economy as well: "We know the country that harnesses the power of clean, renewable 
energy will lead the 21st century” (Obama 2009).    
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Appendix 1: Current Country Groupings under UNCCC, EU 
and OECD  
 
Figure 26: Current Country Groupings under UNCCC (Höhne, Phyllipsen et al. 2005) 
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Appendix 2: Annex B Countries and their Kyoto Protocol 
Emission Targets  
 
Figure 27: Countries Included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and Their Emissions 
Targets (UNFCCC 2008b) 
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Appendix 3: Finnish Energy Taxes 
Table 14: Excise Tax Rates and Strategic Stockpile Fees in Finland (January 2008) 
(Ministry of the Environment 2008) 
Fuel Basic 
tax 
Surtax 
(*=carbon comp., €20/tonne 
CO2) 
Strategic stockpile 
fee  
Unleaded petrol, euro cents/litre 
- reformulated sulphur free 
- other grades 
 
 
57.24 
59.89 
 
 
* 4.78 
* 4.78 
 
 
0.68 
0.68 
Diesel oil, euro cents/litre 
- sulphur free 
- other grades 
 
30.67 
33.32 
 
* 5.38 
* 5.38 
 
0.35 
0.35 
Light fuel oil, euro cents/litre  
2.94 
 
* 5.41 
 
0.35  
Heavy fuel oil, euro cents/kg   
- 
 
* 6.42 0.28 
Jet fuel (kerosene), 
euro cents/litre 33.32 * 5.38 0.35 
Aviation gasoline, 
euro cents/litre 37.54 * 4.78 0.68 
Coal, Euros/tonne - * 49.32 1.18 
Peat - - - 
Natural gas, euros/MWh  - *  2.016 
(reduced rate) 
 
0.084 
Electricity, euro cents/kWh 
- rate I  (households, services, 
agric.) 
- rate II (mining, manufacturing) 
  
- 
- 
  
0.87 
 
0.25  
  
0.013 
 
0.013 
Pine oil (heating), 
euro cents/kg  6.70 - - 
 
*The environmental tax component (i.e. carbon surtax), based on the carbon content of 
fuels used for heating and transportation is, since January 2008, €20 per tonne of CO2 
(€75 per tonne of carbon).  
  
Appendix 4: The United States State Rules, Regulations and 
Policies for Renewable Energy  
Table 15: Summary of State Rules, Regulations and Policies Used in the United States 
for Renewable Energy (North Carolina State University 2008) 
 Rules, Regulations, & Policies for Renewable Energy
 State  PBF  Disclosure  RPS  Net  Metering  connection  Exten.  Analysis  Contract. License  Equip. Certific.  Access Laws  Constr. & Design 
 Alabama 
 Alaska 1-S  
 Arizona 1-S  1-S 3-U  1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  3-S 2-L  
 Arkansas 1-S  1-S  1-S  
 California 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  2-S 8-L  1-S 6-L  
 Colorado 1-L  1-S  1-S 1-L  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S 2-L  2-S 5-L  
 Connecticut 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Delaware 2-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Florida 1-S  1-U  1-S 7-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S 1-L  1-S  
 Georgia 1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Hawaii 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  2-S  
 Idaho 3-U  1-S  
 Illinois 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Indiana 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Iowa 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Kansas 1-S  1-L  
 Kentucky 1-S  1-S  
 Louisiana 1-S 1-L  1-S  
 Maine 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Maryland 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  3-S  
 Massachusetts 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  3-S  
 Michigan 1-S  1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  2-S 1-L  
 Minnesota 1-S  1-S  2-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Mississippi 
 Missouri 1-S 1-L  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Montana 1-S  1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  
 Nebraska 1-U  1-S  
 Nevada 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 New Hampshire 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-L  
 New Jersey 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  2-S  2-S  
 New Mexico 1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 New York 1-S  1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S 1-L  
 North Carolina 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S 1-L  1-S 7-L  
 North Dakota 1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Ohio 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Oklahoma 1-S  1-S  
 Oregon 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S 2-L  1-S 1-L  
 Pennsylvania 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Rhode Island 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 South Carolina 3-U  1-S  1-S  
 South Dakota 1-S  1-S  
 Tennessee 1-S  
 Texas 1-S  1-S 1-U 1-L 1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  2-S 6-L  
 Utah 1-S  1-S 3-U  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-L  
 Vermont 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Virginia 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  2-S  1-S 1-L  
 Washington 1-S  1-S  1-S 1-U  1-S  1-S  1-S 1-L  
 West Virginia 1-S  
 Wisconsin 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-L  1-S 1-L  1-S  
 Wyoming 1-S  1-S  
 District of Columbia 1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Palau 
 Guam 1-S  1-S  1-S  
 Puerto Rico 1-S  1-S  
 Virgin Islands 1-S  1-S  
 N. Mariana Islands 
 American Samoa 
 Totals  21  23  43  72  38  4  10  4  53  80 
F = Federal   S = State/Territory   L = Local   U = Utility  
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